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Abstract
The first chapter studies the dynamics of information acquisition and uncertainty
in a noisy rational expectations model. Investors choose to acquire most information
at times when uncertainty and risk premia are high; this choice feeds back and
endogenously reduces subsequent uncertainty. Within the model, uncertainty can
be measured directly from risk-neutral variance—analogous to the VIX index—so
this translates into the concrete prediction that risk-neutral variance mean-reverts
rapidly following spikes in volatility, as is observed empirically. The cyclicality of
information acquisition depends on the skewness of the underlying asset: if the
market is negatively skewed, market-level information acquisition is countercyclical.
Conversely, information acquisition and risk premia are high following good news
for positively skewed assets such as individual stocks, which gives rise to momentum
in the stock market.
In the second chapter, my co-author and I consider an economy populated by
investors with heterogeneous preferences and beliefs who receive non-pledgeable la-
bor incomes. We study the effects of collateral constraints that require investors to
maintain sufficient pledgeable capital to cover their liabilities. We show that these
constraints inflate stock prices, give rise to clusters of stock return volatilities, and
produce spikes and crashes in price-dividend ratios and volatilities. Furthermore,
the mere possibility of a crisis significantly decreases interest rates and increases
Sharpe ratios. The stock price has a large collateral premium over non-pledgeable
incomes. Asset prices are in closed form, and investors survive in the long run.
The third chapter studies information acquisition with a long-lived risky asset
that generates dividends in each period. The investors can either be informed or
uninformed, and the informed investors actively acquire information on the time-
varying dividend growth rate. Informed investors take short positions in the variance
swap to realize their informational advantage; the uninformed investor takes a long
position to hedge his risks. Serial correlation of returns is decreasing in informa-
tion acquisition of informed investors. Low uncertainty induces investors to acquire
less information and decreases the cross-sectional dispersion of beliefs in expected
returns.
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Chapter 1
Dynamic Information Acquisition
and Asset Prices
This paper studies the dynamics of information acquisition and uncertainty in a
noisy rational expectations model. Investors choose to acquire most information
at times when uncertainty and risk premia are high; this choice feeds back and
endogenously reduces subsequent uncertainty. Within the model, uncertainty can
be measured directly from risk-neutral variance—analogous to the VIX index—so
this translates into the concrete prediction that risk-neutral variance mean-reverts
rapidly following spikes in volatility, as is observed empirically. The cyclicality of
information acquisition depends on the skewness of the underlying asset: if the
market is negatively skewed, market-level information acquisition is countercyclical.
Conversely, information acquisition and risk premia are high following good news
for positively skewed assets such as individual stocks, which gives rise to momentum
in the stock market.
Keywords: Dynamic information acquisition, Uncertainty, Investor attention,
Risk-neutral variance
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1.1. Introduction
Investors acquire information on asset fundamentals when they trade in financial
markets. Information acquisition determines portfolio choices and thus affects asset
prices and the uncertainty that investors face. Conversely, uncertainty about asset
payoffs changes investors’ incentives to acquire information. This interplay between
information acquisition and uncertainty is central to understanding how asset prices
dynamically evolve. The literature on information acquisition and asset prices typi-
cally treats information acquisition as a one-off decision. This paper investigates the
endogenous dynamics of information acquisition and uncertainty in a noisy rational
expectations model.
Within this model, uncertainty can be measured directly from the risk-neutral
variance of the asset payoff, analogous to the volatility index VIX. In periods of
high uncertainty, investors acquire more information. This choice feeds back and
endogenously reduces subsequent uncertainty. As a result, the risk-neutral variance
mean reverts rapidly following spikes in volatility, in line with empirical evidence.
The cyclicality of information acquisition depends on the skewness of the asset pay-
off: market-level information acquisition is countercyclical because aggregate stock
market displays negative skewness; in contrast, firm-level information acquisition is
procyclical because individual stocks are positively skewed. Following good news
for individual stocks, information acquisition and risk premia are high, which gives
rise to momentum in the stock market.
I start by analyzing an economy with a single risky asset. Most findings and
predictions extend to a multiple-asset setup that I later consider. The economy is
populated by a continuum of ex-ante identical investors. Exogenous noisy supply
of the asset prevents the price from fully revealing the asset’s final payoff. Knowl-
edge about the payoff is gradually acquired over multiple time periods and comes to
investors in the form of a stream of private signals. The sources of private informa-
tion are different across investors, as in Hellwig (1980). I use investor attention to
represent the precision of the private signal. Information is costly to investors and
the cost is increasing and convex in attention.
In this paper, attention represents both the effort in gathering information and
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the amount of information acquired by investors in a given period.1 This study
focuses on the variation in investors’ attention levels over time rather than the static
allocation of attention across assets. Investors acquire less information in aggregate
when the market is devoid of profitable investment opportunities.
In this economy, investor attention is endogenously determined by the level of
uncertainty. I show that uncertainty is represented by the risk-neutral variance of
the asset’s terminal payoff, which quantifies the value (in utility terms) of a marginal
piece of information. It can therefore be directly measured, in principle, from option
prices, on similar lines to the construction of the volatility index, VIX.
Investors also learn from past prices. This generates rich dynamics as the public
information set, which consists of the entire history of asset prices, grows over time.
I show that four state variables summarize the public information and that these
state variables have a natural economic interpretation (discussed further in Section
3.2). The four state variables jointly define a system of PDEs, which characterize
equilibrium and can be solved numerically.
I allow the payoff of the risky asset to have an arbitrary distribution. Non-
normality is more plausible empirically. It gives rise to endogenously fluctuating
uncertainty and to comovement between asset prices and information acquisition. If
the payoff is normally distributed, uncertainty no longer varies across states because
the risk-neutral variance becomes a deterministic function of time.
A simple illustration of the dynamic interactions between information acquisi-
tion and asset prices is as follows. Suppose that the economy enters a period of
high uncertainty about asset payoffs. If the level of information acquisition does not
change, then the volatility of asset returns increases, and remains uniformly high
during the high-uncertainty period. Agents, however, respond to the high uncer-
tainty by acquiring more information. This causes asset returns to be even more
volatile in the early stages of the high-uncertainty period, as agents learn more in-
formation. Returns become less volatile in the later stages, as learning gradually
reduces payoff uncertainty. Thus, dynamic information acquisition causes return
volatility to vary more over time and to be less persistent.
1Attention in this paper represents information acquisition. I use attention and information
acquisition interchangeably throughout the paper.
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The model generates a rich set of implications supported by empirical observa-
tions. First, uncertainty is mean-reverting. High uncertainty induces investors to
devote more attention to the asset, in turn creating downward pressure on uncer-
tainty itself. As a result, the model explains why peaks in VIX are usually followed
by a rapid decline.2
Second, the expected return of an asset is increasing in investor attention. When
attention is high today, investors gather information at a rapid pace, leading to a
rapid reduction in uncertainty and the amount of risk that this asset entails. Then,
the asset becomes less risky tomorrow and enjoys a lower risk premium tomorrow
and beyond. This quick reduction in tomorrow’s risk premium compared to today’s
implies a high expected return for the asset.
A growing list of empirical evidence supports this prediction. Da, Engelberg and
Gao (2011) find that an increase in Google Search Volume Index predicts higher
stock prices in the next two weeks. Lou (2014) documents that increased advertis-
ing spending is associated with more attention and a rise in abnormal stock returns.
Lee and So (2017) show that abnormal analyst coverage predicts improvements in
firms’ fundamental performance. Because attention is determined by uncertainty,
the expected return of the asset is also positively associated with uncertainty. Mar-
tin (2017) find that the risk-neutral variance predicts the return of the market at
horizons from one month to one year.
Third, the cyclicality of information acquisition depends on the skewness of the
underlying asset. When the distribution of the payoff is right-skewed, investors are
more excited about potential upside gains. Therefore they devote more attention to
the asset when the price is high. Conversely, when the distribution is left-skewed,
investors are more worried about potential losses in the downside and acquire more
information when the price is low. Aggregate stock market displays negative skew-
ness and individual stocks display positive skewness (e.g., Bakshi, Kapadia and
Madan (2003); Albuquerque(2012)). Therefore, attention is procyclical for firm-
specific information and countercyclical for market-wide information. Hong, Lim
and Stein (2000) find that negative firm-specific news travels more slowly compared
2Martin (2017) find that the leading models including Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Bansal
and Yaron (2004), Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009), and Wachter (2013) cannot explain the
relatively low autocorrelation of VIX.
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to positive news. In contrast, Garcia (2013) documents that investors react more
strongly to business cycle news at times of recession.
I extend the model to multiple assets to explain momentum in the stock mar-
ket. Investors trade several individual stocks. Each stock’s payoff consists of a
common market component and a stock-specific (idiosyncratic) component. Infor-
mation acquisition on this idiosyncratic component determines the dynamics of the
stock’s excess return. Stocks that performed well relative to the market in the past
are likely to attract more attention and thus continue to generate higher expected
excess returns in the future.
Related Literature
This paper relates to an extensive literature on information acquisition in fi-
nancial markets, initiated by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Verrecchia (1982)
and developed by Holden and Subrahmanyam (2002), Mendelson and Tunca (2004),
Veldkamp(2006), Huang and Liu (2007), and Andrei and Hasler (2014), among oth-
ers. The model is in the spirit of Verrecchia (1982). It allows for a group of ex-ante
identical investors to learn from both prices and diverse private information.
Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2016) study how mutual fund
managers allocate attention across different assets and used the state of the busi-
ness cycle to predict information choices. Banerjee and Breon-Drish(2017) consider
a strategic trader who optimizes the time to acquire costly information about an
asset’s payoff in a Kyle(1985) framework. They show that equilibrium with smooth
trading and a pure acquisition strategy cannot exist when the market maker cannot
observe acquisition. In contrast to the above papers, where the incentive to ac-
quire information is affected by exogenous business cycle variations or public news,
investor attention in this model is determined by the endogenously generated risk-
neutral variances.
The explanation of momentum also differs from existing behavioral and rational
models. Hong and Stein (1999) explain underreaction and overreaction in asset mar-
kets through two groups of bounded rational investors and the assumption that in-
formation diffuses gradually across the population. Andrei and Cujean (2017) build
a rational-expectations model where investors use word-of-mouth communication
to acquire information and show that price exhibits momentum when information
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flows at an increasing rate. In both cases, momentum arises because signals first
observed by a small group of investors are subsequently released to a larger group.
This paper’s explanation relies on no such channel and is based on the interaction
between attention and risk premium.
This study also contributes to the analysis of rational expectations equilibrium
with general payoff distributions. Breon-Drish (2015) relax the normality assump-
tion and proved the existence of and characterized the equilibrium for a class of
models that nests the standard Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Hellwig (1980)
setups. Chabakauri, Yuan and Zachariadis (2017) analyze asset prices in both com-
plete and incomplete markets for realistic multi-asset economies with non-normal
payoff distributions. Previous studies employed static setups but this paper works
with a dynamic one.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model setup. Sec-
tion 3 solves investors’ portfolio and attention choice problems and characterizes
the equilibrium. Section 4 illustrates model predictions and empirical implications.
Section 5 extends the model to a multi-asset setup. Section 6 concludes.
1.2. Model
The economy features a single risky asset and a risk-free asset. It is populated by
a continuum of ex-ante identical investors who actively acquire private information
on the asset’s final payoff. To facilitate the exposition, I start with a discrete-time
economy with dates t = 0,∆t, 2∆t, . . . , T, and later take a continuous-time limit
when I characterize the equilibrium in Section 3.3 .
The main differences with a standard rational expectations model (e.g. Hell-
wig(1980)) are that information acquisition is endogenous and that the payoff of the
risky asset is not necessarily normally distributed.
Assets
The risk-free asset is the nume´raire in this economy, and its price is normalized to
1 for all dates. The interest rate is equal to 0 for all periods. The risky asset realizes
a liquidating payoff y at the final date T and pays no dividend between 0 and T−∆t.
The distribution of the terminal payoff G(y) is not restricted to normal distribution.
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I assume that the moment generating function of this distribution My(θ) exists
for any θ. This technical assumption guarantees the existence of investors’ asset
demands in equilibrium.
My(θ) = E[eθy] =
∫ ∞
−∞
eθydG(y) <∞, θ ∈ R. (1.1)
Assets are traded at dates t = 0,∆t, 2∆t, . . . , T −∆t. Let pt represent the price
of the risky asset at date t. For the period between date t and t + ∆t, the return
on the risky asset is pt+∆t − pt. Noisy supply of the risky asset prevents the price
from fully revealing the final payoff. I assume that this supply zt follows a random
walk and its increment zt+∆t − zt is normally distributed with a mean of zero and
variance of σ2z∆t:
zt+∆t − zt i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2z∆t). (1.2)
Information Acquisition
Investors start with no information about the payoff of the risky asset and grad-
ually acquire a stream of private signals about this payoff. Investor attention deter-
mines the precision of these signals.
Suppose investor i ∈ [0, 1] devotes attention ait to payoff y for the period between
date t and date t + ∆t. New private information for this investor in this period is
represented by a signal st+∆t, which communicates y perturbed by a normal noise
with precision ait∆t. Investors acquire different pieces of information and their
sources of private information are independent, as in Hellwig (1980) and Verrecchia
(1982). In this setup, the noises in signals are independent both across time and
across investors:
st+∆t = y + t+∆t, t+∆t ∼ N (0, (ait∆t)−1). (1.3)
New information comes at a cost that is increasing and convex in attention. This
cost takes the form of C(ait)∆t, where C(ait) is a function with continuous first and
second order derivatives. Marginal cost of attention C ′(ait) is increasing in ait.
Investors also learn from past prices. The price history up to the current date p0,
p∆t, . . . , pt represents all available public information. Investor i’s information set
at date t consists of her private signals s∆t, s2∆t, . . . sit and the public information
set. Investors are rational and use all available private and public information to
update their beliefs about the asset payoff and future investment opportunities.
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Preference and Investor Optimization
Investor i is endowed with initial wealth Wi0 at date 0. At date t, she allocates
her wealth Wit to θit units of risky asset and Wit− θitpt−C(ait)∆t units of the risk-
free asset. She also decides at this date how much attention ait to devote to payoff
y for the period between t and t + ∆t. It is worth noting that the corresponding
private signal si,t+∆t arrives at date t+∆t and could only be incorporated in investor
i’s portfolio choice from that date onwards.
All investors have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preference with the
risk aversion parameter A. They make portfolio and attention choices (θit, ait) to
maximize expected utility over the terminal wealth:
max
θit,ait
Eit [U(WiT )] , U(WiT ) = −e−AWiT , (1.4)
subject to the self-financing budget constraint, given by:
Wi,t+∆t = Wit + θit(pt+∆t − pt)− C(ait)∆t. (1.5)
Price and Market Clearing
Equilibrium price pt is determined by market clearing:∫ 1
i=0
θitdi = zt. (1.6)
where the left-hand side represents the aggregate demand of the risky asset and
the right-hand side, its supply.
Definition of Equilibrium
The definition of equilibrium is standard. Investors make the optimal portfolio
and attention choices and the market clears.
Definition 1. The equilibrium is a set of risky asset prices pt and portfolio and
attention policies (θit, ait) that solve the optimization problem (1.4) for each investor
and satisfies market clearing condition (1.6).
1.3. Equilibrium
In this model, the asset payoff y and the noisy supply of the risky asset z0, z∆t, . . . , zT−∆t
are exogenously given. Price pt, attention ait and uncertainty (measured by the risk-
neutral variance of the asset payoff) are endogenously determined.
13
I characterize the equilibrium in a three-step process. First, I solve investors’
portfolio and attention choices. Second, I use the market clearing condition to
express the asset demand in terms of the exogenous variables noisy supply and
asset payoff. The time series of asset demands is informationally equivalent to the
time series of past asset prices. I further define state variables that summarize the
information content of these time series. Third, I derive a system of equations for
the price and the risk-neutral variance.
1.3.1 Portfolio and Attention Choice
Let us first consider a suggestive three-period example. Suppose that the payoff
is realized at the final date T = 2 and assets are traded at dates t = 0, 1 with a
time interval of ∆t = 1. I solve investors’ optimization problems through backward
induction, starting from date 1 and then moving on to date 0.
Date 1 is the last trading opportunity before the realization of payoff. Any
information arriving after date 1 is worthless to investors because they could no
longer change their portfolios. As a result, investors will not devote any attention
to the payoff for the period between date 1 and date 2.
At date 1, from investor i’s perspective, y follows distribution G(y|p0, p1, si1).
She chooses θi1 to maximize expected utility:
max
θi1
∫
− exp (−Aθi1(y − p1)) dG(y|p0, p1, si1). (1.7)
Since investors are infinitely small and their sources of private information are
independent, the asset price does not depend on one particular investor’s signal.
This implies that conditional on payoff y, past prices p0, p1 are independent from
signal si1. To put it another way, the private signal is a source of information
independent of the price history. Applying Bayes theorem and noting that si1 is
normally distributed with mean y and precision ai0, the optimization problem (1.7)
is equivalent to:
max
θi1
∫
− exp (−Aθi1(y − p1)) · 1√
2pi(ai0)−1
exp
(
−ai02 (si1 − y)
2
)
dG(y|p0, p1).
(1.8)
The coefficient of y in the above expression is −Aθi1+ai0si1, a linear combination
of asset demand and private signal. Investors’ utility maximization problems are
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similar despite the differences in the private signals. Taking the first-order condition,
I find that −Aθi1 +ai0si1 is identical across investors. As a result, the asset demand
θi1 is additively separable in the signal, as in Breon-Drish (2015). It also contains
a common component θ1 that only depends on the price history. Lemma 1 reports
this asset demand. Proofs of all lemmas and propositions are given in the appendix.
Lemma 1. Asset demand θi1 is the sum of the attention weighted private signal and
a component θ1 that is common across investors and only depends on the prices p0
and p1:
θi1 = θ1(p0, p1) + A−1ai0si1. (1.9)
At date 0, investors do not possess any private signals and have identical asset
demands θi0 = θ0(p0) that only depend on price p0. They also decide on this date
how much information to acquire for each asset for the period between date 0 and
date 1. A higher level of attention improves portfolio choices at date 1 and increases
investors’ expected utility. Substituting in θi0 and θi1 and integrating over signal
si1, I find that:
Ei0[U(Wi2)] =Ei0 [− exp (−AWi0 − Aθi0(p1 − p0)− Aθi1(y − p1) + A · C(ai0))]
=Ei0
[ ∫
− exp
(
− AWi0 − Aθi0(p1 − p0)− A
(
θi1 − A−1ai0si1
)
(y − p1)
− ai02 (y
2 − p21) + A · C(ai0)
)
· 1√
2pi(ai0)−1
exp
(
−ai02 (si1 − p1)
2
)
dsi1
]
=Ei0
[
− exp
(
− AWi0 − Aθi0(p1 − p0)− Aθ1(y − p1)
− ai02 (y
2 − p21)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Value of Information
+ A · C(ai0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of Information
)]
. (1.10)
In the above expression, A ·C(ai0) represents the cost of information and ai0/2 ·
(y2 − p21) measures the expected gain in utility from a precision ai0 signal. Let
E∗(X) represent the risk-neutral expectation of a random variable X, defined by
E [U ′(Wi2)/E[U ′(Wi2)] ·X], where U ′(Wi2) is investor i’s marginal utility.
Differentiate date 0 expected utility Ei0[U(Wi2)] with respect to attention level
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ai0:
C ′(ai0) =
1
2A
−1 E
i
0 [U ′(Wi2)(y2 − p21)]
Ei0 [U ′(Wi2)]
= 12A
−1 E∗0
[
y2 − p21
]
= 12A
−1 E∗0 [Var∗1(y)] . (1.11)
Marginal cost C ′(ai0) is an increasing function of attention ai0. It is proportional
to the expectation of y2 − p21 under the risk-neutral measure. Since the interest
rate is zero, p1 is equal to E∗1[y], and thus E1[y2 − p21] is equal to the risk-neutral
variance of the payoff Var∗1(y). This risk-neutral variance measures the marginal
value of information for signal si1 and represents the uncertainty in payoff y from
the investors’ perspective. The precision of this signal needs to be decided one
period ahead, at date 0. As a result, attention ai0 is determined by the risk-neutral
expectation of next-period risk-neutral variance E∗0 [Var∗1(y)].
Investors are ex-ante identical and have the same prior belief and cost of infor-
mation. In equilibrium, they choose the same level of attention ai0. The risk-neutral
expectations and variances of the payoff computed from different investors’ marginal
utilities are identical.
The risk-neutral variance Var∗1(y) can be directly measured from option prices
on similar lines to the construction of the volatility index VIX3, thereby relating the
unobservable information acquisition to an empirically observable measure. Allow-
ing options to be traded will not change the equilibrium allocation. If there are no
exogenous supply, investors’ demand for options will also be identical at a level of
zero.
Equations (1.9) and (1.11) report investors’ portfolio and attention choices for
this particular example where T = 2 and ∆t = 1. Proposition 1 generalizes these
findings to arbitrary T and ∆t.
Proposition 1. Let vt represent the risk-neutral variance of the payoff at date t:
vt ≡ Var∗t [y] (1.12)
Attention ait is identical across investors and independent of private signals. Let at
3The risk-neutral variance in this paper more closely resembles volatility index SVIX introduced
by Martin(2017). SVIX differs from VIX if the setting is not conditionally log-normal.
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represent this identical level of attention. It is determined by the price history and
satisfies:
C ′(at) =
1
2A
−1 E∗t [vt+∆t] . (1.13)
Asset demand θit is the sum of attention weighted private signals and a component
θt that is common across investors and only depends on the price history up to the
current date p0, p∆t, . . . , pt:
θit = θt(p0, p∆t, . . . , pt) + A−1
t−∆t∑
u=0
ausi,u+∆t∆t, (1.14)
Additive separability of signals in asset demand functions is a feature of CARA
utility assumption and the normal noise signal structure given in equation (1.3).
Substituting the asset demands into the utility function and simplify, I find that
investors face the same attention optimization problem since they have the same risk-
aversion and cost of information. Therefore, attention and the risk-neutral variance
in equilibrium are identical across investors and independent of the realization of
private signals.
Equation (1.13) establishes a link between investor attention and the risk-neutral
variance of the payoff. The right-hand side of this equation represents the marginal
value of an additional piece of information to investors. The left-hand side is the
marginal cost of information, which is increasing in attention because of the con-
vexity of the cost function C(at). When the risk-neutral variance vt+∆t is expected
to be high, investors are willing to devote more attention to the asset payoff. Intu-
itively, people acquire more information when they are uncertain about the state of
the world.
This risk-neutral variance vt resembles the volatility index VIX in that they both
measure investors’ perceptions of uncertainty in the asset. However, here investors
are interested in the variation of the final payoff, as opposed to that of a one-period
return defined by the ratio of next period price pt+∆t to the current price pt. Falling
asset price is usually accompanied by an upward spike in the VIX index because of
the leverage effect. This is not necessarily true for the risk-neutral variance of the
terminal payoff. Its correlation with the asset price changes with the skewness and
support of the payoff distribution and will be further analyzed in Section 4.3.
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1.3.2 Market Clearing and State Variables
From market clearing, the aggregate demand for the asset is equal to its supply.
Integrate θit in (1.14) over investors. By the law of large numbers, noises in private
signals are canceled out and the average of siu is exactly equal to y
∫ 1
0
θt + A−1 t−∆t∑
u=0
ausi,u+∆t∆t
 di = θt + A−1
t−∆t∑
u=0
au∆t
 y = zt. (1.15)
Investors are infinitely small and the impact of their private signals on the prices
is canceled out by the law of large numbers. It is sufficient to characterize the
equilibrium using the information publicly available to all investors, which is the
history of prices up to the current date p0, p∆t, . . . , pt.
The demand curve is downward sloping in this model: the common component
of asset demand θt, implicitly defined in (1.14), is strictly decreasing in the current
price pt. The mapping from (p0, p∆t, . . . , pt) to (θ0, θ∆t, . . . , θt) is one-to-one.4 In
other words, the time series θ0, θ∆t,. . . , θt is informationally equivalent to the price
history.
At date t + ∆t, the sequence θ0, θ∆t,. . . , θt+∆t represents all publicly available
information. Let us consider A(at∆t)−1(θt+∆t − θt)
A(at∆t)−1(θt+∆t − θt) = y + A(at∆t)−1(zt+∆t − zt). (1.16)
It is a public signal that communicates payoff perturbed by a normal noise with
precision A−2σ−2z a2t∆t. This signal represents new public information that arrives
at date t + ∆t. The noise in this signal is proportional to the increment in asset
supply zt+∆t−zt and is independent of all previous public signals because the supply
follows a random walk.
State Variables
One difficulty involved in solving this model is that the dimension of state space
grows as time increases. θt itself is not Markovian. Both p0, p∆t, . . . , pt and θ0,
θ∆t,. . . , θt have dimensions equal to the number of trading dates. Fortunately, the
4I prove this result by mathematical induction. At the starting date, p0 → θ0 is injective because
θ0(p0) is strictly decreasing. Suppose that for date t−∆t, each set of asset prices (p0, p∆t, . . . , pt−∆t)
correspond to only one set of demands (θ0, θ∆t, . . . , θt−∆t). Fixing p0, p∆t, . . . , pt−∆t, each pt
corresponds to only one θt because θt(. . . , pt) is strictly decreasing in pt. This completes the
mathematical induction.
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information content of these sequences can be summarized into 4 state variables,
including the common component of asset demand θt and other 3 state variables
that I define below.
Definition 2. Expected payoff mt, public information precision χt and private
information precision τt are defined by:
mt ≡ E [y|p0, p∆t, . . . , pt] . (1.17)
χt ≡
t−∆t∑
u=0
A−2σ−2z a
2
u∆t. (1.18)
τt ≡
t−∆t∑
u=0
au∆t. (1.19)
Investors use the public signals from (1.16) to update their beliefs about the final
payoff. Public information is represented by two state variables, expected payoff mt
and public information precision χt. Expected payoff is the expected value of y
using only public signals, ignoring all private signals. Public information precision
is defined by the aggregate precision of all public signals from date 0 to date t. It
represents the aggregate amount of information that is publicly available to investors.
Analogously, I use τt to denote the aggregate precision of private signals. It
measures the amount of information privately acquired by investors from date 0 to
date t. By substituting the definition of τt (1.19) into the market clearing equation
(1.15), I show that the common component of asset demand θt can be expressed as
a linear combination of the terminal payoff and the noisy supply:
θt = zt − A−1τty. (1.20)
The price of and the risk-neutral variance of the terminal payoff can be expressed
as functions of these 4 state variables. Price is decreasing in asset demand θt and
increasing in mt, which represents investors’ expectation of the terminal payoff from
public information. The risk-neutral variance vt is decreasing in information preci-
sions χt and τt, because investors feel less uncertain about the asset payoff if they
are more informed.
State Variable Dynamics
Information about the final payoff is gradually incorporated into private and
public signals. The amount of public and private information increases and investors
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update their beliefs about the expected payoff. Lemma 2 summarizes how these state
variables evolve from date t to t+ ∆t.
Lemma 2. The dynamics of state variables θt, mt, χt and τt are given by:
θt+∆t = θt − A−1aty∆t+ zt+∆t − zt, (1.21)
mt+∆t = mt + A−2σ−2z a2tht(y −mt)∆t− A−1σ−2z atht(zt+∆t − zt) + o(∆t), (1.22)
χt+∆t = χt + A−2σ2za2t∆t, (1.23)
τt+∆t = τt + at∆t. (1.24)
where
ht = Var [y|p0, p∆t, . . . , pt] (1.25)
is a deterministic function of mt and χt and represents the variance of y in the
objective physical measure after observing public information p0, p∆t, . . . , pt.
The aggregate amount of private information is increasing at a speed of attention,
as expressed in the equation (1.24). The amount of public information is growing at
a speed proportional to the square of attention, which is also the rate at which the
expected payoff mt drifts towards the direction of its true value y. A higher level of
attention indicates that information is both acquired and disseminated at a quicker
pace.
1.3.3 Equations for Price and Risk-neutral Variance
In the following section, I derive a system of recursive equations for price pt and the
risk-neutral variance vt. Because the interest rate is zero, the price is a martingale
under the risk-neutral measure:
pt = E∗t (pt+∆t). (1.26)
Using the law of total variance, I decompose vt as the sum of expected next-
period variance and variance of next-period expectation:
vt = Var∗t (y) = E∗t [Var∗t+∆t(y)] + Var∗t [E∗t+∆t(y)]
= E∗t [vt+∆t] + Var∗t (pt+∆t). (1.27)
The stochastic discount factor from date t to date T is required to change the
probability measure from the risk-neutral one to the objective one. Lemma 3 spec-
ifies this stochastic discount factor ξt,T .
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Lemma 3. Let ξit,T denote the ratio of investor i’s marginal utility U ′(WiT ) and its
date t conditional expectation Eit[U ′(WiT )]:
ξit,T =
U ′(WiT )
Eit[U ′(WiT )]
(1.28)
Let ξt,T represent the average of ξit,T across investors. It is a valid SDF and is given
by:
ξt,T = E
[
ξit,T |p0, p∆t, . . . , pT−∆t, y
]
(1.29)
= exp
− T−∆t∑
u=t
[
Aθu(pu+∆t − pu) + 12τu(p
2
u+∆t − p2u)− A · C(au)∆t
]
− ft
 ,
(1.30)
where ft is a normalizing variable defined by:
ft = lnEt
exp
− T−∆t∑
u=t
[
Aθu(pu+∆t − pu) + 12τu(p
2
u+∆t − p2u)− A · C(au)∆t
] .
(1.31)
such that Et[ξt,T ] = 1.
ft is an auxiliary variable that helps form a system of equations involving the
price and the risk-neutral variance. Substituting (1.29) into (1.27) and (1.26), use
law of iterated expectations, and simplify, I arrive at the following recurrence equa-
tions for pt and vt:
pt = Et
[
exp
(
−Aθt(pt+∆t − pt)− 12τt(p
2
t+∆t − p2t ) + A · C(at)∆t− ft + ft+∆t
)
pt+∆t
]
,
vt = Et
[
exp
(
−Aθt(pt+∆t − pt)− 12τt(p
2
t+∆t − p2t ) + A · C(at)∆t− ft + ft+∆t
)
vt+∆t
]
+ Var∗t (pt+∆t). (1.32)
Definition (1.31) can also be rewritten recursively:
exp(ft) = Et
[
exp
(
−Aθt(pt+∆t − pt)− 12τt(p
2
t+∆t − p2t ) + A · C(at)∆t+ ft+∆t
)]
.
(1.33)
Equilibrium in the Continuous-time Limit
A continuous-time limit approach confers several advantages over approaching
(1.32) and (1.33) directly in the discrete-time setup. It is challenging to express
E∗t [vt+∆t] in (1.13) as a function of date t state variables. This issue is sidestepped
by taking the limit ∆t→ 0, in which case E∗t [vt+∆t]→ vt.
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In addition, these integral equations simplify to partial differential equations in
continuous time. Let µpt and σpt denote the instantaneous drift and volatility of
price pt in the continuous-time limit:
µpt = lim∆t→0
Et[pt+∆t − pt]
∆t , σ
2
pt = lim∆t→0
Et[(pt+∆t − pt)2]
∆t . (1.34)
Applying the Taylor series expansion to p(t, θt,mt, χt, τt) and substituting in the
state variable dynamics from Lemma 1, drift µpt and volatility σpt are given by:
µpt =
∂p
∂t
− ∂p
∂θ
A−1atmt +
∂p
∂χ
A−2σ−2z a
2
t +
∂p
∂τ
at +
1
2
∂2p
∂θ2
σ2z ,
+ 12
∂2p
∂m2
(
A−1σ−1z atht
)2 − ∂2p
∂θ∂m
A−1atht (1.35)
σpt =
∂p
∂m
A−1σ−1z atht −
∂p
∂θ
σz. (1.36)
µvt, σvt, µft and σft, the drifts and volatilities of variables vt and ft, are similarly
defined by replacing p with v or f in (1.34) and (1.36).
Proposition 2 describes this system of partial differential equations. The terminal
conditions are reported in the appendix.
Proposition 2. Price, risk-neutral variance, and the normalizing variable in stochas-
tic discount factor, as functions of time and state variables θt, mt, χt and τt satisfy:
µpt + σptσft − (Aθt + τtpt)σ2pt = 0, (1.37)
µvt + σvtσft − (Aθt + τtpt)σvtσpt + σ2pt = 0, (1.38)
µft +
1
2(σft)
2 − 12(Aθt + τtpt)
2σ2pt + A · C(at) = 0. (1.39)
where attention is implicitly determined by:
C ′(at) =
1
2A
−1vt. (1.40)
This system of equations is solved numerically by the finite-difference method
on a five-dimensional grid of time t and four state variables θt, mt, χt, and τt. A
noteworthy by-product of this analysis is the drift in price dynamics µpt, which
also represents the instantaneous expected return Et[dpt]/dt. The solution to price,
risk-neutral variance, attention, and expected return facilitates the analysis of this
equilibrium.
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1.4. Asset Pricing Implications
Different realizations of the exogenous noisy supply of the asset leads to different
endogenous dynamics of price, uncertainty and information acquisition. The price
is decreasing in the noisy supply of the asset. When the payoff distribution is not
normal, uncertainty measured by the risk-neutral variance also varies with the noisy
supply. If uncertainty is high (compared to other realizations of exogenous shocks),
investors acquire more information.
In this section, I investigate how uncertainty, expected return, and past prices
are endogenously related through investor attention. Section 4.1 studies the inter-
play between information acquisition and uncertainty. In Section 4.2, I explore the
link between information acquisition and the future expected return. Section 4.3
relates cyclicality of attention to skewness in the payoff distribution. Findings and
predictions in this section are also valid if multiple assets are traded.
1.4.1 Endogenous Uncertainty Dynamics
Suppose that the economy enters a period of high uncertainty about the asset payoff.
High uncertainty induces investors to acquire more information. This causes asset
returns to be even more volatile in the early stages of the high-uncertainty period,
as agents learn more information. Returns become less volatile in the later stages,
as learning gradually reduces payoff uncertainty.
Proposition 1 establishes the link between uncertainty and information acqui-
sition. The risk-neutral variance of the final payoff vt measures uncertainty and
represents the marginal value of an additional piece of information to investors.
With a high level of uncertainty, information becomes valuable, and investors accu-
mulate it at a quicker pace through a higher level of attention at. The instantaneous
volatility of the asset return σpt also rises as a result.
∂σpt
∂at
= ∂p
∂m
A−1σ−1z > 0 (1.41)
When investors acquire more precise private signals, they also make the asset
demand and thus the asset price more informative with regard to the final payoff,
which increases the amount of public information available to investors. The dy-
namics of private and public information precisions in the continuous-time limit are
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as follows:
τ ′t = at, χ′t = A−2σ2za2t . (1.42)
Private information accumulates at the speed of attention, and public informa-
tion accumulates at a speed proportional to the square of attention. Information
reduces investors’ perception of uncertainty in the asset. A higher level of attention
indicates that this reduction of uncertainty happens more quickly. Let µ∗vt denote
the instantaneous drift of vt in the risk-neutral measure:
µ∗vt = lim∆t→0
E∗t [vt+∆t − vt]
∆t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected reduction of uncertainty
. (1.43)
Proposition 3 reports the expression of this expected change in risk-neutral vari-
ance.
Proposition 3. The risk-neutral drift of risk-neutral variance vt is given by:
µ∗vt = −
(
∂p
∂θ
)2
σ2z + 2
∂p
∂θ
∂p
∂m
A−1atht −
(
∂p
∂m
)2
A−2σ2za
2
th
2
t , (1.44)
It is decreasing in investor attention:
∂µ∗vt
∂at
< 0. (1.45)
The last term in equation (1.44) represents the contribution of public information
to the reduction of uncertainty. It is decreasing in attention and contains A−2σ2za2t ,
the speed at which public information disseminates. This effect is prominent at high
levels of uncertainty because it is proportional to attention squared. The arrival of
public information updates investors’ belief and makes the distribution of the final
payoff more concentrated around its mean, which contributes to the decline of the
risk-neutral variance vt.
The second term in (1.44) is also a decreasing function of attention. A higher
expected payoff mt shifts the risk-neutral distribution of the final payoff to the right.
As a result, the current price pt is increasing in mt. Similarly, the price is decreasing
in the common component of asset demand θt:
∂p
∂m
> 0, ∂p
∂θ
< 0. (1.46)
The drift of uncertainty in the objective physical measure µvt differs from µ∗vt by
the variance risk premium. Depending on the shape and skewness of the risk-neutral
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Figure 1.1: Sample Paths of the Risk-Neutral Variance
The figure demonstrates 2 sample paths of the risk-neutral variance vt simulated from the
model. The parameters are set as follows: T = 3, y ∼ Lognormal(0, σ2y) where σy = 0.702,
z0 = 5, σz = 0.15, A = 0.2, and C(ait) = 5(ait)2.
distribution, it either reinforces or diminishes the positive correlation between atten-
tion and the reduction in uncertainty. However, for a realistic choice of parameters
this channel is unlikely to overtake the direct effect of information dissemination
analyzed above.
When uncertainty is high, investor attention increases and reduction in uncer-
tainty happens more quickly. An upward spike of the risk-neutral variance is usually
followed by a rapid reduction. As uncertainty decreases, the return of the asset also
becomes less volatile. This is consistent with the empirical observation that peaks in
VIX are usually followed by a rapid decline.5 Figure 1 illustrates 2 sample paths of
the risk-neutral variance. The risk-neutral variance in the solid line initially shoots
up but soon falls below the dashed line because of intensive information acquisition.
The model is not stationary and the risk-neutral variance always have a tendency
to decline.
The dynamics of uncertainty and risk-neutral variance also have a profound
5Harvey and Whaley (1992) demonstrate that changes in implied volatilities are negatively
predicted by the lagged changes and that the explanatory power is higher in the sample that
includes the crash. Mencia and Sentana (2013) suggest that during the 2008-2009 crisis volatility
exhibits more mean reversion than that in the past.
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impact on the dynamics of information acquisition. Each piece of information di-
minishes the value of the following piece. High attention levels make subsequent
information acquisition less profitable and are therefore unlikely to be sustained.
1.4.2 Expected Return and Attention
The expected return of an asset is positively associated with investor attention.
When attention is high today, investors acquire information at a rapid pace, leading
to a rapid reduction in uncertainty. Then, the asset becomes less risky tomorrow
and enjoys a lower risk premium tomorrow and beyond. This quick reduction in
tomorrow’s risk premium compared to today’s corresponds to a high expected return
for the asset.
The asset’s expected payoff is mt. The expectation of payoff in the risk-neutral
measure is the price pt. Their difference mt − pt is this asset’s risk premium. In-
vestors’ acquisition and dissemination of information make the asset less risky and
shrink its risk premium towards zero.
Let us move back to the discrete-time setup for a moment. The risk premium
at date t + ∆t is mt+∆t − pt+∆t. Because the expected payoff is a martingale mt =
Et[mt+∆t], the expected return from date t to t+∆t is equal to the expected reduction
of risk premium in the same period:
Et[pt+∆t − pt] = Et
[
(mt − pt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
date t risk premium
− (mt+∆t − pt+∆t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
date t+ ∆t risk premium
]
. (1.47)
When the asset is trading at a price pt below the expected payoff mt, its risk
premium is positive and shrinks towards zero from above. High attention implies a
quick reduction in risk premium and hence a high expected return. Proposition 4
reports the expected return in the continuous-time limit and relates it to attention
and risk premium.
Proposition 4. The instantaneous expected return of the asset µpt is given by:
µpt =
 (mt − pt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk premium
A−1σ−1z at + σz E∗t
[∫ T
t
∂2pu
∂θ2u
Aσ2zdu
]
+ A−1σ−1z htat E∗t
[∫ T
t
χu
χt
∂2pu
∂m2u
auhu
] 
·
(
∂pt
∂mt
A−1σ−1z htat + (−
∂pt
∂θt
σz)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
. (1.48)
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If the risk premium mt− pt is greater than the second-order derivatives terms in the
above expression, the expected return µpt is increasing in attention at.
The expected return is positively associated with investor attention as long as
the risk premium is not exceptionally low, or the curvature of asset demand is
not exceptionally negative. The second-order derivatives ∂2pu/∂θ2u and ∂2pu/∂m2u
appear because of the non-normality in the payoff distribution.
This prediction provides an alternative explanation to a list of well-documented
empirical regularities. Da, Engelberg and Gao (2011) use Google Search Volume
Index to measure investor attention directly. They find that an increase in search
frequency predicts higher stock prices in the following two weeks. Lou (2014) docu-
ments that advertising can attract investor attention and impact stock returns in the
short run: an increase in advertising spending is accompanied by a contemporaneous
rise in retail buying and higher abnormal stock returns. Lee and So (2017) show that
analyst coverage predicts stock return: firms with abnormally high analyst coverage
subsequently outperform firms with abnormally low coverage by approximately 80
basis points per month.
The above analysis suggests that investor attention predicts the asset return.
Because attention is determined by uncertainty, the model also implies that the
risk-neutral variance vt positively forecasts the expected return at the same date. vt
is also useful at predicting µp,t+u, the expected return at a future date t+ u, which
changes with attention and uncertainty at that date. Since information is acquired
and diffused only gradually through the investing public, date t + u risk-neutral
variance vt+u is positively correlated to the date t measure. This translates into a
correlation between vt and µp,t+u, illustrated in the right panel of Figure 2. This
prediction is also supported by empirical evidence. Martin (2017) find that the risk-
neutral variance predicts the return of the market at horizons from one month to
one year.
However, this correlation becomes weaker as the time interval u increases, be-
cause the autocorrelation of the risk-neutral variance decreases over time. High
uncertainty implies increased attention and information acquisition, which in turn
drives down uncertainty. Consequently, the correlation between vt and vt+u de-
creases as the time interval u increases from 1 month to 24 months, as is shown in
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the left panel of Figure 2.
1.4.3 Cyclicality of Information Acquisition
The cyclicality of investor attention depends on the skewness of the payoff distribu-
tion. When the distribution is positively skewed and bounded from below, investors
are more excited about potential upside gains. Therefore they acquire more in-
formation when the price is high. Conversely, when the distribution is negatively
skewed, investors are more worried about potential losses in the downside. They
devote more attention to the asset when the price is low.
First, let us consider an individual stock where the payoff distribution G(y)
has a lower bound and a fat right tail. At date t, investors observe the entire
price history up to this date and use this information to update their beliefs about
the risk-neutral distribution of payoff. Figure 3 demonstrates how the risk-neutral
distribution depends on price in this example.
A low price implies that this probability distribution is concentrated near the
lower bound. Conversely, a high price indicates that the payoff is more likely to be
in a region with high variation and, thus, more uncertain from the investors’ per-
spective. This establishes a positive correlation between price and the risk-neutral
variance. Therefore, attention is procyclical, suggesting that more information is
acquired and disseminated in good times than in bad times.
Now, consider a second example where the asset is a bond that pays 0 if it defaults
and 1 if not. The risk-neutral distribution of payoff is completely characterized by
the bond price pt, which represents the risk-neutral probability that it does not
default. The risk-neutral variance is:
vt = E∗t [(y − pt)2] = pt(1− pt). (1.49)
If the risk-neutral probability of default does not exceed 1/2, pt is greater than
1/2 and in this region, the risk-neutral variance is decreasing in price. When the
bond is trading at a price near its face value 1, investors do not acquire much
information because the value of an additional signal is close to zero. Any negative
news that leads to a decline in price increases the value of information and attracts
more attention. Thus information acquisition is countercyclical when pt ∈ (1/2, 1).
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For general payoff distributions, the cyclicality of information acquisition is de-
termined by ∂v/∂m, the sensitivity of the risk-neutral variance to the expected
payoff. Attention is determined by uncertainty and the price is increasing in the
expected payoff mt. Therefore, attention is procyclical if ∂v/∂m is positive and
countercyclical if it is negative. Proposition 5 discusses how uncertainty moves in
line with the price at date T −∆t, the last trading date before the asset realizes its
payoff.
Proposition 5. At date T−∆t, uncertainty is increasing in price if the risk-neutral
distribution is positively skewed. The sensitivity of the risk-neutral variance vt to
the expected payoff mt is given by:
∂v
∂m
= 1
hT−∆t
E∗T−∆t
[
(y − pT−∆t)3
]
. (1.50)
∂v/∂m has the same sign as the risk-neutral skewness of the payoff. If the
distribution is right-skewed, uncertainty is increasing in the expected payoff and so
is the price. The converse is true if the distribution is left-skewed. Unfortunately,
∂v/∂m does not admit a simple expression at dates other than T−∆t. It is not only
influenced by the risk-neutral skewness but also relies on the interaction between
distribution and other state variables.
The model predicts that information acquisition is procyclical for firm-specific
information and countercyclical for market-wide information, consistent with em-
pirical evidence. Idiosyncratic components of stock returns and payoffs tend to
be right-skewed6, implying that stock-specific information is more valuable in good
times. Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) find that negative firm-specific information dif-
fuses more slowly compared to positive news. The market return, on the contrary,
is left-skewed. Garcia (2013) finds that in times of hardship investors react strongly
to business cycle news, while in good times the predictability of media content on
Dow Jones Industrial Average is much weaker.
6Kothari and Warner(1997) document that abnormal returns estimated using four models (mar-
ket model, market-adjusted model, capital asset pricing model, and Fama French three-factor
model) are all positively skewed.
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1.5. Extension
I consider a simple multi-asset extension of the model that explains momentum in
the stock market. In this economy, a risk-free asset, several individual stocks, and
the market are traded. Each individual stock’s final payoff is the sum of a stock-
specific idiosyncratic component and a market component identical for all stocks.
The focus of analysis in this section is information acquisition with respect to this
idiosyncratic component of the payoff. It determines the return of a stock in excess
of the market and explains why it is positively autocorrelated.
1.5.1 Setup
Investors trade 1 risk-free asset, n individual stocks, and 1 asset representing the
market. Stock j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} has final payoff y0 + yj, which consists of a market
component y0 and a stock-specific idiosyncratic component yj that is independent
of the market and across stocks. The market payoff itself is also traded and there is
a market asset that pays y0 at the final date.
Payoffs y0 and yj are unobservable to investors at the start and they are dis-
tributed with cumulative distribution functions G0(y0) and Gi(yj). The distribution
of stock-specific component yj, Gj(yj), is bounded from below and positively skewed.
A number of factors contribute to this asymmetry in the stock payoff. Limited li-
ability for equity holders indicates that the investments in stocks have bounded
downside risk but some potential for a large upside gain. Besides, the firm may
possess a real option to expand the business when it is doing well which further
boosts the upside potential.
Let p0t denote the date t price of the market asset and pjt denote the price of
a claim that pays yj at the final date. The price of individual stock j which pays
y0 + yj is p0t + pjt. pjt represents the price of the idiosyncratic payoff component,
and it is equal to the difference in price between stock j and the market asset. For
the period between date t and t+ ∆t, the return of the market asset is p0,t+∆t − p0t
and the return of stock j in excess of the market is:
[(p0,t+∆t + pj,t+∆t)− (p0t + pjt)]− [p0,t+∆t − p0t] = pj,t+∆t − pjt. (1.51)
Let zjt represent the supply of stock j and z0t represent the aggregate supply of all
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risky assets, including the market asset and all n individual stocks. Since the payoff
of any risky asset contains a market payoff component, z0t also represents the supply
of this component y0 in the economy. Similar to Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh
and Veldkamp (2016), increments in the supplies of payoff components z0,t+∆t − z0t
and zj,t+∆t − zjt are assumed to be independent. As in the baseline model, they
both follow random walks and have variances σ2z0∆t and σ2zj∆t respectively:
z0,t+∆t − z0t i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2z0∆t),
zj,t+∆t − zjt i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2zj∆t), j = 1, 2, . . . , n. (1.52)
The cost of information acquisition is additive across different payoffs. Let ajit
represent investor i’s attention towards payoff yj. The aggregate cost of informa-
tion for investor j from date t to date t + ∆t is the sum of that for each payoff∑n
j=0C(a
j
it)∆t. Contrary to standard rational inattention models (e.g., Sims (2003)),
which impose a fixed capacity upper bound for the aggregate attention on all assets,
I assume that information acquisition is independent across payoffs and different
assets do not compete for investor attention. Increased attention on one payoff does
not raise the cost of information for other payoffs. Investors acquire less information
in aggregate when the market is devoid of profitable investment opportunities.
The above assumptions about asset supply and information acquisition simplify
the analysis of equilibrium. The portfolio choice for different payoffs can be solved
separately because payoffs y0, y1, . . . , yn are independent and investors have CARA
preference. Since the cost of information is additive across assets, attention choice
can also be solved separately. The characterization of equilibrium is therefore iden-
tical to the single asset baseline model, with θjt, mjt, χjt and τjt replacing θt, mt,
χt and τt as state variables.
1.5.2 Analysis of Equilibrium
I consider a numerical example with parameters provided in Table 1.7 The final
payoff is realized in T = 3 years. For simplicity, I assume the idiosyncratic payoff
components for different stocks have the same distribution yj ∼ Lognormal(0, σ2y),
7The analysis here focuses on idiosyncratic payoffs of individual stocks and does not extend to
the market. In section 5.2, j to refers one of 1, 2, . . . , n and does not include 0.
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Table 1.1: Parameter Values
The table lists values assigned to the length of investment T ; the distribu-
tion of idiosyncratic payoff Gj(yj) and parameter σy; the starting supply
of individual stock zj0; the volatility of stock supply σzj ; the absolute risk
aversion parameter A; and the cost of information C(ajit).
T Gj(yj) σy zj0 σzj A C(ajit)
3 Lognormal(0, σ2y) 0.702 5 0.15 0.2 5(a
j
it)2
where σy is set at 0.702 to match the skewness of 36-month buy-and-hold CAPM
abnormal return at a level of 2.90. 8
The starting supply of individual stock is zj0 = 5, and the volatility of stock
supply is set at σzj = 0.15, such that daily trading volume is approximately 0.2
percent of the outstanding shares. The absolute risk aversion is A = 0.2, which
corresponds to relative risk aversion around 10 at the initial date for an investor with
wealth equal to 10 times its investment in one stock. Last, the cost of information
is assumed to be a quadratic function of attention C(ajit) = 5(a
j
it)2.
Attention and Past Excess Return
For the period between date 0 and date t, the return of stock j in excess of the
market is pjt − pj0. In equilibrium this return is determined by state variables θjt,
mjt, χjt and τjt. In particular, it is increasing in the expected payoff mjt, which
summarizes public information about this stock’s idiosyncratic payoff. Attention to
this stock-specific payoff tends to be procyclical because its distribution is bounded
from below and skewed to the right.
In this numerical example, the risk-neutral variance of idiosyncratic payoff vjt is
indeed increasing in its expected value. Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between
vjt and mjt at date t = 1, one year after the starting date. The other 3 state variables
θjt, χjt and τjt are fixed at the median of their distributions.
Excess return and risk-neutral variance are both increasing in the expected pay-
off. This contributes to a positive correlation between a stock’s past performance
8Kothari and Warner (1997) find that 36-month buy-and-hold abnormal return with respect to
CAPM has a skewness of 2.90. Other moments including kurtosis and quartiles are also similar to
those implied by a log-normal distribution.
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in excess of the market and investors’ current attention to its idiosyncratic payoff.
High excess return in the past indicates that this payoff is likely to be in a range
with high variation, and thus it is more valuable for investors to focus on this piece
of information. Consider a group of stocks with similar payoff distributions. This
model predicts that stocks that performed well relative to the cross-sectional average
are likely to attract more attention. The left panel of Figure 5 shows a scatter plot
for excess return in the first year pj1 − pj0 and attention at the end of the first year
for 20, 000 simulated time-series.
Expected Excess Return and Attention
In the baseline model, Section 4.2 establishes that the expected return is increas-
ing in attention if the asset enjoys a positive risk premium. Similar results hold true
for the multi-asset case. High attention to the stock’s idiosyncratic payoff implies a
quick reduction in the risk-premium concerning this payoff, which in turn contributes
to high excess return for the stock. The right panel of Figure 5 demonstrates the
end of the first year attention at and instantaneous expected excess return µjpt for
simulated data.
Serial Correlation of Excess Return
Investor attention to a stock is positively correlated with its past excess return.
The expected excess return of this stock in the future increases with attention.
Combining these two results, I find that excess return of a stock exhibits positive
autocorrelation because of endogenous information acquisition.
The average return of a sufficiently large group of individual stocks approximates
that of the market. Therefore, a stock’s excess return is high if and only if it
performed well relative to others. Past winners in this group tend to attract more
attention and thus continue to generate higher excess returns. This time-series result
explains the cross-sectional momentum.
This model also predicts that this momentum effect weakens over time. The
autocorrelation of excess return decreases with the horizon. Past excess return
pjt− pj0 affects its future expectation through the risk-neutral variance vjt. As time
interval u increases, the connection between vjt and vj,t+u weakens and the serial
correlation of excess return decreases. Let βjt+u denote the regression coefficient of
instantaneous expected return µjpt on pjt − pj0. Figure 6 reports the estimated βjt+u
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for u from 1 to 24 month using simulated time-series. β̂jt+u exhibits a decreasing
pattern.
1.6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I developed a noisy rational expectations model with endogenous in-
formation acquisition and used it to analyze the joint dynamics of attention, price,
and uncertainty. The starting point of this analysis is equation (1.13), which shows
that investor attention is determined by the uncertainty measure risk-neutral vari-
ance. It is empirically measurable from option prices and resembles the volatility
index VIX. Conversely, attention determines investment choices and thus affects the
dynamics of asset prices and of uncertainty. This interaction between attention and
uncertainty creates rich asset pricing dynamics.
This model generates predictions that are qualitatively different from those in
static and normal distribution models. First, high uncertainty attracts more at-
tention, which in turn reduces both uncertainty and attention. Episodes of high
uncertainty and attention are therefore unlikely to be sustained. Second, informa-
tion acquisition drives down both uncertainty and risk premium. The expected
return, which is identical to the expected reduction of risk premium, increases with
investor attention. Third, the correlation between price and the risk-neutral vari-
ance depends on the skewness and support of the payoff distribution. Information
acquisition tends to be procyclical for right-skewed payoffs and countercyclical for
left-skewed ones. These predictions are consistent with empirical observations.
In the extension, I applied the above results to a multi-asset setup and illustrated
that past winners tend to continue to perform well relative to the market. The
idiosyncratic component of stock payoff is right-skewed because of limited liability
and real option to expand. Stocks that performed well relative to the market have
high uncertainty and attract more attention and, hence, are expected to continue to
generate high excess returns. Because the dynamics of uncertainty contain a mean-
reverting component, the serial correlation of excess return weakens as the horizon
increases.
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(a) Autocorrelation of vt
(b) vt predicts µp,t+u
Figure 1.2: Uncertainty and Expected Return of the Asset
The figure shows the autocorrelation between the risk-neutral variance in panel (a) and
the correlation between present risk-neutral variance vt and future expected return µp,t+u
in panel (b). The current date is t = 1. Other parameters are set as follows: T = 3,
y ∼ Lognormal(0, σ2y) where σy = 0.702, z0 = 5, σz = 0.15, A = 0.2, and C(ait) = 5(ait)2.
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(a) price pt is low
(b) price pt is high
Figure 1.3: Risk-Neutral Distributions of Stock Payoff
The figure demonstrates how asset price changes the shape of the payoff’s risk-neutral
distribution. The solid line represents the probability density, and the dashed line corre-
spond to the asset price, which is identical to the mean of this distribution. The prior
distribution of the payoff is y ∼ Lognormal(0, σ2y) where σy = 0.702.
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Figure 1.4: Risk-Neutral Variance and Expected Payoff
The figure plots the risk-neutral variance vjt as a function of the expected payoff mjt
for the idiosyncratic payoff component of a stock. Other state variables are fixed at the
middle of their distribution. The parameters are set in Table 1.
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(a) attention and Past Return
(b) Expected Return and attention
Figure 1.5: attention and Excess Return
The figure plots past excess return pjt− pj0, attention ajt and the instantaneous expected
excess return µjpt at year t = 1 for 20, 000 simulated time-series. Panel (a) shows that
attention is increasing in past excess return, and Panel (b) illustrates that expected excess
return is increasing in attention. The parameters are set in Table 1.
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Figure 1.6: Serial Correlation of Excess Return
The figure shows the estimated value of the regression coefficient βjt+u for the equation
µjpt = α
j
t+u + β
j
t+u(pjt− pj0) + ejt+u from simulated data. The parameters are set in Table
1.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
Optimization (1.8) is equivalent to:
max
θi1
∫
− exp
(
−A
(
θi1 − A−1ai0si1
)
(y − p1)− ai02 (y
2 − p21) + A · C(ai0)
)
· 1√
2pi(ai0)−1
exp
(
−ai02 (si1 − p1)
2
)
dG(y|p0, p1). (A1)
A ·C(ai0) and exp (−ai0/2 · (si1 − p1)2) only contain known information at date
1 and could be taken out of the expression. Choosing optimal θi1 is equivalent to
choosing optimal θi1 − A−1ai0si1:
max
θi1−A−1ai0si1
∫
− exp
(
−A
(
θi1 − A−1ai0si1
)
(y − p1)− ai02 (y
2 − p21)
)
dG(y|p0, p1).
(A2)
This optimization problem is identical for different investors and concave in θi1−
A−1ai0si1. Take the first-order condition and simplify:∫
− exp
(
−A
(
θi1 − A−1ai0si1
)
(y − p1)− ai02 (y
2 − p21)
)
· (y − p1) dG(y|p0, p1) = 0.
(A3)
Because the moment generating function always exists, G(y) has exponentially
bounded tails. For price p1 that belongs to the support of G(y), the solution to (A3)
exists and is unique. As a result, θi1 −A−1ai0si1 must be the same across investors.
Define
θ1 = θi1 − A−1ai0si1. (A4)
θ1 represents a component of asset demand that is identical across investors. θ1 is
a function of prices p0 and p1 because (A2) relies on dG(y|p0, p1). Identity (A4) is
equivalent to (1.9).
Proof of Proposition 1.
I prove this proposition by backward induction. Suppose asset demand equation
(1.14) holds for dates t = t0 + ∆t, . . . , T − ∆t and attention equation (1.13) holds
for dates t = t0, . . . , T −∆t.
First I prove that (1.14) is valid for date t = t0.
Let pt0 denote future prices pt0+∆t, . . . , pT−∆t, and st0 denote investor i’s fu-
ture signals si,t0+∆t, . . . , si,T−∆t. The joint distribution of future prices and signals
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conditional on all public and private information possessed by investor i at date
t0 is represented by G(y, pt0 , st0|p0, . . . , pt0 , si,∆t, . . . , si,t0). I use pi(si,∆t, . . . , si,t0) to
denote the probability density function of the signals.
At date t0, investor i’s utility is:
Eit0 [− exp(−AWiT )]
=
∫
− exp(−AWiT ) dG(y, pt0 , st0 |p0, . . . , pt0 , si,∆t, . . . , si,t0)
=
∫
− exp(−AWiT )
pi(si,∆t, . . . , si,t0|y)
pi(si,∆t, . . . , si,t0|p0, . . . , pt0)
dG(y, pt0 , st0|p0, . . . , pt0)
=
∫
− exp
−AWi,t0 − A T−∆t∑
t=t0
θit(pi,t+∆t − pit) + A
T−∆t∑
t=t0
C(ait)∆t

·
t0−∆t∏
t=0
1√
2pi(ait∆t)−1
exp(−ait∆t2 (si,t+∆t − y)
2)
dG(y, pt0 , st0|p0, . . . , pt0)
pi(si,∆t, . . . , si,t0|p0, . . . , pt0)
.
(A5)
In the second equality, I applied the conditional Bayes theorem on the prob-
ability density function and used the fact that signals si,∆t,. . . ,si,t0 as a group is
conditionally independent with prices p0, . . . , pt0 . In the third inequality, I further
used the fact that the signals themselves are conditionally independent.
Substitute in the expressions of θit for t = t0 + ∆t, . . . , T −∆t and simplify,
Eit0 [− exp(−AWiT )]
=
∫
− exp
−AWi,t0 −
Aθi,t0 − t0−∆t∑
u=0
aiusi,u+∆t∆t
 (pt0+∆t − pt0) + A T−∆t∑
t=t0
C(ait)∆t
−
T−∆t∑
t=t0+∆t
Aθit − t0−∆t∑
u=0
aiusi,u+∆t∆t
 (pt+∆t − pt)− t0−∆t∑
t=0
ait∆t
2 (y
2 − p2t0)

·
t0−∆t∏
t=0
1√
2pi(ait∆t)−1
exp(−ait∆t2 (si,t+∆t − pt0)
2)
dG(y, pt0 , st0|p0, . . . , pt0)
pi(si,∆t, . . . , si,t0 |p0, . . . , pt0)
=
∫
− exp
−AWi,t0 −
Aθi,t0 − t0−∆t∑
u=0
aiusi,u+∆t∆t
 (pt0+∆t − pt0) + A T−∆t∑
t=t0
C(ait)∆t
−
T−∆t∑
t=t0+∆t
Aθt + t−∆t∑
u=t0
aiusi,u+∆t∆t
 (pt+∆t − pt)− t0−∆t∑
t=0
ait∆t
2 (y
2 − p2t0)

·
t0−∆t∏
t=0
1√
2pi(ait∆t)−1
exp(−ait∆t2 (si,t+∆t − pt0)
2)
dG(y, pt0 , st0|p0, . . . , pt0)
pi(si,∆t, . . . , si,t0 |p0, . . . , pt0)
.
(A6)
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Investors’ utility maximization problems are similar despite the differences in
private signals received. In the above integral, si,∆t,. . . ,si,t0 only appears as coeffi-
cients of pt0+∆t − pt0 . Taking the first order condition, Aθi,t0 −
∑t0−∆t
u=0 aiusi,u+∆t∆t
must be identical across investors. Define
θt0 =
1
A
Aθi,t0 − t0−∆t∑
u=0
aiusi,u+∆t∆t
 . (A7)
θt0 represents the common component of asset demand and only relies on the
price history p0,. . . ,pt0 . This completes the backward induction for the asset demand
equation.
Next, I prove that (1.13) is correct for date t = t0 − ∆t. Attention at this
date is decided without the knowledge of date t0 information. Substitute in (A6)
and differentiate date t0 −∆t expected utility Eit0−∆t
[
Eit0 [U(WiT )]
]
with respect to
ai,t0−∆t:
E
[
U ′(WiT )
(
A · C ′(ai,ut0−∆t)∆t−
∆t
2 (y
2 − p2t0)
)∣∣∣∣∣ p0, . . . , pt0−∆t
]
= 0. (A8)
Apply the law of iterated expectations and use the fact that pt0 = E∗t0 [y],
C ′(ai,ut0−∆t) =
1
A
E∗t0−∆t
[
E∗t0(y
2 − p2t0)
]
= 1
A
E∗t0−∆t[vt]. (A9)
This completes the backward induction for the attention equation.
Proof of Lemma 2.
I arrive at (1.21), (1.23), and (1.24) by taking first difference of θt, χt and τt from
equations (1.18)-(1.20).
Let Gt(y) denote the posterior distribution of y after observing all public infor-
mation up to date t. mt and ht respectively represent the mean and variance of this
distribution:
mt = E[y|p0, p1, · · · , pt] =
∫
y dGt(y),
ht = Var[y|p0, p1, · · · , pt] =
∫
(y −mt)2 dGt(y). (A10)
The signal A(at∆t)−1(θt+∆t − θt) communicates payoff y perturbed by a normal
noise with precision A−2σ−2z a2t∆t. It represents new public information arrived at
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date t+∆t and is independent of all previous public signals. Applying Bayes formula,
mt+∆t = E[y|p0, p1, · · · , pt+∆t]
=
∫
exp
(
−12A
−2σ−2z a
2
t∆t (y − A(at∆t)−1(θt+∆t − θt))2
)
y dGt(y)∫
exp
(
−12A
−2σ−2z a
2
t∆t (y − A(at∆t)−1(θt+∆t − θt))2
)
dGt(y)
=
(
1− A−2σ−2z a2tht∆t
)
mt + A−2σ−2z a2tht∆t · A(at∆t)−1(θt+∆t − θt) + o(∆t).
(A11)
Substituting in the expression of A(at∆t)−1(θt+∆t − θt) from (1.16), I obtain
(1.22).
Proof of Lemma 3.
First I prove that ξt,T defined in (1.29) is a valid stochastic discount factor.
At date t, investor i makes portfolio choice θit to maximize her expected utility
Et[U(WiT )], where
WiT = Wit +
T−∆t∑
u=t
θiu(pu+∆t − pt) + A
T−∆t∑
u=t
C(aiu)∆t. (A12)
The first-order condition with respect to θiu suggests that
Eiu[U ′(WiT )(pu+∆t − pu)] = 0. (A13)
Apply the law of iterated expectations:
Eit[U ′(WiT )(pu+∆t − pu)] = Eit
[
Eiu[U ′(WiT )(pu+∆t − pu)]
]
= 0, (A14)
Eit[U ′(WiT )(y − pt)] =
T−∆t∑
u=t
Eit[U ′(WiT )(pu+∆t − pu)] = 0, (A15)
Substitute in the definition of ξit,T ,
Eit[ξit,T (y − pt)] = 0. (A16)
Eit represents the conditional expectation using investor i’s private information
set at time t. Et represents the conditional expectation using the public information
set (the price history). The private information set contains the public one. Apply
law of iterated expectations:
Et[ξit,T (y − pt)] = Et[Eit[ξit,T (y − pt)]] = 0. (A17)
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Now consider ξt,T = E
[
ξit,T |p0, p∆t, . . . , pT−∆t, y
]
.
Et[ξt,T (y − pt)] = Et
[
E
[
ξit,T |p0, p∆t, . . . , pT−∆t, y
]
(y − pt)
]
= Et
[
E
[
ξit,T (y − pt)|p0, p∆t, . . . , pT−∆t, y
]]
= Et[ξit,T (y − pt)] = 0. (A18)
In the second equality, I used the fact that both pt and y are measurable with re-
spect to p0, p∆t, . . . , pT−∆t, y. In the third equality I applied the law of iterated expec-
tations. As a result, ξt,T prices the risky asset correctly. Furthermore, Et[ξt,T ] = 1.
This completes the proof that ξt,T is a valid SDF.
Next, I prove that ξt,T has the expression given in (1.30). From the definition of
ξit,T ,
ξit,T =
U ′(WiT )
Eit[U ′(WiT )]
=
− AU(WiT )
Eit[−AU(WiT )]
=
U(WiT )
Eit[U(WiT )]
. (A19)
U(WiT ) is given by:
U(WiT ) = − exp
− T−∆t∑
u=t
Aθt + u−∆t∑
u0=0
ai,u0si,u0+∆t(pu+∆t − pu)
+ A T−∆t∑
u=t
C(aiu)∆t
 .
(A20)
The derivation of Eit[U(WiT )] is similar to (A6):
Eit[U(WiT )]
=
∫
− exp
− T−∆t∑
u=t
Aθt + u−∆t∑
u0=t
ai,u0si,u0+∆t(pu+∆t − pu)
+ A T−∆t∑
u=t
C(aiu)∆t− τt2 (y
2 − p2t )

·
t−∆t∏
u=0
1√
2pi(aiu∆t)−1
exp(−aiu∆t2 (si,u+∆t − pt)
2) ·
dG(y, pt, st|p0, . . . , pt)
pi(si,∆t, . . . , sit|p0, . . . , pt)
=
∫
− exp
− T−∆t∑
u=t
[
Aθu(pu+∆t − pu) + 12τu(p
2
u+∆t − p2u)− A · C(au)∆t
]
·
t−∆t∏
u=0
1√
2pi(aiu∆t)−1
exp(−aiu∆t2 (si,u+∆t − pt)
2) ·
dG(y, pt, st|p0, . . . , pt)
pi(si,∆t, . . . , sit|p0, . . . , pt)
= − exp(ft) ·
t−∆t∏
u=0
1√
2pi(aiu∆t)−1
exp(−aiu∆t2 (si,u+∆t − pt)
2) ·
1
pi(si,∆t, . . . , sit|p0, . . . , pt).
(A21)
In the second equality, I applied the conditional Bayes theorem and then inte-
grated over the signals si,t+∆t, . . . , si,T−∆t, similar to (A5) and (A6). In the third
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equality, I used the definition of ft (1.31). Therefore,
ξt,T = E
 U(WiT )
Eit[U(WiT )]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ p0, p∆t, . . . , pT−∆t, y
 (A22)
= E
exp
− T−∆t∑
u=t
Aθt + u−∆t∑
u0=0
ai,u0si,u0+∆t(pu+∆t − pu)
+ A T−∆t∑
u=t
C(aiu)∆t− ft

· pi(si,∆t, . . . , sit|p0, . . . , pt) ·
t−∆t∏
u=0
 1√
2pi(aiu∆t)−1
exp(−aiu∆t2 (si,u+∆t − pt)
2)

−1 ∣∣∣∣∣ p0,
p∆t, . . . , pT−∆t, y
]
. (A23)
Applying conditional Bayes theorem and integrating over the signals once again, I
arrive at (1.30).
Proof of Proposition 2.
First, I prove the expression of µpt and σpt given in (1.36). Apply Taylor series
expansion to p(t+ ∆t, θt+∆t,mt+∆t, χt+∆t, τt+∆t) around (t, θt,mt, χt, τt),
p(t+ ∆t, θt+∆t,mt+∆t, χt+∆t, τt+∆t)
=p(t, θt,mt, χt, τt) +
∂p
∂t
∆t+ ∂p
∂θ
(θt+∆t − θt) + ∂p
∂m
(mt+∆t −mt) + ∂p
∂χ
(χt+∆t − χt)
+ ∂p
∂τ
(τt+∆t − τt) + 12
∂2p
∂θ2
(θt+∆t − θt) + 12
∂2m
∂θ2
(mt+∆t −mt)
+ ∂
2p
∂θ∂m
(θt+∆t − θt)(mt+∆t −mt) + o(∆t). (A24)
Substituting in (1.21)-(1.24) and use the fact the expectation of payoff Et[y] is
mt, the conditional expectations of state variable increments are given by:
Et[θt+∆t − θt] = Et[−A−1aty∆t+ zt+∆t − zt] = −A−1atmt∆t,
Et[mt+∆t −mt] = Et[A−2σ−2z a2tht(y −mt)∆t− A−1σ−1z atht(zt+∆t − zt) + o(∆t)]
= A−2σ−2z a2tht∆t Et[y −mt] + o(∆t) = o(∆t),
Et[χt+∆t − χt] = A−2σ2za2t∆t,
Et[τt+∆t − τt] = at∆t. (A25)
The conditional variance of θt+∆t − θt is:
Vart[θt+∆t − θt] = Vart[−A−1aty∆t+ zt+∆t − zt]
= Vart[−A−1aty∆t] + Vart[zt+∆t − zt]
= A−2a2t Vart[y] · (∆t)2 + σ2z∆t = σ2z∆t+ o(∆t). (A26)
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Similarly,
Vart[mt+∆t −mt] = A−2σ−4a2th2t Vart[zt+∆t − zt] = A−2σ−2a2th2t∆t,
Covt[θt+∆t − θt,mt+∆t −mt] = A−1σ−2atht Vart[zt+∆t − zt] = A−1atht∆t. (A27)
Substituting (A24) and (A25)-(A27) into (1.34) and simplify, I arrive at the
expression of drift µpt and volatility σpt.
Next, I derive the system of partial differential equations (1.37)-(1.39). Let ξt,t+∆t
denote the stochastic discount factor from date t to t+ ∆t:
ξt,t+∆t =
ξt,T
ξt+∆t,T
= exp
(
−Aθt(pt+∆t − pt)− 12τt(p
2
t+∆t − p2t ) + A · C(at)∆t− ft + ft+∆t
)
.
(A28)
Because the interest rate is zero, Et[ξt,t+∆t] is equal to 1. From (1.26),
pt = Et[ξt,t+∆tpt+∆t] = Et[ξt,t+∆t] Et[pt+∆t] + Covt[ξt,t+∆t, pt+∆t]
= pt + µpt∆t+ Covt
[
−Aθtpt+∆t − 12τtp
2
t+∆t + ft+∆t, pt+∆t
]
+ o(∆t)
= pt +
(
µpt + σptσft − (Aθt + τtpt)σ2pt
)
∆t+ o(∆t). (A29)
The first equation (1.37) in the system of PDEs is obtained by taking the limit
∆t→ 0. Similarly, the second equation (1.38) comes from
vt = Et[ξt,t+∆tvt+∆t] + Var∗t [pt+∆t]
= Et[ξt,t+∆tvt+∆t] + Vart[pt+∆t] + o(∆t)
= vt +
(
µvt + σvtσft − (Aθt + τtpt)σ2pt + σ2pt
)
∆t+ o(∆t). (A30)
Apply Taylor expansion to ξt,t+∆t = exp(ln ξt,t+∆t) around ln ξt,t+∆t = 0:
ξt,t+∆t = 1 + ln ξt,t+∆t +
1
2(ln ξt,t+∆t)
2 + o(∆t)
Et[ξt,t+∆t] = 1 + Et
[
−Aθt(pt+∆t − pt)− 12τt(p
2
t+∆t − p2t ) + A · C(at)∆t− ft + ft+∆t
]
+ 12 Et
[(
−Aθt(pt+∆t − pt)− 12τt(p
2
t+∆t − p2t ) + A · C(at)∆t− ft + ft+∆t
)2]
+ o(∆t)
= 1 +
[
−(Aθt + τtpt)µpt + A · C(at) + µft + 12 (−(Aθt + τtpt)σpt + σft)
2
]
∆t+ o(∆t).
(A31)
Taking the limit ∆t → 0 and substitute in (1.37) to eliminate µpt, I arrive at
(1.39). The equation that relates attention to risk-neutral variance (1.13) converges
to equation (1.40) in the continuous-time limit.
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The terminal conditions for this system of equations come from the continuous-
time limit of pT−∆t, vT−∆t and fT−∆t:
pT−∆t = ET−∆t
[
exp
(
−AθT−∆t(y − pT−∆t)− 12τT−∆t(y
2 − p2T−∆t))∆t− fT−∆t
)
· y
]
,
vT−∆t = ET−∆t
[
exp
(
−AθT−∆t(y − pT−∆t)− 12τT−∆t(y
2 − p2T−∆t))∆t− fT−∆t
)
· (y − pT−∆t)2
]
,
fT−∆t = log
(
ET−∆t
[
exp
(
−AθT−∆t(y − pT−∆t)− 12τT−∆t(y
2 − p2T−∆t)
)])
. (A32)
Proof of Proposition 3.
Risk-neutral variance at date t and t+ ∆t is related by equation (1.27):
E∗t [vt+∆t − vt] = −Var∗t [pt+∆t] = −
(
Et[ξt,t+∆t p2t+∆t]− p2t
)
= −(Et[p2t+∆t]− p2t )− Covt[ξt,t+∆t, p2t+∆t]
= −σ2pt∆t+ o(∆t), (A33)
As a result, the instantaneous drift of vt in the risk-neutral measure is given by:
µ∗vt = lim∆t→0
E∗t [vt+∆t − vt]
∆t = −σ
2
pt
= −
(
∂p
∂m
A−1σ−1z atht −
∂p
∂θ
σz
)2
. (A34)
Since price is increasing in mt and decreasing in θt, µ∗vt is decreasing in attention:
∂µ∗vt
∂at
= 2∂p
∂θ
∂p
∂m
A−1ht − 2
(
∂p
∂m
)2
A−2σ2zath
2
t < 0. (A35)
I introduce Lemma A1 and Lemma A2 to prove Proposition 4.
Lemma A1. ∂ft/∂θt is given by:
∂ft
∂θt
= (Aθt + τtpt)
∂pt
∂θt
+ E∗t
[∫ T
t
∂2pu
∂θ2u
Aσ2zdu
]
, (A36)
Proof Lemma A1.
I start from the definition of ft in discrete time (1.31):
ft = lnEt
exp
− T−∆t∑
u=t
[
Aθu(pu+∆t − pu) + 12τu(p
2
u+∆t − p2u)− A · C(au)∆t
] .
(A37)
Differentiate ft in (1.31) with respect to pt,
∂ft
∂pt
= (Aθt + τtpt).
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An increase in θt implies the same change in θu for u = t+∆t, . . . , T −∆t. From
the dynamics of state variables (1.21),
∂θu
∂θt
= 1, u = t+ ∆t, . . . , T −∆t. (A38)
Now differentiate ft in (1.31) with respect to θu
∂ft
∂θu
= 1
ft
Et
exp
− T−∆t∑
u=t
[
Aθu(pu+∆t − pu) + 12τu(p
2
u+∆t − p2u)− A · C(au)∆t
]
(
−A(pu+∆t − pt) + (Aθu − Aθu−∆t + au−∆t∆tpu)∂pu
∂θu
).
=E∗t
[
−A(pu+∆t − pt) + (Aθu − Aθu−∆t + au−∆t∆tpu)∂pu
∂θu
]
=0 + Cov∗t
[
(Aθu − Aθu−∆t + au−∆t∆tpu), ∂pu
∂θu
]
=Cov∗t
[
(Aθu − Aθu−∆t + au−∆t∆tpu), ∂
2pu
∂θ2u
(θu − θu−∆t)
]
+ o(∆t)
=∂
2pu
∂θ2u
Aσ2z∆t+ o(∆t). (A39)
The third equality in the above expression follows from the fact that price is a
martingale under the risk-neutral measure and that E∗t [Aθu−Aθu−∆t+au−∆t∆tpu] =
0. From (A38) and (A39), I obtain (A36).
Lemma A2. ∂ft/∂mt is given by:
∂ft
∂mt
= (pt −mt)h−1t + (Aθt + τtpt)
∂pt
∂mt
− E∗t
[∫ T
t
χu
χt
∂2pu
∂m2u
auhu
]
. (A40)
Proof Lemma A2.
From equation (1.16), A(at∆t)−1(θt+∆t−θt) is a public signal of y with precision
A−2σ−2z a
2
t∆t. χt represents the aggregate precision of all public signals. Let ηt
denote the average of public signals using precisions A−2σ−2z a2t∆t as weights:
χt =
t−∆t∑
u=0
A−2σ−2z a
2
u∆t, (A41)
ηt =
t−∆t∑
u=0
A−2σ−2z a
2
u∆t
χT−∆t
· A(at∆t)−1(θt+∆t − θt). (A42)
Because public signals in different periods are independent, they are informa-
tionally equivalent to a signal ηt with precision χt. Applying Bayes formula, the
expected payoff mt could be expressed as:
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mt =
∫ [
exp
(
−χt2 (y − ηt)
2
)
· y dG(y)
]
∫ [
exp
(
−χt2 (y − ηt)
2
)
dG(y)
] . (A43)
Differentiate mt with respect to ηt:
dmt
dηt
=
∫ [
exp
(
−χt2 (y − ηt)
2
)
· y · χt(y − ηt) dG(y)
]
∫ [
exp
(
−χt2 (y − ηt)
2
)
dG(y)
]
−mt ·
∫ [
exp
(
−χt2 (y − ηt)
2
)
· χt(y − ηt) dG(y)
]
∫ [
exp
(
−χt2 (y − ηt)
2
)
dG(y)
]
= Et[y · χt(y − ηt)]−mt Et[χt(y − ηt)]
= χt
[
Et[y2]−mt Et[y]
]
= χtht. (A44)
Similarly, ft could be expressed as:
ft = ln
∫ exp
− T−∆t∑
u=t
[
Aθu(pu+∆t − pu) + 12τu(p
2
u+∆t − p2u)− A · C(au)∆t
]
− χt2 (y − ηt)
2
 dG(y)

− ln
(∫
exp
(
−χt2 (y − ηt)
2
)
dG(y)
)
(A45)
Differentiate ft with respect to ηt:
dft
dηt
= χt E∗t [y − ηt]− χt Et[y − ηt] = χt(pt −mt). (A46)
(A44) and (A46) give rise to the first term in (A40). The second term is similar
to Lemma 1.
An increase in mt implies less than one-to-one change in mu for u = t +
∆t, . . . , T −∆t. From the dynamics of state variables (1.22),
dmu
dmt
= χu
χt
+ o(∆t), u = t+ ∆t, . . . , T −∆t. (A47)
Similar to (A39),
∂ft
∂mu
= −∂
2pu
∂m2u
auhu + o(∆t). (A48)
The above expression gives the third term in (A40).
Proof of Proposition 4.
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Using (1.37) and (1.36), the instantaneous expected return µpt is given by:
µpt = σpt(−σft + (Aθt + τtpt)σpt)
=
(
∂pt
∂mt
A−1σ−1z htat −
∂pt
∂θt
σz
)
(−σft + (Aθt + τtpt)σpt)
=
(
∂pt
∂mt
A−1σ−1z htat −
∂pt
∂θt
σz
)
(∂ft
∂θt
σz − ∂ft
∂mt
A−1σ−1z htat + (Aθt + τtpt)σpt).
(A49)
Combine (A49) with the results from Lemma A1 and Lemma A2, I arrive at
(1.48).
Proof of Proposition 5.
Define ηT−∆t similar to ηt in (A42). Public signals from date 0 to date T −∆t
are informationally equivalent to a signal ηT−∆t with precision χT−∆t. Similar to
(A44),
dmT−∆t
dηT−∆t
= χT−∆t
[
ET−∆t[y2]−mT−∆t ET−∆t[y]
]
= χT−∆thT−∆t. (A50)
Applying the Bayes formula, the risk-neutral variance vT−∆t can be expressed as
follows:
vT−∆t =
∫ [
ξT−∆t,T · exp
(
−χT−∆t2 (y − ηT−∆t)
2
)
· (y − p2T−∆t) dG(y)
]
∫ [
ξT−∆t,T · exp
(
−χT−∆t2 (y − ηT−∆t)
2
)
dG(y)
] . (A51)
And the partial derivative of vT−∆t to ηT−∆t is:
∂vT−∆t
∂ηT−∆t
= χT−∆t E∗T−∆t[(y − p3T−∆t)].
Combine (A50) and (A52), I arrive at (1.50).
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Chapter 2
Collateral Requirements and Asset
Prices
We consider an economy populated by investors with heterogeneous preferences and
beliefs who receive non-pledgeable labor incomes. We study the effects of collateral
constraints that require investors to maintain sufficient pledgeable capital to cover
their liabilities. We show that these constraints inflate stock prices, give rise to clus-
ters of stock return volatilities, and produce spikes and crashes in price-dividend ra-
tios and volatilities. Furthermore, mere possibility of a crisis significantly decreases
interest rates and increases Sharpe ratios. The stock price has large collateral pre-
mium over non-pledgeable incomes. Asset prices are in closed form, and investors
survive in the long run.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D52, G12.
Keywords: collateral, non-pledgeable labor income, heterogeneous preferences, dis-
agreement, asset prices, stationary equilibrium.
55
2.1. Introduction
Financial markets play a key role in facilitating risk sharing and efficient allocation
of assets among investors. However, trading in financial assets often entails moral
hazard due to investors’ incentives to default on their risky positions. The moral
hazard can be alleviated by collateralized trades whereby risky positions are backed
by financial capital that can be seized in the event of default. The latter arrangement
restores the functionality of financial markets at a cost of restricting risk sharing
among investors. In this paper, we develop a parsimonious model which sheds light
on the economic effects of such restrictions and show that they give rise to rich
dynamics of asset prices. In particular, we show how collateralization inflates asset
prices, generates repeated booms and busts in the stock market, and leads to spikes,
crashes, and clustering of stock return volatilities, as well as cycles of high and low
leverage. Our analysis is facilitated by closed-form solutions and the stationarity of
equilibrium processes.
We consider a pure exchange economy with one consumption good produced
by a tree with i.i.d. shocks, similar to Lucas (1978). The economy is populated
by two representative investors with heterogeneous constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) preferences over consumption and heterogeneous beliefs about the output
growth rate. Each investor receives a fraction of the tree’s output as labor income
and invests total wealth in financial assets such as bonds and stocks. The investors
have limited liability and can re-enter the financial market following defaults on
risky positions in financial assets. In the event of default the financial assets can be
seized by counterparties but labor income cannot be expropriated. The arising moral
hazard problem is resolved by requiring risky positions to be backed by collateral in
such a way that each investor’s total financial wealth stays positive at all times, and
hence, investors can always pay back to counterparties. We also allow the aggregate
consumption to experience rare large negative shocks, which help us explore how
mere anxiety about the possibility of a production crisis affects the economy by
tightening collateral requirements. Our closed form solutions allow us to prove some
of the results for general model parameters rather than for particular calibrations.
First, we show that collateral requirements increase the prices of all tradable
assets with positive cash flows relative to a frictionless economy. Moreover, these
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increases in prices are larger when investors are closer to their default boundaries.
In particular, the stock price-dividend ratio is a U-shaped function of one of the
investor’s share of the aggregate consumption. Consequently, it spikes upwards in
response to small economic shocks near default boundaries giving rise to repeated
periods of high and low stock prices.
The intuition for the latter results is as follows. Absent any frictions, the in-
vestors’ consumption shares gradually approach zero or one, and hence the eco-
nomic impact of one of the investors vanishes in the long-run (e.g., Blume and
Easley, 2006; Yan, 2008; Chabakauri, 2015). The collateral requirements restrict
financial losses and protect investors from losing their consumption shares. The re-
sult is that the consumption shares are bounded away from zero and one. Moreover,
the constraints never bind simultaneously for both investors, and at each moment
one of the investors is unconstrained. The unconstrained investor’s marginal util-
ity of consumption is proportional to the prices of Arrow-Debreu securities. This
marginal utility is expected to be higher in the economy with constraints because
the unconstrained investor’s consumption is expected to be lower than in the un-
constrained economy due to the upper bound on the consumption share, discussed
above. Consequently, the prices of Arrow-Debreu securities, and hence, the prices
of all assets with positive cash flows, are higher in the constrained economy.
The dynamics of the price-dividend ratio determines the effect of constraints on
volatilities. We show that collateral requirements dampen volatilities in bad times,
when aggregate consumption is low, and amplify them in good times, when aggregate
consumption is high. The latter effect makes collateral requirements a useful tool
for curbing excessive volatility in bad times. The explanation is that the U-shaped
price-dividend ratio is procyclical in good and countercyclical in bad times. As a
result, the price-dividend ratio and the dividend move in the same direction in good
times and in opposite directions in bad times. Because the stock price is the product
of the price-dividend ratio and the dividend, the stock return volatility increases in
good times and decreases in bad times. The volatility experiences spikes and crashes
due to the sensitivity of price-dividend ratios to small shocks when investors are
close to hitting their constraints. Moreover, the periods of high and low volatility
are persistent because of the persistence of periods when constraints are likely to
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bind, as discussed below, which gives rise to the clustering of volatilities.
We also derive the distributions of investors’ consumption shares in analytic form
and show that they are stationary and non-degenerate (i.e., their support is a closed
interval rather than a single point). The analysis of these distributions yields three
economic insights. First, there is non-trivial time-variation of asset prices in the long
run. Second, periods of binding collateral requirements are persistent. That is, the
economy stays close to default boundaries for some time because hitting a constraint
makes likely hitting it again in the near future due to slow accumulation of wealth
over time. Third, we show that all investors, including those with incorrect beliefs,
survive in the long run and can have large economic impact in equilibrium because
the constraints prevent investors from losing their consumption shares, similar to
the related literature (e.g., Blume and Easley, 2006; Cao, 2018). We note that
the non-degeneracy of consumption share distributions and the persistence of the
periods of binding constraints are more difficult to demonstrate than survival, and,
to our best knowledge, these results are new to the literature.
Next, we show that mere possibility of a large (albeit unpredictable) drop in the
aggregate output next period decreases interest rates and increases Sharpe ratios
in the current period when the irrational optimist is close to hitting the collateral
constraint. The latter effect only occurs when production crises and collateral re-
quirements are jointly present in the economy. Hence, the collateral requirements
amplify the spillover of the production crisis to the financial market. The am-
plification effect arises because investors “fly to quality” by buying riskless bonds
when there is a possibility of hitting the collateral constraint next period. We note
that lower interest rates and higher Sharpe ratios can be generated by alternative
mechanisms and constraints, discussed in the literature review below. However, the
amplification mechanism, to our best knowledge, has not been studied before. We
also show that investor heterogeneity and the stationarity of equilibrium give rise
to cycles of high and low leverage. In particular, the leverage is high when investors
are far away from their default boundaries, and drops to zero when investors hit
their constraints.
Finally, we measure the collateral liquidity premium of the stock versus labor
income. This premium arises because dividends and labor incomes are collinear but
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incomes are non-pledgeable. First, we derive shadow prices of claims to labor in-
comes such that exchanging marginal units of these claims for the consumption good
at shadow prices does not affect investors’ welfare. Then, we construct portfolios of
stocks that replicate labor incomes. We define the collateral liquidity premium as the
percentage difference in the value of the replicating portfolio and the shadow price.
The premium from the view of a particular investor widens close to that investor’s
default boundary and ranges from 0% to 35% in our calibration, which demonstrates
the economic importance of collateralization. We also show that the non-tradability
of labor income does not contribute to this premium. This is because in economies
with pledgeable labor income investors circumvent non-tradability by taking short
positions in the stock, and hence, the liquidity premium is such economies is zero.
The paper develops new methodology for studying the effects of collateral re-
quirements. This new methodology allows us to obtain closed-form equilibrium
processes and prove their properties which previously could only be studied numer-
ically. For example, we prove that collateral requirements always increase price-
dividend ratios and generate spikes in asset prices, and lead to non-degeneracy and
stationarity of consumption share distributions. Hence, collateralization emerges as
a tractable way of inducing the stationary of equilibrium. Finally, the paper intro-
duces a tractable discrete-time framework that makes exposition less technical and
permits taking continuous-time limits. The tractability and stationarity make our
model a convenient benchmark for asset pricing research that can be extended in
various directions.
Related Literature. Closest to us are papers that study economies where investors
have limited liability and face solvency constraints. Deaton (1990) considers a par-
tial equilibrium model in which investors trade in a riskless asset with an exogenous
interest rate and face a non-negativity constraint on their financial wealth. De-
temple and Serrat (2003) also study the non-negative wealth constraint in a model
where investors have heterogeneous beliefs and identical risk aversions. They show
that this constraint introduces a singularity component into interest rates when the
constraint binds while stock risk premia have the same structure as in unconstrained
economies. They do not compute price-dividend ratios, volatilities, and consumption
share distributions as we do in this paper, which are more difficult to characterize
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than interest rates and risk premia. Moreover, in our paper the constraint has an
effect on interest rates and risk premia in the internal area of the state-space when
there are rare production crises in the economy.
Chien and Lustig (2010) study a similar constraint in an economy with a con-
tinuum of ex ante identical investors that receive non-pledgeable labor incomes af-
fected by idiosyncratic shocks. Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) study the role
of housing collateral when labor income is non-pledgeable. The main difference of
our paper from the latter two papers is that our investors are ex ante heterogeneous
and are not affected by idiosyncratic shocks to labor income. The economic effects of
heterogeneity in preferences and beliefs are different from the effects of ex-post het-
erogeneity in realized idiosyncratic labor income shocks in the above literature. For
example, Krueger and Lustig (2010) show the irrelevance of market incompleteness
induced by these income shocks for the risk premia. Kubler and Schmedders (2013)
show the existence of stationary equilibria in economies with collateral constraints.
Cao (2018) proves that investors with incorrect beliefs have strictly positive
shares of consumption in the long run (i.e., survive in the long-run) in economies
with general collateral constraints and stationary endowment processes bounded
away from zero. Similar results are also shown numerically in an example with
non-stationary endowments. Blume et al (2015) explore potential benefits from
imposing trading restrictions, such as natural borrowing constraints, in economies
with bounded endowments and investors with heterogeneous beliefs. In contrast to
these works, our results do not rely on bounded endowments. Moreover, in addition
to showing the survival of investors, we derive consumption share distributions in
closed form, and establish their bimodality, stationarity, and non-degeneracy (i.e.,
their support is a closed interval rather than a single point), and derive new equi-
librium effects. Rampini and Viswanathan (2018) study household insurance in
an economy with collateral constraints with limited enforcement and deep-pocket
risk-neutral lenders, who provide state-contingent claims to households at zero risk
premium. In contrast to their model, all investors in our economy are risk averse,
and risk-premia are non-zero and time-varying.
Geanakoplos (2003, 2009), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008, 2014), and Geanako-
plos and Zame (2014) develop the theory of collateral constraints in two- and three-
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period multinomial general equilibrium economies. Similar to the baseline analysis
in Geanakoplos (2003, 2009), our constraint also prevents investors from default-
ing in the worst-case scenario. Simsek (2013) studies a two-period economy with
a continuum of states and shows that collateral constraints have asymmetric disci-
plining effects, depending on investor’s beliefs, and also shows how defaultable debt
endogenously emerges in equilibrium. Biais, Hombert, and Weill (2018) study a
two-period economy with multiple trees and imperfect collateral pledgeability. In
contrast to this literature, we focus on the non-pledgeability of labor income rather
than imperfect pledgeability of assets. Hence, our model generates a different set
of predictions. Our constraint is also more tractable and allows us to study mul-
tiperiod economies where investors have different preferences and beliefs and the
output follows a geometric Brownian motion with jumps.
Kehoe and Levine (1993), Kocherlakota (1996), Tsyrennikov (2012), and Osam-
bela (2015) study economies where investors are weakly better off not defaulting
and are permanently excluded from securities markets if they default. Alvarez and
Jermann (2000) show that such constraints can be implemented by imposing cer-
tain “not too tight” solvency portfolio constraints. Alvarez and Jermann (2001) find
that such constraints help explain equity premia in the U.S. economy. They solve a
simple example in closed form and develop a numerical method for the general case.
In contrast to this literature, our investors have limited liability and can re-enter
the market after a default.
Our constraint restricts borrowing and short-selling in equilibrium. Consequently,
the paper is related to the literature on economic effects of borrowing, margin, short-
sale and position limit constraints (e.g., Harrison and Kreps, 1978; Detemple and
Murthy, 1997; Basak and Cuoco, 1998; Basak and Croitoru, 2000, 2006; Gromb
and Vayanos, 2002, 2010; Pavlova and Rigobon, 2008; Brunnermeier and Peder-
sen, 2009; Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen, 2011; Chabakauri, 2013, 2015; Rytchkov, 2014;
Brumm et al, 2015; Buss et al, 2016), portfolio insurance (e.g., Basak, 1995) and
VaR constraints (e.g., Basak and Shapiro, 2001). Our economic results are different
from the results in this literature. First, the latter constraints can increase or de-
crease stock prices depending on whether the investors’ risk aversions are greater or
less than one (e.g., Chabakauri, 2015), whereas our collateral requirements always
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increase stock prices irrespective of risk aversions and beliefs. Second, these con-
straints typically dampen stock return volatility whereas our collateral requirements
amplify them in some states of the economy. We also uncover new effects such as
spikes and crashes of volatilities and stock prices, and clusters of volatility.
We also note that our collateral requirements are conceptually different from the
margin and borrowing constraints in some of the related models discussed above
(e.g., Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen, 2011; Chabakauri, 2013, 2015; Rytchkov, 2014). The
latter models focus on partial non-pledgeability of stocks and do not incorporate
labor incomes. The economic effects of constrains in these models are driven by
reduced risk-sharing. In contrast to these works, we explore the non-pledgeability of
labor incomes in a setting with fully pledgeable financial assets serving as collateral.
The effects of constraints in our model are driven by increased marginal utilities of
investors and collateral premia, which inflate asset prices.
Our methodology is also different from the approaches in the related literature.
The equilibrium in models with constraints is often constructed using fictitious com-
plete market economies (Cvitanic´ and Karatzas, 1992; Cuoco, 1997; Detemple and
Murthy, 1997; Basak and Cuoco, 1998; Basak and Croitoru, 2000, 2006; Pavlova
and Rigobon, 2008; Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen, 2011; Chabakauri, 2013, 2015). More-
over, when investors have non-logarithmic utilities the equilibrium is characterized
in terms of non-linear differential equations that can only be solved numerically (e.g.,
Chabakauri, 2013, 2015; Rytchkov, 2014). In contrast to these works, we do not
employ fictitious markets and derive the equilibrium using the envelope theorem.
To our best knowledge this paper is the first to derive analytical prices, distributions
of consumption shares, and conditions for the constraints to be binding.
The paper is also related to macro-finance, financial intermediation, and banking
literatures that study economies with frictions (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Brunner-
meier and Sannikov, 2014; Klimenko, Pfeil, Rochet, and De Nicolo, 2016; Kondor
and Vayanos, 2018) and to the literature on frictionless economies with heteroge-
neous investors (e.g., Chan and Kogan, 2002; Basak, 2005; Yan, 2008; Bhamra
and Uppal, 2014; Atmaz and Basak, 2018; Borovicˇka, 2018; Massari, 2018, among
others).
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Figure 2.1
States of the Economy
After time t the economy moves to a normal state with probability 1−λ∆t and to a crisis
state with probability λ∆t. Conditional on being in a normal state the economy moves to
either ω1 or ω2 with equal probabilities.
2.2. Economic setup
We consider a pure-exchange infinite-horizon economy with one consumption good
produced by an exogenous Lucas (1978) tree. The economy is populated by two
representative heterogeneous investors A and B that hold shares in the tree and
receive labor income each period. To facilitate the exposition, we start with a
discrete-time economy with dates t = 0,∆t, 2∆t, . . . , and later take a continuous-
time limit.
At each point of time t = 0,∆t, 2∆t, . . . the economy is in one of the three states:
ω1, ω2, and ω3. With probability 1− λ∆t the economy is either in state ω1 or state
ω2, which we call normal states, and with probability λ∆t in state ω3, which we
call the crisis state. Parameter λ > 0 is the crisis intensity. States ω1 and ω2 have
probabilities 1/2 conditional on the economy being in a normal state. Figure 2.1
depicts the structure of uncertainty.
2.2.1 Output, financial markets, and investor heterogeneity
At date t the tree produces Dt∆t units of aggregate output, where Dt follows a
process
∆Dt = Dt[µD∆t+ σD∆wt + JD∆jt], (2.1)
where µD ≥ 0, σD > 0, and JD ≤ 0 are output growth mean, volatility, and drop
during a crisis, respectively, and ∆Dt = Dt+∆t −Dt is the change in output. Pro-
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cesses wt and jt are discrete-time analogues of a Brownian motion and Poisson
processes, respectively.1 These processes follow dynamics wt+∆t = wt + ∆wt and
jt+∆t = jt + ∆jt, where increments ∆wt and ∆jt are i.i.d. random variables given
by:
∆wt =

+
√
∆t, in state ω1,
− √∆t, in state ω2,
0, in state ω3,
∆jt =

0, in state ω1,
0, in state ω2,
1, in state ω3.
(2.2)
It can be easily verified that Et[∆wt|normal] = 0 and vart[∆wt|normal] = ∆t, similar
to a Brownian motion, where Et[·] and vart[·] are expectation and variance condi-
tional on time-t information. Parameters µD, σD, and JD are such that Dt > 0 for
all t.
The economy is populated by two representative price-taking investors A and B.
Each investor stands for a continuum of identical investors of unit mass. Fractions
lA and lB of the aggregate output Dt∆t are paid to investors A and B as their labor
incomes, respectively. Labor incomes are non-tradable. Fractions lA and lB can be
also interpreted as non-tradable shares in the aggregate output such as holdings
of illiquid assets. The remaining fraction 1 − lA − lB is paid as a dividend to the
shareholders.
The investors can trade three securities at each date t: 1) a riskless bond in zero
net supply, which pays one unit of consumption at date t+ ∆t; 2) one stock in net
supply of one unit, which is a claim to the stream of dividends (1−lA−lB)Dt∆t; 3) a
one-period insurance contract in zero net supply, which pays one unit of consumption
in the crisis state ω3 and zero otherwise. Absent any frictions the market is complete.
Market completeness and the absence of idiosyncratic shocks to labor income are
required for tractability, and allow us to solve the model in closed form. Bond, stock,
and insurance prices Bt, St, and Pt, respectively, are determined in equilibrium.
1Chabakauri (2014) shows that process (2.1) converges to a continuous-time Le´vy process as
∆t→ 0.
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2.2.2 Investor heterogeneity and optimization problems
The investors have heterogeneous CRRA preferences over consumption, given by
ui(c) =

c1−γi
1− γi, if γi 6= 1,
ln(c), if γi = 1,
(2.3)
where i = A,B. The investors agree on time-t asset prices and the aggregate output
but disagree on the probabilities of states. Investor A is rational and has correct
probabilities
piA(ω1) =
1− λ∆t
2 , piA(ω2) =
1− λ∆t
2 , piA(ω3) = λ∆t, (2.4)
where λ is such that probabilities (2.4) are positive. Investor B has biased proba-
bilities
piB(ω1) =
1− λB∆t
2 (1 + δ
√
∆t), piB(ω2) =
1− λB∆t
2 (1− δ
√
∆t), piB(ω3) = λB∆t,
(2.5)
where crisis intensity λB and disagreement parameter δ are such that probabilities
(2.5) are positive. It is immediate to verify that piB(ω1) + piB(ω2) + piB(ω3) = 1, and
hence, piB(ω) is a probability measure. Throughout the paper, by Eit[·] and varit[·]
we denote conditional expectations and variances under the probability measure of
investor i.
It can be easily verified that time-t conditional expected output growth rate in
normal times under the beliefs of investor B is given by:
EBt
∆Dt
Dt
∣∣∣∣normal
 = (µD + δσD)∆t, (2.6)
Therefore, parameter δ measures the extent of the investor disagreement about the
expected output growth during normal times. For tractability, we assume that
investor B does not update probabilities over time. We also assume that investor
B is weakly less risk averse and more optimistic than investor A: γA ≥ γB, λ ≥ λB
and δ ≥ 0. The assumption that the less risk averse investor is also more optimistic
is imposed to simplify the exposition and does not affect the qualitative results in
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the paper.2 We allow for the heterogeneity in both risk aversions and beliefs for
generality. Main qualitative results do not change if we keep only one source of
heterogeneity.
At date 0 the investors have certain endowments of financial assets. The total
time-t disposable wealth of investor i is given by Wit + liDt∆t, where Wit is the
financial wealth, defined as the time-t value of all positions in financial assets ac-
quired at the previous date, and liDt∆t is the labor income. At date t, investor i
allocates wealth to cit∆t units of consumption, bit units of bond, and a portfolio of
risky assets nit = (ni,St, ni,P t), where ni,St and ni,P t are units of stock and insurance,
respectively. The bond and the risky assets are pledgeable, i.e., can be used as
collateral, but the labor income is not.
In a frictionless economy, the financial wealth Wit can become negative when
investors take risky positions backed by their future labor income. However, we
assume that labor income is not pledgeable, and the investors can default when
their financial wealth becomes negative. The investors also have limited liability and
can re-enter the market after default, which gives rise to a moral hazard problem,
similar to the related literature (e.g., Chien and Lustig, 2010; Geanakoplos, 2009).
This problem is addressed here by requiring the investors to keep their next-period
financial wealth Wi,t+∆t positive at all times, so that their pledgeable capital is
sufficient to cover all liabilities such as debt and short positions.
Investor i = A,B maximizes expected discounted utility with time discount ρ
max
cit,bit,nit
Eit
[ ∞∑
τ=t
e−ρτui(ciτ )∆t
]
, (2.7)
subject to the self-financing budget constraints, given by
Wit + liDt∆t = cit∆t+ bitBt + nit(St, Pt)>, (2.8)
Wi,t+∆t = bit + nit
(
St+∆t + (1− lA − lB)Dt+∆t∆t, 1{ωt+∆t=ω3}
)>
, (2.9)
and the collateral constraint:
Wi,t+∆t ≥ 0, (2.10)
2Assuming that the less risk averse investor is more optimistic makes our main state variable
st = c∗At/Dt (introduced in Section 2.3 below) countercyclical, which facilitates the analysis of
the results. If this assumption is relaxed, the qualitative results remain the same, but additional
analysis is required to determine whether the state variable s is counter- or pro-cyclical.
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where Wi,t+∆t is the financial wealth at date t + ∆t given by equation (2.9). Con-
straint (2.10) requires investors to cross-collateralize their positions in such a way
that losses on one position are always offset by gains on the other positions. As a
result, default is prevented even in the worst-case scenario, similar to Geanakoplos
(2003, 2009).
Remark 1 (Partially pledgeable labor income). Our model can be easily
extended to economies where fraction ki ∈ [0, 1] of investor i’s labor income can be
pledged. The requirement to keep next-period pledgeable wealth is then given by:
Wi,t+∆t +
kili
1− lA − lB
(
St+∆t + (1− lA − lB)Dt+∆t∆t
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
measure of pledgeable labor income
≥ 0. (2.11)
The second term in constraint (2.11) measures the value of the pledgeable income.
Let kiliDt∆t be the pledgeable income of investor i. This income is proportional to
stock dividends (1 − lA − lB)Dt∆t, and hence, can be replicated by a portfolio of
n̂i = kili/(1−lA−lB) units of stock with cum-dividend value n̂i(St+(1−lA−lB)Dt∆t).
The investors can circumvent the non-tradability of pledgeable income by shorting
stocks against this income. Hence, the claims to pledgeable income are, effectively,
tradable and have the same value as the replicating portfolio. The requirement
to have positive pledgeable wealth then becomes Wi,t+∆t + n̂i
(
St+∆t + (1 − lA −
lB)Dt+∆t∆t
)
≥ 0, which is equivalent to constraint (2.11). Lemma A.1 in the
Appendix shows that models with ki 6= 0 reduce to models with ki = 0 by a change
of variable. Hence, the economic implications of our baseline model with constraint
(2.10) and the model with a more general constraint (2.11) are the same.
2.2.3 Equilibrium
Definition. An equilibrium is a set of asset prices {Bt, St, Pt} and of consumption
and portfolio policies {c∗it, b∗it, n∗it}i∈{A,B} that solve optimization problem (2.7) for
each investor, given processes {Bt, St, Pt}, and consumption and securities markets
clear:
c∗At + c∗Bt = Dt, b∗At + b∗Bt = 0, n∗A,St + n∗B,St = 1, n∗A,P t + n∗B,P t = 0. (2.12)
In addition to asset prices, we derive price-dividend and wealth-output ratios
Ψ = S/
(
(1 − lA − lB)D
)
and Φi = W ∗i /D, respectively. We also derive annualized
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∆t-period riskless interest rates rt, stock mean-returns µt and volatilities σt in normal
times, and the percentage change of the stock price in the crisis state, denoted by
Jt.
We derive the equilibrium in terms of state variable vt given by the log-ratio of
marginal utilities of investors evaluated at their shares of the aggregate consumption
c∗it/Dt:
vt = ln
 (c∗At/Dt)−γA(c∗Bt/Dt)−γB
 . (2.13)
Substituting consumption shares of investors A and B, denoted by st = c∗At/Dt and
1− st = c∗Bt/Dt, into equation (2.13), we express vt as a function of st:
vt = γB ln(1− st)− γA ln(st). (2.14)
Variable vt is a decreasing function st, and hence, st is an alternative state variable.
We assume that the exogenous model parameters are such that
Ei
e−ρ∆t
Dt+∆t
Dt

1−γi < 1, i = A,B. (2.15)
Condition (2.15) is necessary and sufficient for the existence of equilibrium in homogeneous-
agent economies populated only by investor A or investor B.
2.3. Characterization of equilibrium
First, we derive the investors’ state price densities (SPD) ξAt and ξBt defined as
processes such that asset prices can be expressed as follows (e.g., Duffie (2001,
p.23)):
Bt = Eit
[ξi,t+∆t
ξit
]
, (2.16)
St = Eit
[ξi,t+∆t
ξit
(
St+∆t + (1− lA − lB)Dt+∆t∆t
)]
, (2.17)
Pt = Eit
[ξi,t+∆t
ξit
1{ωt+∆t=ω3}
]
, (2.18)
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where i = A,B. The state price density ξit exists for each investor i due to the
absence of arbitrage opportunities in our economy.3 The investors can eliminate ar-
bitrage because strategies with zero investment and non-negative payoffs are feasible
given constraints (2.8)–(2.10). The SPDs ξAt and ξBt differ due to heterogeneity in
beliefs and are linked by the change of measure equation4
ξB,t+∆t
ξBt
=
ξA,t+∆t
ξAt
piA(ωt+∆t)
piB(ωt+∆t)
. (2.19)
We find the SPDs from the first order conditions in terms of investors’ marginal
utilities of consumption and Lagrange multipliers for collateral requirements (2.10).
First, we rewrite the budget equations (2.8)–(2.9) in a static form that expresses
the current wealth in terms of current consumption and the expected discounted
future wealth (e.g., Cox and Huang, 1989). Then, we solve investor optimizations
by dynamic programming and the method of Lagrange multipliers. Lemma 1 below
reports the results.
Lemma 1 (Dynamic programming and the first order condition).
1) Let Vi(Wit, vt; li) denote the value function of investor i, where vt is the state
variable. Then, the value function solves the following equation of dynamic pro-
gramminng:
Vi(Wit, vt; li) = max
cit
{
ui(cit)∆t+ e−ρ∆tEit[Vi(Wi,t+∆t, vt+∆t; li)]
}
, (2.20)
subject to the static budget and collateral constraints:
Wit + liDt∆t = cit∆t+ Eit
ξi,t+∆t
ξit
Wi,t+∆t
 , (2.21)
Wi,t+∆t ≥ 0. (2.22)
2) Value function Vi(Wit, vt; li) is a concave function of wealth Wit.
3) The SPDs ξit and optimal consumptions c∗it satisfy the first order conditions
ξi,t+∆t
ξit
= e−ρ∆t
(c∗i,t+∆t)−γi + `i,t+∆t
(c∗it)−γi
, (2.23)
3The proof of existence of the SPD in arbitrage-free economies can be found in Duffie (2001,
p.4).
4Three equations (2.16)–(2.18) can be rewritten as equations for three unknowns
pii(ωk)ξi,t+∆t(ωk)/ξit, where k = 1, 2, 3 and i is set to either A or B. The solution of these equa-
tions is unique when the matrix of asset payoffs is invertible, and hence, piB(ωt+∆t)ξB,t+∆t/ξBt =
piA(ωt+∆t)ξA,t+∆t/ξAt for all states.
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where `i,t+∆t ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier for collateral requirement (2.22) satisfy-
ing the complementary slackness condition `i,t+∆tW ∗i,t+∆t = 0.
We use Lemma 1 to derive the dynamics of state variable vt. First, suppose
constraints do not bind. In this case, Lagrange multipliers `i,t+∆t vanish and the
first order conditions (2.23) are the same as in the unconstrained economy. The
dynamics of the state variable vt in the unconstrained region of the state-space
is then the same as in the unconstrained economy, and is found in closed form
below. Next, let v and v be the values of the state variable vt when constraints
(2.10) of investors A and B bind, respectively. We show that state variable vt stays
within boundaries v ≤ vt ≤ v. Intuitively, binding collateral constraints restrict
the investors’ losses of wealth and consumption, which traps the state variable in
the interval [v, v]. The boundaries v and v are found from the condition that the
constraints bind: Wi,t+∆t = 0. Dividing these constraints by Dt+∆t, we obtain
equations
ΦA(v) = 0, ΦB(v) = 0, (2.24)
where Φi(vt) are wealth-output ratios given by equations (A18) and (A19) in the
Appendix. Proposition 1 below reports the dynamics of vt.
Proposition 1 (Closed-form dynamics of state variable vt).
Given the boundaries v and v, the equilibrium dynamics of state variable vt is given
by:
vt+∆t = max
{
v; min{ v; vt + µv∆t+ σv∆wt + Jv∆jt}
}
, (2.25)
where drift µv, volatility σv, and jump Jv are given in closed form by:
µv =
1
2∆t
(γA − γB) ln[(1 + µD∆t)2 − σ2D∆t] + ln
1− λB∆t1− λ∆t

2
+ ln(1− δ2∆t)
 ,(2.26)
σv =
1
2
√
∆t
(γA − γB) ln
1 + µD∆t+ σD
√
∆t
1 + µD∆t− σD
√
∆t
+ ln
1 + δ
√
∆t
1− δ√∆t

 , (2.27)
Jv = (γA − γB) ln(1 + µD∆t+ JD) + ln
λB
λ
− µv∆t. (2.28)
Boundaries v and v are reflecting when ∆t is sufficiently small; that is, vt does not
stay at the boundaries forever: Prob(v > vt+∆t|vt = v) > 0 and Prob(vt+∆t > v|vt =
v) > 0.
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Equation (2.25) reveals the exact structure of the state variable and sheds light
on the equilibrium effects of the collateral requirement. The equation demonstrates
that the constraint does not alter the dynamics of the state variable when the
constraint does not bind, and all its effects are due to imposing bounds on process vt.
This property of state variable vt plays important role in establishing the clustering
of volatilities and other results in Section 4 below, and it is difficult to see using
numerical methods instead of a closed-form dynamics.
Proposition B.1 in technical appendix B proves the existence of time-independent
bounds v and v satisfying equations (2.24). The intuition for the existence of these
bounds is as follows. Suppose, for example, that bound v does not exist. Then,
equation (2.14) for the consumption share s(vt) of investor A implies that s(vt) ≈ 0
when vt is sufficiently large, and hence, investor A’s consumption net of labor income
(s(vt) − lA)Dt can be negative for a long period. As a result, investor A’s wealth
is negative for a sufficiently large vt because this wealth equals the present value of
net consumption. However, negative wealth contradicts the constraint WA,t+∆t ≥ 0,
and hence v exists.
The closed-form dynamics (2.25) helps us build a theory of collateral constraints.
In particular, we use this dynamics to prove the existence of equilibrium and sta-
tionarity of equilibrium processes, derive asset prices, and to study the effects of
collateralization on asset prices. Proposition 2 below reports the SPD and the stock
price.
Proposition 2 (State price density and the effects on asset prices).
1) The state price density under the beliefs of investor A is given by:
ξA,t+∆t
ξAt
= e−ρ∆t
s(vt+∆t)
s(vt)
Dt+∆t
Dt

−γA
exp
(
max{0; vt +µv∆t+σv∆wt +Jv∆jt− v}
)
,
(2.29)
where investor A’s time-t consumption share s(vt) solves equation (2.14).
2) The price-dividend ratio Ψ(vt) is uniformly bounded, and the stock price St is
given by
St = (1− lA − lB)DtEAt
[ +∞∑
τ=t+∆t
ξAτ
ξAt
Dτ
Dt
]
, (2.30)
the prices of the bond and the insurance contract are given by Bt = EAt [ξA,t+∆t]/ξAt
and Pt = EAt [ξA,t+∆t1{ωt+∆t=ω3}]/ξAt, respectively.
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3) The prices of bond, stock, and insurance contract are higher in the economy with
collateral constraints than in the frictionless economy, conditional on two economies
having the same current output Dt and the state variable vt.
Equation (2.29) captures the effect of collateralization on the SPD in our econ-
omy. It shows that the change in the SPD, ξt+∆t/ξt, can be decomposed into two
terms. The first term, e−ρ∆t(s(vt+∆t)Dt+∆t)−γA/(s(vt)Dt)−γA , given by the ratio of
marginal utilities of investor A at times t + ∆t and t, is the change in SPD in the
frictionless economy. The second term captures the effect of the friction on the SPD,
and is only activated when the constraint of investor A is binding. An equivalent
representation of SPD can be obtained in terms of the marginal utilities of investor
B.
Proposition 2 demonstrates that imposing collateral requirements inflates asset
prices. This is because the SPD in the constrained economy exceeds its counterpart
in the frictionless economy due to the positive Lagrange multiplier `i,t+∆t in the first
order condition (2.23). This result is in contrast to the effects of borrowing, margin,
and restricted participation constraints in the related literature (e.g., Chabakauri,
2013, 2015; Rytchkov, 2014), which increase or decrease the stock prices depending
on the investors’ elasticities of intertemporal substitution. Moreover, this literature
evaluates the effects of frictions numerically, whereas we provide rigorous proofs
aided by the closed-form dynamics of the state variable (2.25) and the SPD (2.29).
We discuss the intuition and further economic differences between our constraint
and the constraints in the literature in Section 4.1.
Proposition B.2 in the technical Appendix B provides the verification theorem for
the optimality of investors’ optimal strategies, and is not reported here for brevity.
In particular, this proposition shows that in the economy where the state price
density is given by equation (2.29) the dynamic programming problem (2.20)–(2.22)
has a unique solution Vit and this solution is the indirect utility function of investor
i.
2.3.1 Closed-form solution in a continuous-time limit
Next, we take continuous-time limit ∆t → 0 and derive the equilibrium in closed
form. Taking the limit allows rewriting equations (A30) and (A31) for the price-
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dividend and wealth-consumption ratios, Ψt and Φit, as differential-difference equa-
tions. For tractability, we derive ratios Ψt and Φit in terms of a transformed ratio
Ψ̂(v; θ), which satisfies a simpler equation reported in Lemma 2 below.
Lemma 2 (Differential-difference equation). In the limit ∆t → 0, the price-
dividend ratio Ψ and wealth-output ratios Φi are given by:
Ψ(v) = Ψ̂(v;−γA)s(v)γA , (2.31)
Φi(v) =
(
(1{i=A} − 1{i=B})Ψ̂(v; 1− γA) + (1{i=B} − li)Ψ̂(v;−γA)
)
s(v)γA ,(2.32)
where s(v) solves equation (2.14) and Ψ̂(v; θ) satisfies a differential-difference equa-
tion
σ̂2v
2 Ψ̂
′′(v; θ) +
(
µ̂v + (1− γA)σDσ̂v
)
Ψ̂′(v; θ)
−
λ+ ρ− (1− γA)µD + (1− γA)γA2 σ2D
 Ψ̂(v; θ)
+ λ(1 + JD)1−γAΨ̂
(
max{v; v + Ĵv}; θ
)
+ s(v)θ = 0,
(2.33)
subject to the reflecting boundary conditions
Ψ̂′(v; θ) = 0, Ψ̂′(v; θ)− Ψ̂(v; θ) = 0, (2.34)
where µ̂v, σ̂v ≥ 0, and Ĵv ≤ 0 are constants given by:
µ̂v = (γA − γB)
µD − σ2D2
+ λ− λB − δ22 , (2.35)
σ̂v = (γA − γB)σD + δ, (2.36)
Ĵv = (γA − γB) ln(1 + JD) + ln
λB
λ
 . (2.37)
The boundaries v and v solve the following equations:
Ψ̂(v; 1− γA)
Ψ̂(v;−γA)
= lA,
Ψ̂(v; 1− γA)
Ψ̂(v;−γA)
= 1− lB. (2.38)
We observe that equation (2.33) is linear, in contrast to economies with con-
straints directly imposed on trading strategies of investors (e.g., Gaˆrleanu and Peder-
sen, 2012; Chabakauri, 2013, 2015; Rytchkov, 2014). This equation is a differential-
difference equation with a “delayed” argument in the fourth term on the left-hand
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side of the equation because Ĵv ≤ 0. This term is further complicated by the fact that
the delayed argument is restricted to stay above the lower boundary v, which gives
rise to the dependence of the fourth term on a peculiar argument max{v; v + Ĵv}.
This term captures investors’ decisions in anticipation of hitting their collateral
constraint.
Before deriving the equilibrium in the general case, in Corollary 1 below, we
provide analytical price-dividend ratios when there is no crisis and investors have
log preferences.
Corollary 1 (Analytical asset prices in a special case). Suppose, investors
A and B have logarithmic preferences and there is no production crisis, that is,
λ = λB = 0. Then, price-dividend ratio Ψ(v) is given by:
Ψ(v) =
1
ρ
+
C1e
ϕ+v + C2eϕ−v
1 + ev , (2.39)
where ϕ± = 0.5(1 ±
√
1 + 8ρ/δ2), and constants C1 and C2 are given by equations
(A44) and (A45) in the Appendix, respectively.
In Section 4 below, we argue that the analytical price-dividend ratio (2.39) cap-
tures some important properties of price-dividend ratio that hold in the general
case with arbitrary risk aversions and crises. Hence, this special case can be used
as a tractable benchmark in asset pricing research. Nevertheless, we undertake a
comprehensive investigation of equilibrium in the general case.
Proposition B.3 in Appendix B presents the closed-form price-dividend ratio for
general CRRA risk aversions and beliefs. These solutions are in terms of exogenous
model parameters and do not require solving equation (2.33). Although the closed-
form solution in Proposition B.3 is complex, it provides a constructive proof for the
existence of price-dividend ratios and helps avoid numerical methods based on value
function iterations (e.g., Krusell and Smith, 1998), widely used in the literature with
market frictions, for which the convergence results, in general, are not available. We
double-checked the solution reported in Proposition B.3 by solving problem (2.33)–
(2.34) using the method of finite differences.
We call the interval v ∈ [v, v−Ĵv] in the state-space a period of anxious economy,
similar to Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008).5 When the economy falls into this state,
5However, in contrast to Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008), the disagreement about the consump-
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even a small possibility of a crisis renders the collateral requirement binding and
leads to deleveraging in the economy. To explore the economic effects of the anxious
economy, we provide closed-form expressions for the interest rates rt and risk premia
in normal times µt − rt, which can be easily obtained using previously derived
equations for asset prices and the state price density. Proposition 3 below reports
the results.
Proposition 3 (Interest rates and risk premia in the limit). For a sufficiently
small interval ∆t, the interest rate rt and the risk premium µt − rt in normal times
are given by:
rt =

r˜t − λ(1 + JD)−γA
s
(
max{v; vt + Ĵv}
)
st

−γA
+O(∆t), for v < vt < v,
(1− st)Γt
(
1{v=v} − 1{v=v}
)
− γB
2γB
√
∆t
σ̂v +O(1), for v = v or v = v,
(2.40)
µt − rt =
γAσD − (1− st)Γtσ̂v
γB
+
(1− st)Γtσ̂v(1{v=v} + 1{v=v})− γBσ̂v1{v=v}
2γB
σt
− λ(1 + JD)−γAJt
s
(
max{v; vt + Ĵv}
)
st

−γA
+O(
√
∆t), (2.41)
where r˜t is the interest rate in the unconstrained economy without crisis risk, given
by:
r˜t = λ + ρ+ γAµD −
γA(1 + γA)
2 σ
2
D +
γAσDσ̂v − µ̂v
γB
 (1− st)Γt
− σ̂2v
 12γ2B(1− st)2Γ2t +
1
2γ2Aγ2B
st(1− st)Γ3t
 ,
(2.42)
drift µ̂v, volatility σ̂v, and Ĵv of the state variable v are given by equations (2.35)–
(2.37), volatility σt and jump size Jt are given by equations (B27)–(B28), respectively,
and Γt ≡ γAγB/
(
γA(1− st) + γBst
)
is the risk aversion of a representative investor.
tion growth dynamics in our economy does not increase during these periods.
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The effects of collateral requirements on interest rates and risk premia arise due to
the investors’ concern that a potential crisis may render the constraint binding next
period when the economy is close to boundary v. The last term in the first equation
in (2.40) for the interest rate quantifies the impact of collateral requirements on
precautionary savings due to a downward jump in the aggregate consumption, which
we further discuss in Section 4.
Equations (2.40) and (2.41) also feature terms with indicator functions 1{v=v}
and 1{v=v}, which are non-zero only at the boundaries v and v. For the interest
rate rt these terms have the order of magnitude proportional to 1/
√
∆t, and hence,
the interest rate has singularities at the boundaries v and v when ∆t→ 0. Similar
singularities arise in a continuous-time model of Detemple and Serrat (2003). Our
discrete-time analysis sheds new light on these singularities by uncovering their order
of magnitude 1/
√
∆t. Consequently, the per-period rate rt∆t is finite and has an
order of magnitude O(
√
∆t).
The intuition for the singularity is that near the boundaries v and v even a small
shock ∆wt may lead to a default. Consequently, when the collateral requirement of
an investor binds at time t, the investor allocates a larger fraction of labor income
to bond than in the interior region v < vt < v and requires a higher risk premium.
Therefore, the interest rate decreases and Sharpe ratio increases at the boundaries.
The interest rates and Sharpe ratios in a similar model have been studied in
Detemple and Serrat (2003). However, our model is more general in that it incorpo-
rates jumps and heterogeneity of preferences. Moreover, their paper does not study
price-dividend ratios and stock return volatilities, which are significantly more dif-
ficult to obtain, as can be seen from the price-dividend ratios reported in Lemma 2
above and Proposition 3.B in the technical Appendix B. We also note that the inter-
est rate (2.40) and the risk-premium (2.41) are significantly different from those in
the related literature on borrowing and margin constraints (e.g., Chabakauri, 2013,
2015; Rytchkov, 2014). The main difference is that these quantities in the related
literature feature additional Lagrange multipliers for the constraints that bind in an
interval of a state space and do not have singularities.
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2.3.2 Stationary distribution of consumption share
Absent any frictions, state variable v follows an arithmetic Brownian motion with
a jump. This process is non-stationary and induces non-stationarity of the uncon-
strained equilibrium where one of the investor’s share of consumption gradually
converges to zero. Hence, with the exception of some knife-edge parameter com-
binations, only one of the investors has a significant impact on asset prices in the
frictionless economy in the long run (e.g., Blume and Easley, 2001; Yan, 2008;
Chabakauri, 2015).
It is intuitive that imposing collateral requirements (2.10) helps both investors
survive and have an impact on equilibrium in the long-run because these constraints
protect investors against losing their shares of aggregate consumption beyond cer-
tain limits. This intuition for the survival of of investors in economies with market
imperfections has also been discussed in the previous literature (e.g., Blume and
Easley, 2001; Cao, 2018, among others). However, this intuition does not reveal
the shape of the distribution of consumption share s, whether this distribution is
well-defined or degenerate (e.g., fully concentrated at boundaries s or s), and which
parameters determine the relative dominance of investors in the economy. Our main
contribution in this section is that armed with the closed-form dynamics of the state
variable vt in (2.25), we derive the probability density function (PDF) of consump-
tion share s in closed form, show that this PDF is stationary and non-degenerate,
and find parameters that determine its shape. The latter result is important because
it implies non-trivial time-variation of asset prices in the long run. For simplicity,
we assume that there is no crisis risk so that λ = λB = 0. Proposition 4 reports the
results.
Proposition 4 (Stationary distribution of consumption share). Suppose,
λ = λB = 0. Then, the PDF f(s, τ ; st; τ) of consumption share s at time τ condi-
tional on observing share st at time t is given in closed form by expression (A65) in
the Appendix. Furthermore, the stationary PDF of consumption share s is given by:
f(s) =
2µ̂v
σ̂2v
γA
s
+
γB
1− s

(
(1− s)γB/sγA
)2µ̂v/σ̂2v
(
(1− s)γB/sγA
)2µ̂v/σ̂2v − ((1− s)γB/sγA)2µ̂v/σ̂2v1{s≤s≤s},
(2.43)
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where µ̂v = (γA − γB)(µD − σ2D/2) − δ2/2, σ̂v = (γA − γB)σD + δ, 1{s≤s≤s} is an
indicator function and s and s are the bounds on the consumption share s, which
solve equation (2.24) for v and v, respectively.
Proposition 4 confirms that both investors survive in the long run, and that
consumption share s has well-defined stationary distribution. The beliefs enter PDF
(2.43) via the ratio of the drift and variance of process vt, given by µ̂v/σ̂2v . This ratio
determines the relative dominance of investors in the economy. In particular, for
bounds s and s that are symmetric around 0.5 the PDF is concentrated around s if
µ̂v > 0 and around s if µ̂v < 0.
Figure 2.2 plots the stationary PDF (2.43) and transition densities f(s, t; s0, 0),
for parameters described in the legend and explained in Section 4 below. The
stationary PDF has a larger mass around s = 0.1 because the labor share lB = 0.14
of investor B exceeds the labor share lA = 0.123 of investor A in this example in
order to get boundary values s = 0.1 and s = 0.9 symmetric around 0.5. From
Figure 2.2 we observe that both rational and irrational investors can occasionally
have large consumption shares.
Another notable feature of PDF (2.43) is that it is bimodal, with a large mass of
the distribution concentrated around boundaries s and s. The economic implication
of this bimodality is that the periods of binding constraints are likely to be persistent.
The closed-form dynamics (2.25) for the state variable v helps explain the bimodality
of the PDF. From this dynamics, we observe that after hitting a boundary the
process vt remains in its vicinity for some time. Hence, because variable v follows
an arithmetic Brownian motion in the interval (v, v), the probability of hitting the
same boundary again is high.
Proposition 4 implies that the PDF of consumption share s is always stationary
when investors have positive labor incomes lB > 0 and lA > 0 because in this case
1 > s > s > 0, and hence, the PDF (2.43) is well-defined. The PDF of s is also
stationary when lA = 0, lB > 0, and µ̂v < 0, or lA > 0, lB = 0, and µ̂v > 0. In the
latter cases, s = 0 or s = 1, respectively. Then, we observe that the PDF (2.43)
is well-defined when s = 0 and µ̂v < 0, and when s = 1 and µ̂v > 0, and hence is
stationary. The PDF of s is non-stationary when lA = 0 and lB = 0, and is derived
in closed form in Chabakauri (2015). In the latter case only investor A survives if
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Figure 2.2
Convergence to stationary distribution of consumption share st = c∗A,t/Dt
The Figure shows transition densities f(s, t; s0, 0) for the starting point s0 = 0.2 and the
stationary distribution f(s) (i.e., density for t =∞). We set γA = 2, γB = 1.5, µD = 0.018,
σD = 0.032, λ = λB = 0, ρ = 0.02, δ = 0.1125, s = 0.1, s = 0.9, lA = 0.123, and lB = 0.14.
µ̂v < 0, and only investor B survives when µ̂v > 0.
2.4. Analysis of Equilibrium
In this section, we demonstrate the economic implications of our model. In Section
4.1, we show that capital requirements amplify the effect of rare crises on generating
lower interest rates and higher Sharpe ratios, lead to spikes and crashes of stock
prices and stock return volatilities, amplify volatility in good times and decrease it
in bad times, and generate volatility clusters. Section 4.2 measures the economic
significance of collateralization by quantifying the collateral premium of the stock.
We study the equilibrium for calibrated parameters. We set the parameters of
the aggregate consumption process to µD = 0.018, σD = 0.032, JD = −0.2, and the
crisis intensities of investors A and B to λ = 0.017 and λB = 0.01, respectively.6
The risk aversions are γA = 2 and γB = 1.5, and the time discount is ρ = 0.02.
The disagreement parameter is δ = 0.1125, which corresponds to the mean growth
rate (2.6) under investor B’s beliefs equal to 1.2µD. The shares of labor income
6Drift µD and volatility σD are within the ranges considered in the literature (e.g., Basak and
Cuoco, 1998; Chan and Kogan, 2002; Rytchkov, 2014), intensity λ = 0.017 is from Barro (2009).
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lA = 0.123 and lB = 0.14 are chosen to generate symmetric bounds on investor A’s
consumption share: s = 0.1 and s = 0.9.7
We plot the equilibrium distributions and processes as functions of consumption
share st = c∗At/Dt because s lies in the interval [0, 1] and is more intuitive than
variable v. We observe that consumption share s is countercyclical in the sense
that corrt(dst, dDt) < 0. Intuitively, the aggregate wealth and consumption shift
to (away from) investor A following negative (positive) shocks to output because
this investor is more risk averse and pessimistic than investor B. We call a process
procyclical (countercyclical) if that process is a decreasing (increasing) function of
s. We interpret periods of low (high) st as good (bad) times in the economy, because
during these periods the output Dt is high (low).
2.4.1 Equilibrium processes
Figure 2.3 depicts investor B’s leverage/market ratio Lt/St and stock holdings nBt
in the constrained (solid line) and unconstrained (dashed line) economies. Panel (a)
demonstrates the cyclicality of leverage. The leverage is lowest when either investor
A or investor B bind on their constraints. Intuitively, when s = s, investor B’s
financial wealth is zero, and hence, B lacks collateral and cannot borrow. When s =
s, investor A’s financial wealth is zero and the labor income lADt∆t is infinitesimally
small in the continuous-time limit. The liquidity dries up because investor A cannot
supply credit. The leverage cycles are present only in the constrained economy.
They do not occur in the unconstrained economy where the state variable s is non-
stationary and gradually converges to 0 or 1.
Panel (b) presents the number of stocks held by investor B. Consider first the
unconstrained economy where the labor income is pledgeable. From panel (b) we
observe that in this economy investor B shorts stocks despite being more optimistic
than investor A when consumption share s is close to 1. The intuition is that in
bad times, following a sequence of negative shocks to output, investor B shorts
7To avoid finding bounds s and s numerically, we set them exogenously to s = 0.1 and s = 0.9
and then recover the shares of labor incomes lA = 0.123 and lB = 0.14 that imply these bounds
in equilibrium. First, we find v and v from equation (2.14) for v, and then find lA and lB from
equations (2.38).
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Figure 2.3
Leverage and stock holdings of optimistic and less risk averse investor B
Panels (a) and (b) depict optimistic and less risk averse investor B’s leverage/market price
ratio Lt/St and the number of shares nSt, respectively, as functions of consumption share
st = c∗At/Dt. The solid and dashed lines correspond to constrained and unconstrained
economies, respectively.
stocks to finance consumption and backs short positions by the pledgeable labor
income. The stream of labor income lBDt∆t is equivalent to dividends from holding
n̂B = lB/(1 − lA − lB) units of non-tradable shares in the Lucas tree. Short-selling
allows the investor to circumvent the non-tradability of labor income and freely
adjust the effective share nˆB+nB,St in the Lucas tree. Overcoming the non-tradability
of labor incomes makes this economy similar to the non-stationary unconstrained
economy where investors can freely trade shares in the Lucas tree. The financial
wealth can then become negative. The collateral requirement imposes non-negative
wealth constraint, which precludes investor B from shorting. The trading strategy
of investor A equals 1− n∗Bt in equilibrium and can be analyzed similarly. Investor
A also has an additional motive to short stocks due to being more pessimistic than
investor B.
Figure 2.4 depicts the interest rate rt, Sharpe ratio (µt − rt)/σt, price-dividend
ratio Ψ, and excess stock return volatility (σt−σD)/σD in the constrained (solid line)
and unconstrained (dashed line) economies. Panel (a) shows the interest rates rt.8
The interest rate declines sharply when the economy enters into an anxious state
close to the boundary s where even a small possibility of a crisis next period makes
8We exclude the singularities in the dynamics of rt and focus on the dynamics in the uncon-
strained region because the economy spends an infinitesimal amount of time at the boundaries.
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Equilibrium processes
Panels (a)–(d) show interest rate rt, Sharpe ratio (µt−rt)/σt, price-dividend ratio Ψt, and
excess volatility (σt − σD)/σD as functions of st = c∗At/Dt for the constrained (solid lines)
and unconstrained (dashed lines) economies.
the constraint of investorB binding. The intuition is as follows. In the unconstrained
economy, a crisis around state s generates wealth transfer to the pessimistic and
more risk averse investor A and increases her consumption share s above s. In the
constrained economy, consumption share s is capped by s. Consequently, following
a crisis, investor A’s marginal utility (c∗A)−γA is higher in the constrained than in
the unconstrained economy. As a result, investor A is more willing to smooth
consumption in the constrained economy, and hence, the interest rate declines due
to the precautionary savings motive. In particular, the investor buys more bonds,
which drives interest rates down. Panel (b) of Figure 2.4 shows that the Sharpe
ratio increases to compensate investor A for buying risky assets from investor B.
Our results on interest rates and Sharpe ratios indicate that the rare crises and
collateral requirements reinforce the effects of each other. In particular, the decreases
in interest rates and increases in Sharpe ratios during anxious times arise only when
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both the crises and the constraints (2.10) are simultaneously present. Removing the
constraint but keeping the crisis risk increases the interest rate and decreases the
Sharpe ratio. Equation (2.40) for the interest rate and equation (2.41) for the risk
premium show that removing the crisis risk (i.e., setting λ = λB=0) but keeping the
constraint leads to rt and µt − rt which are the same as in the frictionless economy
when v < vt < v, consistent with findings in Detemple and Serrat (2003). Absent
any crises, the constraints affect rt and µt − rt only at the boundaries of the state-
space, as shown in Section 3.1.
From panel (c), we observe that the collateral requirements give rise to higher
price-dividend ratio Ψ than in the unconstrained economy, Ψconstrt − Ψunct > 0, as
proven in Proposition 2. The increases in ratio Ψ are larger around the boundaries
s and s, which makes ratio Ψ a U-shaped function of s sensitive to small shocks
close to boundaries. The U-shape is a robust phenomenon that does not require
rare crises or investors that differ both in risk aversions and beliefs. When both
investors have identical risk aversions γA = γB = 1 but different beliefs and there
is no crisis risk (i.e., λA = λB = 0), the U-shape is an analytical result that follows
from the closed-form expression (2.39) for ratio Ψ. This ratio remains U-shaped
when investors have different risk aversions but identical beliefs.
The intuition for the U-shape is as follows. Suppose, consumption share s is close
to the boundary s, where investor B’s constraint is likely to bind but investor A is
unconstrained. Because investor A’s constraint is loose the state price density ξAt is
proportional to investor A’s marginal utility (c∗At)−γA . In the constrained economy
the consumption share of investor A is capped by s < 1 whereas in the unconstrained
economy it can increase above s. Therefore, the marginal utility of investor A and,
hence, the state price density are expected to be higher in the constrained than in the
unconstrained economy. Consequently, stocks are more valuable in the constrained
economy around the boundary s. The intuition around s can be analyzed in a
similar way. An additional economic force contributing to higher stock price is that
the stock can be used as collateral that helps relax the constraint, which gives rise
to a premium. This force is explored in Section 4.2.
The results on panel (d) demonstrate that the constraint makes volatility more
procyclical, reduces volatility in bad times (around s) and increases it in good times
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(around s). This is because U-shaped price-dividend ratio in the constrained econ-
omy is more procyclical in good times (i.e., around s) and more countercyclical in
bad times (i.e., around s) than in the unconstrained economy. Stock price St = ΨtDt
is more volatile in good times (around s) because both Ψ and Dt change in the same
direction, and is less volatile in bad times (around s) because Ψ and Dt change in
opposite directions and partially offset the effects of each other. Lower volatility
in bad times is in line with the previous literature on the effects of portfolio con-
straints on asset prices (e.g., Chabakauri, 2013, 2015; Brunnermeier and Sannikov,
2014, among others). The empirical literature finds that the volatility tends to be
higher in bad times (e.g., Schwert, 1989). However, high volatility can be explained
by high uncertainty about the economic growth and learning effects in bad times
(e.g., Veronesi, 1999), which we do not study in this paper to focus on the effects of
collateral constraints which are not confounded by other effects.
Boundary conditions (2.34) allow us to explore volatility σt near the boundaries
s and s using closed form expressions in Corollary 2 below.
Corollary 2 (Stock return volatility at the boundaries). Stock return volatil-
ity in normal times σt satisfies the following boundary conditions:
σ(s) = σD +
γBsσ̂v
γA(1− s) + γBs > σD, σ(s) = σD −
γA(1− s)σ̂v
γA(1− s) + γBs < σD. (2.44)
By continuity, inequalities (2.44) also hold in a vicinity of the boundaries. Panel
(d) shows that volatility σt is very steep at the boundaries: it spikes close to s and
crashes close to s, consistent with Corollary 2. It also evolves in three regimes of
low, medium, and high volatility, which resembles volatility clustering documented
in the empirical literature (e.g., Bollerslev, 1987). The distribution of consumption
share s on Figure 2.2 implies that the economy persists in these clusters for some
time.
Figure 2.5 plots the simulated dynamics of P/D ratio and stock return volatility
over a period of 50 years. Consistent with our discussion above, the dynamics of
P/D ratio on panel (a) exhibits intervals of booms and busts around the times when
the collateral requirements become binding. These intervals resemble periods of
inflating and deflating bubbles in the economy. The volatility σ on panel (b) evolves
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Simulated P/D ratio Ψ and stock return volatility σ over time
Panels (a) and (b) show the spikes and crashes of simulated P/D ratio and volatility σ,
and clustering of volatility σ over the period of 50 years.
in clusters of high and low volatility, as explained above.
The economic effects of collateral requirements are different from the effects of
margin and borrowing constraints in the related literature discussed in the intro-
duction. In particular, those constraints increase or decrease price-dividend ratios
and make them pro- or counter-cyclical depending on investors’ risk aversions (e.g.,
Chabakauri, 2015). They also shrink volatility towards the output volatility σD by
reducing the risk-sharing. The main mechanism in our paper is different, and is
driven by the increased marginal utilities due to endogenously arising bounds on
the consumption share s. As a result, in our model price-dividend ratios increase
irrespective of the beliefs and risk aversions of investors, and the volatility deviates
further away from the output volatility (Figure 2.4). Other new effects relative to
this literature include the cyclicality of leverage, mutual amplification of effects of
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rare crises and collateral constraints, and spikes in price-dividend ratios and volatil-
ities.
2.4.2 Collateral liquidity premium
In this section, we measure the liquidity premium of stocks over labor income arising
because stocks can be used as collateral. We consider a marginal representative
investor i that does not affect asset prices and characterize this investor’s shadow
indifference price Ŝit of labor income. We define Ŝit as the price such that exchanging
marginal ∆li units of labor income for Ŝit∆li units of wealth leaves the investor’s
utility unchanged. Consider the investor’s value function Vi(Wit, vt; li) satisfying
the dynamic programming equation (2.20) subject to constraints (2.21) and (2.22).
Price Ŝit is the solution of equation Vi(W ∗it, vt; li) = Vi(W ∗it+ Ŝit∆li, vt; li−∆li) when
∆li → 0. In the limit, we find:
Ŝit =
∂Vi(W ∗it, vt; li)/∂li
∂Vi(W ∗it, vt; li)/∂Wit
. (2.45)
The definition of shadow indifference price Ŝit comes from the literature on the
valuation of derivative securities in incomplete markets (e.g., Davis, 1997).
The labor incomes liDt∆t are proportional to dividends (1−lA−lB)Dt∆t. There-
fore, if claims on labor incomes were tradable and pledgeable, shadow price Ŝit would
have been equal to St/(1 − lA − lB). However, labor incomes are non-tradable and
non-pledgeable. Hence, from the view of investor i, the stock enjoys liquidity pre-
mium, which we define as
Λit =
St/(1− lA − lB)− Ŝit
St/(1− lA − lB) . (2.46)
We find derivatives in equation (2.45) using the envelope theorem. Then, we
derive prices Ŝit and show that premia (2.46) are positive and large. Proposition 5
reports our results.
Proposition 5 (Shadow prices and the liquidity premium). In the limit
∆t→ 0, investor i′s shadow price of a unit of labor income is given by:
Ŝit = Ψ̂i(v;−γA)s(v)γADt, i = A,B, (2.47)
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Collateral liquidity premia from the view of investors A and B
The Figure shows the collateral liquidity premia (2.46) of stocks over non-pledgeable labor
incomes from the view of investors A and B.
where Ψ̂i(v; θ) satisfies differential-difference equation (2.33) subject to the following
boundary conditions for investors A and B
Ψ̂′A(v; θ) = 0, Ψ̂′A(v; θ) = 0, (2.48)
Ψ̂′B(v; θ) = Ψ̂B(v; θ), Ψ̂′B(v; θ) = Ψ̂B(v; θ). (2.49)
The investors’ liquidity premia for stocks ΛA and ΛB are positive, and hence,
St/(1− lA − lB) > ŜAt, St/(1− lA − lB) > ŜBt. (2.50)
The premium Λit > 0 arises because the stock can be used as a collateral whereas
the labor income cannot. We note that this premium is zero in the unconstrained
economy, and hence the non-tradability of labor income and the possibility of short-
ing stocks do not contribute to the premium. This is because, as discussed in Section
4.1, in an unconstrained economy with fully pledgeable labor income the investors
can circumvent the non-tradability of labor income by shorting stocks. We further
remark that the shadow prices and liquidity premia can be found in closed form,
similar to stock prices in Section 3, but we do not present them for brevity.
Figure 2.6 plots the liquidity premia (2.46) for the same calibrated parameters as
in Section 4.1. We observe that investors A and B have different valuations of their
labor incomes due to differences in preferences and beliefs. Their premia Λi are close
to zero when the investors are far away from the boundaries where their respective
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collateral requirements become binding. The premia increase up to 35% close to
the boundaries where the stock is more valuable for the purposes of relaxing the
constraints. Large premia Λit imply the economic significance of stock pledgeability.
2.5. Conclusion
We develop a parsimonious and tractable theory of asset pricing under collateral
requirements. We show that requiring investors to collateralize their trades has
significant effects on asset prices and their moments. The constraints decrease in-
terest rates and increase Sharpe ratios when optimistic investors are close to default
boundaries. They also increase price-dividend ratios, amplify volatilities in good
states and dampen them in bad states. Hence, collateral requirements emerge as vi-
able instruments for stabilizing markets in bad times. The tractability of our model
allows us to obtain asset prices and the distributions of consumption shares in closed
form.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Lemma A.1 (Change of variable). Let n̂i = kili/(1 − lA − lB). Maximization
of expected discounted utility (2.7) subject to budget constraints (2.8) and (2.9), and
constraint (2.11) is equivalent to maximizing (2.7) with respect to cit, bit and n˜it
subject to the following set of constraints:
W˜it + liDt∆t = cit∆t+ bitBt + n˜it(St, Pt)>, (A1)
W˜i,t+∆t = bit + n˜it
(
St+∆t + (1− lA − lB)Dt+∆t∆t, 1{ωt+∆t=ω3}
)>
, (A2)
W˜i,t+∆t ≥ 0, (A3)
where W˜it = Wit + n̂iSt and W˜i,t+∆t = Wi,t+∆t + n̂i(St+∆t + (1− lA − lB)Dt+∆t).
Proof of Lemma A.1. Substituting nit = n˜it − (n̂i, 0) into (2.8) and (2.9), we
obtain constraints (A1) and (A2). Rewriting constraint (2.11) in terms of variable
W˜i,t+∆t, we obtain (A3). Finally, we note that W˜it = Wit + n̂iSt is worth W˜i,t+∆t
next period. Hence, (A1) and (A2) can be seen as self-financing budget constraints.

Proof of Lemma 1.
1) We start by demonstrating the equivalence of the dynamic (2.8)–(2.9) and static
budget constraints (2.21). Multiplying equation (2.9) by ξi,t+∆t/ξit, taking expecta-
tion operator Eit[·] on both sides, and using equations (2.16)–(2.18) for asset prices,
we obtain:
Eit
ξi,t+∆t
ξit
Wi,t+∆t
 = bitBt + nit(St, Pt)>. (A4)
From the budget constraint equation (2.8), we observe that the right-hand side of
(A4) equals Wit + liDt∆t, and hence, we obtain the static budget constraint (2.21).
Conversely, if there exists Wi,t+∆t satisfying constraints (2.21) and (2.22) there exist
trading strategies bit and nit that replicate Wi,t+∆t because the underlying market
is effectively complete (i.e., the payoff matrix is invertible). Then, rewriting the
optimization problem (2.7) in a recursive form, we obtain the dynamic programming
equation (2.20) for the value function.
2) Consider wealth levels Wit and Ŵit. Let {c∗it, b∗it, n∗it} and {ĉ∗it, b̂∗it, n̂∗it} be optimal
consumptions and portfolios that correspond toWit and Ŵit, respectively, and satisfy
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constraints (2.8)–(2.10). For any α ∈ [0, 1], policies {αĉ∗it + (1 − α)c∗it, αb̂∗it + (1 −
α)b∗it, αn̂∗it + (1− α)n∗it} are admissible for wealth αWit + (1− α)Ŵit. By concavity
of CRRA utilities:
Vi(αWit + (1− α)Ŵit, vt; li) ≥
∞∑
τ=t
ui(αĉ∗it + (1− α)c∗it)
≥ ∞∑
τ=t
(αui(ĉ∗it) + (1− α)ui(c∗it))
= αVi(Wit, vt; li) + (1− α)Vi(Ŵit, vt; li).
(A5)
Therefore, Vi(Wit, vt; li) is a concave function of wealth.
3) Consider the following Lagrangian:
L = ui(cit)∆t+ e−ρ∆tEit
[
Vi(Wi,t+∆t, vt+∆t; li)
]
+ ηit
Wit + liDt∆t− cit∆t− Eit[ξi,t+∆tξit Wi,t+∆t
]+ Eit[e−ρ∆t`i,t+∆tWi,t+∆t)],(A6)
where multiplier `i,t+∆t satisfies the complementary slackness condition `i,t+∆tWi,t+∆t =
0. Differentiating the Lagrangian (A6) with respect to cit and Wi,t+∆t, we obtain:
u′i(c∗it) = ηit, (A7)
e−ρ∆t
∂Vi(Wt+∆t, vt+∆t; li)
∂W
+ `i,t+∆t
 = ηit ξi,t+∆t
ξit
. (A8)
By the envelope theorem (e.g, Back (2010, p.162)):
∂Vi(Wi,t+∆t, vt+∆t; li)
∂W
= u′i(c∗i,t+∆t). (A9)
Substituting the partial derivative of the value function (A9) and the marginal utility
(A7) into equation (A8), and then dividing both sides of the equation by u′i(c∗it), we
obtain the expression for the SPD (2.23). 
Proof of Proposition 1.
Step 1. Consider the case when constraints do not bind, and hence, `i,t+∆t = 0.
Then, using equation (2.13) for the state variable vt and the first order conditions
(2.23), we obtain:
vt+∆t−vt = ln
 (c
∗
A,t+∆t/c
∗
At)−γA
(c∗
B,t+∆t/c
∗
Bt)−γB
Dt+∆t
Dt

γA−γB = ln
ξA,t+∆t/ξAtξB,t+∆t/ξBt
Dt+∆t
Dt

γA−γB .
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From the above equation and the change of measure equation (2.19), which relates
SPDs ξA,t+∆t and ξB,t+∆t, we obtain the dynamics of vt when constraints do not
bind:
vt+∆t − vt = ln
piB(ωt+∆t)piA(ωt+∆t)
Dt+∆t
Dt

γA−γB . (A10)
Let v and v be the boundaries satisfying Equations (2.24), at which the con-
straints of investors A and B bind, respectively. Let investor A’s constraint be
binding so that vt+∆t = v, and hence, `A,t+∆t ≥ 0. Using Equation (2.13) for vt, first
order conditions (2.23), and `A,t+∆t ≥ 0, we obtain:
v − vt ≤ ln
((c
∗
A,t+∆t)−γA + `A,t+∆t)/(c∗At)−γA
(c∗
B,t+∆t/c
∗
Bt)−γB
Dt+∆t
Dt

γA−γB
= ln
ξA,t+∆t/ξAtξB,t+∆t/ξBt
Dt+∆t
Dt

γA−γB = ln
piB(ωt+∆t)piA(ωt+∆t)
Dt+∆t
Dt

γA−γB .
(A11)
Similarly, for vt+∆t = v we obtain that v−vt ≥ ln
(
piB(ωt+∆t)/piA(ωt+∆t)
(
Dt+∆t/Dt
)γA−γB)
.
The latter two inequalities imply that when the constraint binds vt+∆t is given by:
vt+∆t = max
v; min
v; vt + ln
piB(ωt+∆t)piA(ωt+∆t)
Dt+∆t
Dt

γA−γB

 . (A12)
We observe that (A12) is also satisfied in the unconstrained case where v < vt+∆t <
v. It remains to prove that vt does not escape [v, v] interval. Consider a marginal
investor of type A. We guess that vt follows dynamics (A12) and verify that the
consumption choice of investor A indeed implies this dynamics. The analysis for
investor B is similar.
We have shown above that vt satisfies inequality (A11) when investor A is con-
strained. Now, we show the opposite: investor A is constrained when vt satisfies
(A11). Hence, vt+∆t cannot exceed v. Consider vt such that vt+ln
(
piB(ωt+∆t)/piA(ωt+∆t) (Dt+∆t/Dt)γA−γB
)
>
v for some ωt+∆t and vt ∈ (v, v). Because v < vt < v, investor A consumes
c∗At = s(vt)Dt, as shown above. We show that the constraint of investor A binds and
c∗A,t+∆t = s(v)Dt+∆t. This consumption level confirms that vt+∆t = v is indeed an
equilibrium outcome.
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Consider the constraint of investor A at date t in the state ωt+∆t where vt+∆t = v:
WA,t+∆t ≥ 0 ≡ ΦA(v)Dt+∆t, (A13)
where the last equality holds by the definition of v. Using the concavity of the value
function, proven in Lemma 1, and condition (A9) from the envelope theorem, we
obtain:
u′A(c∗A,t+∆t) =
∂VA(WA,t+∆t, v; lA)
∂W
≤
∂VA(ΦA(v)Dt+∆t, v; lA)
∂W
= u′A(s(v)Dt+∆t).
(A14)
Because u′i(c) is a decreasing function, we find that c∗A,t+∆t/Dt+∆t ≥ s(v).
Investor B is unconstrained when vt+∆t = v, and hence, has SPD
ξB,t+∆t
ξBt
= e−ρ∆t
c∗B,t+∆t
c∗Bt

−γB
= e−ρ∆t
(1− s(v))Dt+∆t(1− s(vt))Dt

−γB
. (A15)
From the change of measure equation (2.19) and the FOC (2.23), the SPD of investor
A is
ξA,t+∆t
ξAt
=
ξB,t+∆t
ξBt
piB(ωt+∆t)
piA(ωt+∆t)
= e−ρ∆t
(c∗A,t+∆t)−γA + `A,t+∆t
(c∗At)−γA
. (A16)
From (A16) and (A15), we find the Lagrange multiplier:
lA,t+∆t
(c∗
A,t+∆t)−γA
=
c∗A,t+∆t
c∗At

γ
A
(1− s(v))Dt+∆t(1− s(vt))Dt

−γB
piB(ωt+∆t)
piA(ωt+∆t)
− 1
≥
s(v)Dt+∆t
s(vt)Dt

γ
A
(1− s(v))Dt+∆t(1− s(vt))Dt

−γB
piB(ωt+∆t)
piA(ωt+∆t)
− 1
=
piB(ωt+∆t)piA(ωt+∆t)
Dt+∆t
Dt

γA−γB evt−v − 1 > 0.
The first inequality follows from the fact that c∗A,t+∆t ≥ s(v)Dt+∆t we proved above.
The second equality holds by the definition of state variable (2.13). The second in-
equality comes from the assumption that vt+ln
(
piB(ωt+∆t)/piA(ωt+∆t) (Dt+∆t/Dt)γA−γB
)
>
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v. Hence, the Lagrange multiplier lA,t+∆t is strictly positive. From the complemen-
tary slackness condition, the constraint (A13) must be binding. Therefore, inequality
(A14) becomes an equality, and hence, c∗A,t+∆t = s(v)Dt+∆t.
Step 2. We now look for coefficients µv, σv and Jv such that:
µv∆t + σv∆wt + Jv∆jt = ln
piB(ωt+∆t)piA(ωt+∆t)
Dt+∆t
Dt

γA−γB
= ln
piB(ωt+∆t)
piA(ωt+∆t)
+ (γA − γB) ln(1 + µD∆t+ σD∆wt + Jv∆jt).
(A17)
We write identity (A17) in each of the states ωt+∆t ∈ {ω1, ω2, ω3} and obtain the
following system of three linear equations with three unknowns µv, σv and Jv:
µv∆t + σv
√
∆t = ln
(1− λB∆t)(1 + δ∆t)1− λ∆t
+ (γA − γB) ln(1 + µD∆t+ σD√∆t),
µv∆t − σv
√
∆t = ln
(1− λB∆t)(1− δ∆t)1− λ∆t
+ (γA − γB) ln(1 + µD∆t− σD√∆t),
µv∆t + Jv = ln
λB
λ
+ (γA − γB) ln(1 + µD∆t+ JD).
Solving the above system, we obtain µv, σv and Jv reported in Proposition 1.
Step 3. Finally, we show that the boundaries are reflecting for a sufficiently small
∆t. Suppose, two conditions are satisfied: µv∆t−σv
√
∆t < 0 and µv∆t+σv
√
∆t > 0.
Then, the boundaries are reflecting: 1) if vt = v, then vt+∆t = v+µv∆t−σv
√
∆t < v
with positive probability; 2) if vt = v, then vt+∆t = v + µv∆t + σv
√
∆t > v with
positive probability. It can be easily verified that as ∆t→ 0, µv → µ̂v and σv → σ̂v,
where µ̂v and σ̂v are constants given by equations (2.35) and (2.36), respectively.
Because σv > 0 and
√
∆t-terms dominate ∆t-terms for small ∆t, we find that
µv∆t− σv
√
∆t < 0 and µv∆t+ σv
√
∆t > 0 for all sufficiently small ∆t. Hence, the
boundaries are reflecting. 
Lemma A.2 (Wealth-output ratios). The investors’ wealth-output ratios Φi are
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uniformly bounded and given by:
ΦA(vt) = EAt
+∞∑
τ=t
e−ρ(τ−t)
Dτ
Dt

1−γA s(vτ )
s(vt)

−γA
(s(vτ )− lA)∆t
 , (A18)
ΦB(vt) = EBt
+∞∑
τ=t
e−ρ(τ−t)
Dτ
Dt

1−γB 1− s(vτ )1− s(vt)

−γB
(lB − s(vτ ))∆t
 .(A19)
Proof of Lemma A.2. Substituting FOC (2.23) into the budget constraint (2.21)
and using the complementary slackness condition `i,t+∆tW ∗i,t+∆t = 0, we obtain:
W ∗At = EAt
e−ρ∆t
c∗A,t+∆t
c∗At

−γA
W ∗A,t+∆t
+ (c∗At − lADt)∆t. (A20)
Substituting W ∗At = ΦAtDt and c∗At = s(vt)Dt into equation (A20) and iterating, we
obtain equation (A18). Let s = s(v) s = s(v), where s(v) is given by equation
(2.14). Then, s ≥ s ≥ s > 0. Using the bounds on st, we obtain the following
uniform bound on ΦA:
ΦA(vt) ≤ Const× EAt
+∞∑
τ=t
e−ρ(τ−t)
Dτ
Dt

1−γA
∆t
 .
The series on the right-hand side of the latter inequality is convergent due to condi-
tion (2.15) on model parameters. Equation (A19) is obtained along the same lines.

Proof of Proposition 2. 1) First, we derive the SPD ξAt under the correct beliefs of
investor A. When investor A’s constraint does not bind, substituting c∗At = s(vt)Dt
into the first order condition (2.23) we find that
ξA,t+∆t
ξAt
= e−ρ∆t
s(vt+∆t)
s(vt)

−γA Dt+∆t
Dt

−γA
. (A21)
Equation (A21) is consistent with SPD (2.29) because when the constraint does not
bind vt+∆t = vt + µv∆t + σv∆wt + Jv∆jt < v, and hence the exponential term in
(2.29) vanishes.
When the constraint of investor A binds, the constraint of investor B is loose:
the constraints cannot bind simultaneously because stock market would not clear
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otherwise. Therefore, the ratio ξB,t+∆t/ξBt is given by FOC (2.23) for investor B
with `B = 0. Using equation (2.19), we rewrite the latter SPD under the correct
beliefs of investor A:
ξA,t+∆t
ξAt
= e−ρ∆t
1− s(vt+∆t)1− s(vt)

−γB Dt+∆t
Dt

−γB
piB(ωt+∆t)
piA(ωt+∆t)
. (A22)
Next, from equation (2.14) for consumption share s we find that (1 − st)−γB =
e−vts−γAt . Substituting the latter equality into equation (A22), and also using equa-
tion (A17) for the increment vt+∆t − vt, we obtain:
ξA,t+∆t
ξAt
= e−ρ∆t
s(vt+∆t)
s(vt)

−γA Dt+∆t
Dt

−γA
evt−vt+∆t
piB(ωt+∆t)
piA(ωt+∆t)
Dt+∆t
Dt

γA−γB
= e−ρ∆t
s(vt+∆t)
s(vt)

−γA Dt+∆t
Dt

−γA
exp{vt − vt+∆t + µv∆t+ σv∆wt + Jv∆jt}.
(A23)
The fact that the constraint of investor A is binding means that vt+∆t = v and vt +
µv∆t+σv∆wt+Jv ≥ v (because otherwise vt+∆t < v, and hence, the constraint does
not bind). Therefore, the exponential term exp(vt − vt+∆t) in equation (A23) can
be replaced with exp(max{0, vt+µv∆t+σv∆wt+Jv∆jt−v}). When the constraint
of investor A does not bind the latter term vanishes and we obtain equation (A21).
Therefore, both equations (A21) and (A23) are summarized by equation (2.29) for
ξA,t+∆t/ξAt.
2) Lemma A.2 derives the wealth-output ratios Φi(vt) and shows that they are
uniformly bounded. From the market clearing condition St = WAt +WBt. Dividing
by Dt, we obtain that Ψ(vt) = ΦA(vt) + ΦB(vt). Hence, Ψ(vt) is uniformly bounded.
The fact that stock price St is given by (2.30) can be verified by substituting St into
the recursive equation (2.17).
3) In the unconstrained economy, the state variable vunct follows dynamics:
vunct = µv∆t+ σv∆wt + Jv∆jt. (A24)
Define processes Ut+∆t = Ut + ∆Ut and Vt+∆t = Vt + ∆Vt, where increments are
given by:
∆Ut = max{0; vt+µv∆t+σv∆wt+Jv∆jt−v}, ∆Vt = max{0; v−vt−µv∆t−σv∆wt−Jv∆jt}.
(A25)
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The process for the state variable in the constrained economy can be rewritten as
vt+∆t = vt + µv∆t+ σv∆wt + Jv∆jt + ∆Vt −∆Ut. (A26)
If the state variables have the same value at time 0, i.e., v0 = vunc0 , we obtain:
vt = vunct + Vt − Ut (A27)
Next, we prove that the SPD is higher in the constrained economy.
ξA,t+∆t
ξAt
= e−ρ∆t
s(vt+∆t)
s(vt)
Dt+∆t
Dt

−γA
exp(∆Ut), (A28)
ξuncA,t+∆t
ξuncAt
= e−ρ∆t
s(vunct+∆t)
s(vunct )
Dt+∆t
Dt

−γA
. (A29)
Iterating the above equations, we obtain:
ξAt
ξA0
= e−ρt
 s(vt)
s(v0)
Dt
D0

−γA
exp(Ut),
ξuncAt
ξuncA0
= e−ρt
s(vunct )
s(v0)
Dt
D0

−γA
.
By the definition of s(v) in equation (2.14), we have ev = (1 − s(v))γB · s(v)−γA .
Hence,
ξAt/ξA0
ξuncAt /ξ
unc
A0
=
 s(vt)
s(vunct )

−γA
exp(Ut) =
s(vunct + Vt − Ut)
s(vunct )

−γA
ev
unc
t e−(v
unc
t −Ut)
≥ s(vunct − Ut)−γAe−(vunct −Ut) · s(vunct )γAevunct
= (1− s(vunct − Ut))−γB · (1− s(vunc))γB ≥ 1.
Therefore, we conclude that ξAt/ξA0 ≥ ξuncAt /ξuncA0 . The latter inequality and the equa-
tions for asset prices (2.16)–(2.18) imply that prices are higher in the constrained
economy. 
Proof of Lemma 2. The price-dividend ratio Ψ and wealth-aggregate consumption
ratios Φi are functions of the state variable v, and satisfy equations:
Ψ(vt) = EAt
ξA,t+∆t
ξAt
Dt+∆t
Dt
(
Ψ(vt+∆t) + ∆t
) , (A30)
Φi(vt) = EAt
ξA,t+∆t
ξAt
Dt+∆t
Dt
Φi(vt+∆t)
+ (1{i=A}s(vt) + 1{i=B}(1− s(vt))− li)∆t.(A31)
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These equations are obtained by substituting St = (1− lA− lB)DtΨ(vt) into equation
(2.17) for the stock price, and Ψi = DtWit into static budget constraints (2.21).
Define the following function in discrete time:
Ψ̂(vt; θ) = EAt
e−ρ∆t+∆Ut
Dt+∆t
Dt

1−γA
Ψ̂(vt+∆t; θ)
+ s(vt)θ∆t, (A32)
where ∆Ut is given by equation
∆Ut = max{0; vt + µv∆t+ σv∆wt + Jv∆jt − v}. (A33)
Comparing equation (A32) with equations (A30) and (A31) for Ψ and Φi and using
the linearity of equation (A32), it easy to observe that Ψ(vt) and Φi(vt) are given
by the following equations in terms of Ψ̂(vt; θ):
Ψ(vt) = Ψ̂(vt,−γA)s(vt)γA −∆t,
Φ(vt) =
(
(1{i=A} − 1{i=B})Ψ̂(v; 1− γA) + (1{i=B} − li)Ψ̂(v;−γA)
)
s(v)γA .
Taking limit ∆t→ 0, we obtain equations (2.31) and (2.32) for Ψ(vt) and Φi(vt).
First, we derive the equation for Ψ̂(vt; θ) when vt belongs to the interior (v, v).
For a sufficiently small ∆t we have ∆Ut = 0, where ∆Ut is given by (A33). Then,
we rewrite the expectation of (Dt+∆t)/Dt)1−γAΨ̂(vt; θ) as follows:
EAt

Dt+∆t
Dt

1−γA
Ψ̂(vt+∆t; θ)
 = (1− λ∆t)EAt

Dt+∆t
Dt

1−γA
Ψ̂(vt+∆t; θ)
∣∣∣∣normal

+λ∆tEAt

Dt+∆t
Dt

1−γA
Ψ̂(vt+∆t; θ)
∣∣∣∣crisis
 .
(A34)
Noting that in the crisis Dt+∆t/Dt = 1 + µv∆t + JD and vt+∆t = max{v; vt +
µv∆t + Jv} and in the normal state Dt+∆t/Dt = 1 + µD∆t + σD∆wt and vt+∆t =
vt +µv∆t+σv∆wt, using Taylor expansions for (Dt+∆t/Dt)1−γA and Ψ̂(vt+∆t; θ), we
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find:
EAt

Dt+∆t
Dt

1−γA
Ψ̂(vt+∆t; θ)|crisis
 = (1 + JD)1−γAΨ̂(max{v; vt + Jv}; θ). (A35)
EAt

Dt+∆t
Dt

1−γA
Ψ̂(vt+∆t; θ)|normal
 =
1 +
(1− γA)µD + (1− γA)γAσ2D2
∆t
 Ψ̂(vt; θ)
+
(
µv + (1− γA)σDσv
)
Ψ̂′(vt; θ)∆t +
σ2v
2 Ψ̂
′′(vt; θ)∆t+ o(∆t). (A36)
Substituting (A35)-(A36) into (A32), we obtain:
Ψ̂(vt; θ) =
1−
λ+ ρ− (1− γA)µD + (1− γA)γA2 σ2D
∆t
 Ψ̂(vt; θ)
+
(
µv + (1− γA)σDσv
)
Ψ̂′(v; θ)∆t+
σ2v
2 Ψ̂
′′(v; θ)∆t
+ λ(1 + JD)1−γAΨ̂
(
max{v; vt + Jv}; θ
)
∆t+ s(v)θ∆t+ o(∆t).
(A37)
Canceling similar terms, diving by ∆t, taking limit ∆t→ 0, and noting that µv, σv
and Jv converge to µ̂v, σ̂v and Ĵv given by (2.35)-(2.37), we obtain equation (2.33)
for Ψ̂(vt; θ).
Next, we derive the boundary conditions for Ψ̂(vt; θ). From equation (2.25), the
state variable dynamics at lower bound is vt+∆t = v+max{0, µv∆t+σv∆wt+Jv∆jt}.
We use ∆vt to denote the difference of vt+∆t and vt. In this case,
∆vt = max{0, µv∆t+ σv∆wt + Jv∆jt}. (A38)
For sufficiently small ∆t increment ∆vt is positive only in state ω1 and is zero
otherwise. In state ω1, ∆vt = µv∆t + σv
√
∆t. Therefore, the order of EAt [∆vt] is√
∆t, but second order terms involving ∆vt have lower order:
lim
∆t→0
EAt [∆vt]√
∆t
=
σ̂v
2 ,
lim
∆t→0
EAt
[
(∆vt)2
]
√
∆t
= lim∆t→0
EAt [∆vt∆t]√
∆t
= lim
∆t→0
EAt [∆vt∆wt]√
∆t
= lim∆t→0
EAt [∆vt∆jt]√
∆t
= 0.
(A39)
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Taylor expansion of Ψ̂(vt+∆t; θ) at vt = v is given by
Ψ̂(vt+∆t; θ) = Ψ̂(v; θ) + Ψ̂′(v; θ)∆vt +
1
2Ψ̂
′′(v; θ)∆v2t + o(
√
∆t). (A40)
In subsequent calculations we keep terms with order of
√
∆t. Using the above
results, we obtain the following expansion:
EAt

Dt+∆t
Dt

1−γA
Ψ̂(vt+∆t; θ)

= EAt
(1 + µD∆t+ σD∆wt + Jv∆jt)1−γA
Ψ̂(v; θ) + Ψ̂′(v; θ)∆vt + 12Ψ̂′′(v; θ)∆v2t


= Ψ̂(v; θ) + Ψ̂′(v; θ)EAt [∆vt] + o(
√
∆t).
(A41)
Substituting (A41) into (A32), taking into account that ∆Ut = 0 at vt = v, and
canceling Ψ̂(v; θ) on both sides, we obtain the first boundary condition Ψ̂′(v; θ) = 0.
At the upper bound vt = v investor A is constrained, and hence, ∆Ut in (A33)
is positive. From (2.25) the state variable at the upper bound is
vt+∆t = min{v, vt + µv∆t+ σv∆wt + Jv∆jt} = vt + µv∆t+ σv∆wt + Jv∆jt −∆Ut.
(A42)
The order of EAt [∆Ut] is
√
∆t, but second order terms involving ∆Ut have order
o(
√
∆t).
Proceeding in the same way as (A39)-(A41), we arrive at
Ψ̂(v; θ) = Ψ̂(v; θ) +
[
Ψ̂(v; θ)− Ψ̂′(v; θ)
]
EAt [∆Ut] + o(
√
∆t).
Canceling similar terms, taking limit ∆t→ 0, we obtain condition Ψ̂(v; θ)−Ψ̂′(v; θ) =
0.
Finally, we derive the equations for v and v. Taking limit ∆t → 0 in equations
(2.24), we find that these equations become: ΦA(v) = 0, ΦB(v) = 0. Substituting
Φi(v) and Ψ(v) in terms of Ψ̂(v; θ) from equations (2.32) into the latter equations
for the boundaries, after some algebra, we obtain equations (2.38). 
Proof of Corollary 1. Consider the case λ = λB = 0 and γA = γB = 1. Then,
s(v) solving equation (2.25) is given by s(v) = 1/(1 + ev), Ψ(v) = Ψ̂(v)s(v), where
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Ψ̂(v) solves a special case of equation (2.33) given by:
δ2
2 Ψ̂
′′(v)−
δ2
2 Ψ̂
′(v)− ρΨ̂(v) + 1 + ev = 0, (A43)
subject to boundary conditions (2.34). It can be easily verified that Ψ̂(v) = C1eϕ−v+
C2e
ϕ+v + (1 + ev)/ρ satisfies (A43). Substituting Ψ̂(v) into boundary conditions
(2.34), we obtain the following system for coefficients C1 and C2:
C1ϕ−eϕ−v + C2ϕ+eϕ+v + ev/ρ = 0; C1(ϕ− − 1)eϕ−v + C2(ϕ+ − 1)eϕ+v − 1/ρ = 0.
Solving these equations, we obtain:
C1 =
1
ρ
(ϕ+ − 1)ev+ϕ+v + ϕ+eϕ+v
ϕ+(ϕ− − 1)eϕ−v+ϕ+v − ϕ−(ϕ+ − 1)eϕ+v+ϕ−v, (A44)
C2 = −
1
ρ
(ϕ− − 1)ev+ϕ−v + ϕ−eϕ−v
ϕ+(ϕ− − 1)eϕ+v+ϕ−v − ϕ−(ϕ+ − 1)eϕ+v+ϕ−v.  (A45)
Proof of Proposition 3. From equation (2.16) for the bond price and the fact
that 1 = Bt(1 + rt∆t) we find that the riskless interest rate rt is given by:
rt =
1− Et[ξA,t+∆t/ξAt]
Et[ξA,t+∆t/ξAt]∆t
=
1− (1− λ∆t)Et[ξA,t+∆t/ξAt|normal]− λ∆tEt[ξA,t+∆t/ξAt|crisis]
Et[ξA,t+∆t/ξAt]∆t
,
(A46)
where ξA,t+∆t/ξAt is given by equation (2.29). We separately calculate Et[ξA,t+∆t/ξAt|normal]
and Et[ξA,t+∆t/ξAt|crisis], and then take the limit ∆t→ 0.
We start with the derivation of Et[ξA,t+∆t/ξAt|normal] when v < vt < v, and hence,
by continuity, for a sufficiently small ∆t the economy is unconstrained next period,
so that v < vt+∆t < v. In the unconstrained region ∆vt = µ̂v∆t + σ̂v∆wt and the
SPD is given by (A21). From the expression for the SPD, using expansions (A55)
and (A57), we obtain:
Et
ξA,t+∆t
ξAt
∣∣∣∣normal
 = Et [((1 + at∆vt + bt(∆vt)2)(1− rA∆t− κA∆wt)|normal]+ o(∆t)
= Et
[
1 + at∆vt + bt(∆vt)2 − rA∆t− κA∆wt − κAat∆vt∆wt
∣∣∣∣normal]+ o(∆t)
= 1 + atµ̂v∆t+ btσ̂2v∆t− rA∆t− κAatσ̂v∆t+ o(∆t).
(A47)
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Conditioning on the crisis state, we have:
Et
ξA,t+∆t
ξAt
∣∣∣∣crisis
 = (1− ρ∆t)(1 + µD∆t+ JD)−γA
s(max{v, vt + µv∆t+ Jv})
s(vt)

−γA
= (1 + JD)−γA
s(max{v, vt + Ĵv})
s(vt)

−γA
+ o(∆t).
(A48)
Substituting at and bt from (A56) into equation (A47), and then substituting (A47)
and (A48) into equation (A46), after simple algebra, we obtain rt in (2.40) for the
case v < vt < v.
Now, we derive rt at the boundaries v and v. The SPD is given by (2.29). Using
expansions (A55) and (A57), we obtain the following expansion:
Et
ξA,t+∆t
ξAt
∣∣∣∣normal
 = Et[((1 + at∆vt + bt(∆vt)2)(1− rA∆t− κA∆wt)
×(1 + ∆Ut + 0.5(∆Ut)2)|normal
]
+ o(∆t)
= Et
[
1 + at∆vt + bt(∆vt)2 − rA∆t− κA∆wt − κAat∆vt∆wt
+ ∆Ut − κA∆wt∆Ut + at∆Ut∆vt + 0.5(∆Ut)2
∣∣∣∣normal]+O(∆t),
(A49)
where ∆Ut is given by equation (A33). Using equation (2.25) for the process vt and
equation (A33) for ∆Ut, for a fixed vt and sufficiently small ∆t, we find that ∆vt
and ∆Ut at the boundaries are given by:
∆vt =

min(0, µv∆t+ σv∆wt), if vt = v,
max(0, µv∆t+ σv∆wt), if vt = v,
(A50)
∆Ut =

0, if vt < v,
max(0, µv∆t+ σv∆wt), if vt = v,
(A51)
We note that for a sufficiently small ∆t the sign of µv∆t+σv∆wt is solely determined
by the second term σv∆wt because it has the order of magnitude
√
∆t. Volatility σv
is positive because under our assumptions investor A is more risk averse and more
pessimistic. Using the latter observation, substituting equations (A50) and (A51)
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into equation (A49) and computing the expectation, we obtain:
Et
ξA,t+∆t
ξAt
∣∣∣∣normal
 = 1+

at(µv − κAσv)2 +
btσ
2
v
2 +
µv + κAσv + σ2v
2 − rA
∆t
+
σv(1− at)
2
√
∆t+O(∆t), if vt = v,atµv − atκAσv + btσ2v2
∆t+ atσv2 √∆t+O(∆t), if vt = v.
(A52)
Substituting (A52) and (A48) into equation (A46) for the interest rate rt, we obtain
rt in (2.40) for the case when vt is at the boundary.
To obtain the risk premium, we first decompose stock returns as follows:
∆St + (1− lA − lB)Dt+∆t∆t
St
= µt∆t+ σt∆wt + Jt∆jt. (A53)
Multiplying both sides of (A53) by ξA,t+∆t/ξAt and taking expectations, we obtain:
Et
ξA,t+∆t
ξAt
∆St + (1− lA − lB)Dt+∆t∆t
St
 = µt∆tEt
ξA,t+∆t
ξAt
+σtEt
ξA,t+∆t
ξAt
∆wt
+JtEt
ξA,t+∆t
ξAt
∆jt
 .
On the other hand, from the equation for stock price (2.17) we find that:
Et
ξA,t+∆t
ξAt
∆St + (1− lA − lB)Dt+∆t∆t
St
 = 1− Et
ξA,t+∆t
ξAt
 .
Combining the last two equations and the equation (A46) for the interest rate, we
obtain:
µt − rt = −
σtEt
ξA,t+∆t
ξAt
∆wt
+ JtEt
ξA,t+∆t
ξAt
∆jt

 1 + rt∆t∆t . (A54)
Then, proceeding in the same way as with the calculation of interest rates and using
similar expansions, we obtain equation (2.41) for the risk premium. 
Lemma A.3 (Useful expansions).
1) For small increment ∆vt = vt+∆t−vt the ratio
(
s(vt+∆t)/s(vt)
)−γA
has expansion:
s(vt+∆t)
s(vt)

−γA
= 1 + at∆vt + bt(∆vt)2 + o(∆t), (A55)
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where coefficients at and bt are given by:
at =
(1− st)Γt
γB
, bt =
1
2γ2B
(1− st)2Γ2t +
1
2γ2Aγ2B
st(1− st)Γ3t , (A56)
Γt = γAγB/(γA(1 − s) + γBs) is the risk aversion of the representative investor and
st is consumption share of investor A that solves equation (2.14).
2) For the case JD = 0, the SPD in a one-investor economy can be expanded as
follows:
e−ρ∆t
Dt+∆t
Dt

−γA
= 1− rA∆t− κA∆wt + o(∆t), (A57)
where rA and κA are the riskless rate and the Sharpe ratio in an economy populated
only by investor A, given by:
rA = ρ+ γAµD −
γA(1 + γA)
2 σ
2
D, κA = γAσD. (A58)
Proof of Lemma A.3. 1) We expand the ratio on the left-hand side of (A55) using
Taylor’s formula, and observe that at = (s(vt)−γA)′/s(vt)−γA and bt = 0.5(s(vt)−γA)′′/s(vt)−γA .
Differentiating, we obtain the following expressions for at and bt:
at = −γA
s′(vt)
s(vt)
, bt =
γA(1 + γA)
2
s′(vt)
s(vt)

2
−
γA
2
s′′(v)
s(v) . (A59)
To find derivatives s′(v) and s′′(v), we differentiate equation (2.14) twice with respect
to v, and obtain two equations for the derivatives:
1 = −
γA
st
+
γB
1− st
 s′(vt), (A60)
0 =
γA
s2t
−
γB
(1− st)2
 (s′(vt))2 −
γA
st
+
γB
1− st
 s′′(vt). (A61)
Finding s′(v) and s′′(v) from the system (A60)–(A61) and substituting them into
expressions (A59) for coefficients at and bt, after some algebra, we obtain expressions
(A56).
2) Substituting Dt+∆t/Dt from (2.1) into equation (A57), after some algebra, we
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obtain:
e−ρ∆t
Dt+∆t
Dt
 = e−ρ∆t (1 + µD∆t+ σD∆wt)−γA
= (1− ρ∆t)
1−
γAµD − γA(1 + γA)2 σ2D
∆t− γAσD
+ o(∆t)
= 1− rA∆t− κA∆wt + o(∆t). 
(A62)
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider a reflected arithmetic Brownian motion with
boundaries v and v and dynamics dvt = µ̂vdt + σ̂vdwt when v < vt < v, where
wt is a Brownian motion. The transition density for this process is given by (see
Veestraeten, 2004):
fv(v, τ ; vt, t) =
1√
2piσ̂2v(τ − t)
∑+∞
n=−∞
exp
−2µ̂vσ̂2v n(v − v)−
(
v−vt−µ̂v(τ−t)+2n(v−v)
)2
2σ̂2v(τ−t)

+ exp
−2µ̂vσ̂2v
(
vt − v + n(v − v)
)
−
(
v − vt − µ̂v(τ − t) + 2(vt − v + n[v − v])
)2
2σ̂2v(τ − t)


+
2µ̂v
σ̂2v
∑+∞
n=0
exp(−2µ̂v
σ̂2v
(
v − v + n[v − v]
))
N
vt + µ̂v(τ − t)− v − 2(v − v + n[v − v])
σ̂v
√
τ − t

− exp
(
2µ̂v
σ̂2v
(
v − v + n[v − v]
))1−N
vt + µ̂v(τ − t)− v + 2(v − v + n[v − v])
σ̂v
√
τ − t


 ,
(A63)
where N (·) is the cumulative distribution of a standard normal distribution. By
Fv(v, τ ; vt, t) = Prob{vτ ≤ v|vt} we denote the corresponding cumulative distribu-
tion function of v conditional on observing vt at time t. We observe that st = s(vt)
is a decreasing function of vt implicitly defined by equation (2.14). From the latter
equation we also find that s−1(x) = γB ln(1−s)−γA ln(s). The cumulative distribu-
tion function of consumption share sτ at time τ conditional on observing st at time
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t can then be found as follows:
F (x, τ ; st, t) = Prob{sτ ≤ x|st} ≡ Prob{s(vτ ) ≤ x|st}
= 1− Prob{vτ ≤ s−1(x)|vt}
= 1− Prob{vτ ≤ γB ln(1− x)− γA ln(x)|vt}
= 1− Fv(γB ln(1− x)− γA ln(x), τ ; vt, t).
(A64)
Substituting vt = γB ln(1−st)−γA ln(st) into (A64), differentiating CDF F (x, τ ; st, t)
with respect to x and setting x = s, we find that the transition PDF for s is given
by:
f(s, τ ; st, t) =
γA
s
+
γB
1− s
 fv(γB ln(1−s)−γA ln(s), τ ; γB ln(1−st)−γA ln(st), t),
(A65)
where transition density fv(v, τ ; vt, t) is given by equation (A63).
The stationary distribution of variable v, calculated in Veestraeten (2004), is
given by:
fv(v) =
2µ̂v
σ̂2v
exp
(
(2µ̂v/σ̂2v)v
)
exp
(
(2µ̂v/σ̂2v)v
)
− exp
(
(2µ̂v/σ̂2v)v
). (A66)
Proceeding in the same way as for the derivation of transition PDF (A65), we obtain
stationary PDF (2.43) for consumption share s. 
Proof of Corollary 2. The proof easily follows by substituting boundary condi-
tions (2.34) into the equation (B27) for volatility σt at the boundary values v and
v. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider Lagrangian (A6) for the dynamic optimization
of investor i. Differentiating this Lagrangian with respect to li and cit, we obtain:
∂Vi(W ∗it, vt; li)
∂li
= ηitDt∆t+ e−ρ∆tEit
[
∂Vi(W ∗i,t+∆t, vt+∆t; li)
∂li
]
, (A67)
u′(c∗it) = ηit. (A68)
By the envelope theorem (e.g., Back (2010, p.162)):
∂Vi(Wit, vt; li)
∂W
= u′i(c∗it), (A69)
∂Vi(Wi,t+∆t, vt+∆t; li)
∂W
= u′i(c∗i,t+∆t). (A70)
110
Substituting (2.45), (A68), (A69), and (A70) into equation (A67), and simplifying,
we find:
Ŝit = Dt∆t+ Eit
e−ρ∆tu′i(c∗i,t+∆t)
u′i(c∗it)
Ŝi,t+∆t
 . (A71)
From equation (2.29), we recall that the SPD of investor A is given by
ξA,t+∆t
ξAt
= e−ρ∆t+∆Ut
(c∗A,t+∆t)−γA
(c∗At)−γA
Dt+∆t
Dt
, (A72)
where ∆Ut = max{0; vt + µv∆t + σv∆wt + Jv∆jt − v}. Rewriting equation (A71)
for investor A in terms of SPD (A72), we obtain:
ŜAt = Dt∆t+ EAt
e−∆Ut ξA,t+∆t
ξAt
ŜA,t+∆t
 . (A73)
Following the same steps as in the proof of Lemma 2, we find that ŜAt = Ψ̂i(vt;−γA)s(vt)γADt,
where Ψ̂i(v; θ) satisfies differential-difference equation (2.33) with boundary condi-
tions (2.48).
Iterating equation (2.17) for stock and equation (A73) for shadow prices, we
obtain:
St + (1− lA − lB)Dt∆t =
1
ξt
EAt
[ ∞∑
τ=t
ξτ (1− lA − lB)Dτ∆t
]
, (A74)
ŜAt =
1
ξt
EAt
[ ∞∑
τ=t
e−(Uτ−Ut)ξτDτ∆t
]
. (A75)
Inequality (St + (1 − lA − lB)Dt∆t)/(1 − lA − lB) > ŜAt follows from the fact that
Ut =
∑t
τ=0 ∆Uτ is a non-decreasing processes. In the continuous-time limit, we
obtain that St/(1 − lA − lB) > ŜAt. Hence, the liquidity premium ΛAt is positive.
The derivation of the shadow price of investor B is analogous and available upon
request. 
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Appendix B: Technical results.
Proposition B.1 (Existence of boundaries v and v). There exist constant
boundaries v and v for the state variable vt process (2.25) that solve equations (2.24).
Proof of Proposition B.1. We here show the existence of v that solves ΦA(v) = 0,
where ΦA(v) is given by equation (A18) in Appendix A. The proof for v is analogous.
We note that ΦA(vt) ≥ 0 because of the constraint WAt ≥ 0. Suppose, v does
not exist, and hence ΦA(vt) > 0 for all vt. From equation (2.14) for consumption
share s we observe that s(vt)→ 0 when vt → +∞. For arbitrary ε ∈ (0, lA) choose
vt sufficiently large, so that s(vt)− lA < −ε. Let T (vt) be the stopping time, defined
as
T (vt) = inf{τ : s(vτ )− lA ≥ −ε}. (B1)
From equation (A18) for ΦA(vt) we obtain the following inequality:
ΦA(vt)s(vt)−γA ≤ −εEAt
T (vt)∑
τ=t
e−ρ(τ−t)
Dτ
Dt

1−γA
s(vτ )−γA∆t

+ EAt
 +∞∑
τ=T (vt)+∆t
e−ρ(τ−t)
Dτ
Dt

1−γA
s(vτ )−γA(s(vτ )− ε)1{s(vτ )≥ε}∆t

≤ −ε(lA − ε)−γAEAt
T (vt)∑
τ=t
e−ρ(τ−t)
Dτ
Dt

1−γA
∆t

+ max(1; ε1−γA)EAt
 +∞∑
τ=T (vt)+∆t
e−ρ(τ−t)
Dτ
Dt

1−γA
∆t
 .
(B2)
Next, we show that T (vt)→ +∞ as vt → +∞. Let v̂ be such that s(v̂) = lA− ε.
Then, because s(vt) is a decreasing function, vt ≥ v̂ and the stopping time (B1) can
be rewritten as T (vt) = inf{τ : vτ ≤ v̂}. We note that T (vt) ≥ T̂ , where T̂ is the
minimal time required to get from vt to v̂, which is the time when ∆wt = −
√
∆t and
∆jt = 1 along the path. Time T̂ is found from the condition vt + (T̂ /∆t)(µv∆t −
σv
√
∆t+Jv) = v̂, where Jv < 0. We observe that T̂ → +∞ as vt → +∞, and hence
T (vt) → +∞. We also note that Et[∑∞τ=t e−r(τ−t)D1−γAτ ∆t] < +∞ by condition
(2.15). Therefore, for a sufficiently large vt we obtain from inequality (B2) that
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ΦA(vt) < 0, which contradicts initial assumption that ΦA(vt) > 0 for all vt. Hence,
there exists v such that ΦA(v) = 0. 
Lemma B.1 (Unconstrained optimization). Consider an infinitesimal uncon-
strained investor with risk aversion γi and labor income liDt, i = A,B, who lives in
the economy where the state price density is given by (2.29). The investor’s value
function is given by
V unci (Wt, vt) =
(Wt + li/(1− lA − lB)St)1−γi
1− γi hi(vt)
γi , (B3)
where h(vt) is a uniformly bounded wealth-consumption ratio, given by:
hi(vt) = Eit
[+∞∑
τ=t
(
ξiτ
ξit
)1−1/γi
e−ρ(τ−t)/γi∆t
]
. (B4)
The investor’s optimal consumption is given by c∗iτ = `(ξiτeρ(τ−t))−1/γi, where ` is
a constant. Moreover, for all feasible consumptions ct the following inequalities are
satisfied:
+∞∑
τ=t
e−ρ(τ−t)ui(cτ )∆t ≤
+∞∑
τ=t
e−ρ(τ−t)ui(c∗τ )∆t = V unci (Wt, vt), (B5)
lim
T→∞
sup e−ρTEt
[
V unci (WT , vT )
]
≤ 0. (B6)
Proof of Lemma B.1. We solve the problem using the martingale method. The
static budget constraint is given by:
Eit
[+∞∑
τ=t
ξiτ
ξit
c∗τ
]
= Wt +
liSt
1− lA − lB, (B7)
where the last term is the value of the labor income. Because the dividends and
labor incomes are collinear, the value of the labor income is given by:
Eit
[+∞∑
τ=t
ξiτ
ξit
(liDτ )
]
=
liSt
1− lA − lB.
The first order condition gives the optimal consumption c∗τ = `(ξiτ/ξiteρ(τ−t))−1/γi ,
where ` is the Lagrange multiplier that can be found by substituting c∗τ into (B7).
Finding the multiplier ` and substituting c∗τ into the objective function, we obtain
the value function (B3), where h(vt) is given by (B4).
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Next, we show that h(vt) is uniformly bounded. First, we consider the case
γi ≥ 1. Using equation (B4) and Ho¨lder’s inequality, we obtain:
hi(vt) = Eit
[ ∞∑
τ=t
(ξiτ
ξit
)1−1/γi
e−ρ(τ−t)/γi
]
≤
(
Eit
[ ∞∑
τ=t
ξiτDτ
ξitDt
])1−1/γi(
Eit
[ ∞∑
τ=t
e−ρ(τ−t)
(Dτ
Dt
)1−γi])1/γi
.
We note that both multipliers on the right-hand side of the latter inequality are
bounded. The first multiplier equals the price-dividend ratio and is bounded by
Proposition 2. The second multiplier is bounded due to condition (2.15) on the
model parameters. Consider now the case γi ≤ 1. From the FOCs (2.23) and the
fact that s ≤ s ≤ s, we obtain:
ξiT
ξit
≥ e−ρ(T−t)
(c∗T
c∗t
)−γi
≥ e−ρ(T−t)
(DT
Dt
)−γi(s
s
)−γi
.
From the latter inequality it follows that
Eit
[(
ξiτ
ξit
)1−1/γi
e−ρ(τ−t)/γi
]
≤
(s
s
)1−γi
Eit
[
e−ρ(τ−t)
(Dτ
Dt
)1−γi]
. (B8)
The inequality (B8) and condition (2.15) imply that the infinite series in (B4) con-
verges and function hi(v) is uniformly bounded. We also observe that hi(v) ≥ ∆t >
0.
Now, we prove inequality (B5). We consider feasible consumption streams sat-
isfying condition Wt + li/(1 − lA − lB)St ≥ 0 for all t, which means that investor’s
aggregate wealth is non-negative at all times so that investor does not go bankrupt.
From the investor’s budget constraint and the latter inequality for all feasible con-
sumptions we obtain:
Wt +
liSt
1− lA − lB ≥ E
i
t
[ T∑
τ=t
ξiτ
ξit
cτ∆t
]
+Eit
[ξiT
ξit
(
WT +
liST
1− lA − lB
)]
≥ Eit
[ T∑
τ=t
ξiτ
ξit
cτ∆t
]
.
(B9)
Consider the weighting function wt given by
wτ =
(
ξiτ
ξit
)1−1/γi
e−ρ(τ−t)/γi
ĥiT (vt)
, where ĥiT (vt) = Eit
[ T∑
τ=t
(
ξiτ
ξit
)1−1/γi
e−ρ(τ−t)/γi∆t
]
.
(B10)
We note that Eit[
∑T
τ=twτ∆t] = 1. Using Jensen’s inequality and inequality (B9), we
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obtain:
Eit
[
T∑
τ=t
e−ρ(τ−t)c1−γiτ
1− γi ∆t
]
= Eit
[
T∑
τ=t
(
(ξiτ/ξit)1/γieρ(τ−t)/γicτ
)1−γi
wτ∆t
1− γi
]
ĥiT (vt)
≤
(
Eit
[
T∑
τ=t
(ξiτ/ξit)1/γieρ(τ−t)/γicτwτ∆t
])1−γi
1− γi ĥiT (vt)
=
(
Eit
[
T∑
τ=t
(ξiτ/ξit)cτ∆t
])1−γi
1− γi ĥiT (vt)
γi
≤
(
Wt + liSt1−lA−lB
)1−γi
1− γi ĥiT (vt)
γi .
(B11)
Taking limit T →∞ in (B11), and noting that ĥiT (vt)→ hi(vt), we obtain (B5).
Finally, we prove inequality (B6). Because cτ ≥ 0, from inequality (B9), we
obtain:
Eit
[ξiT
ξit
(
WT +
liST
1− lA − lB
)]
≤ Wt +
liSt
1− lA − lB. (B12)
Using Jensen’s inequality following the same steps as in inequality (B11), we obtain:
Eit
[(
WT + liST1−lA−lB
)1−γi]
1− γi ≤
(
Eit
[
ξiT
ξit
(
WT + liST1−lA−lB
)])1−γi
1− γi
(
Eit
[(ξiT
ξit
)− 1−γi
γi
])γi
≤
(
Wt + liSt1−lA−lB
)1−γi
1− γi
(
Eit
[(ξiT
ξit
)− 1−γi
γi
])γi
.
The above inequality and the boundedness of hi(vt) then imply the following in-
equality:
e−ρ(τ−t)Eit[V unciT ] ≤ Const× V uncit
(
Eit
[(ξiT
ξit
)− 1−γi
γi
e−ρ(τ−t)/γi
])γi
. (B13)
Inequality (B13) also holds for γi = 1 if CRRA preferences are replaced with log-
arithmic preferences. Suppose, γi > 1. Then, inequality (B6) is satisfied because
V unci < 0. Suppose, γi ≤ 1. Then, using inequalities (B8), (B13), and condition
(2.15), we obtain:
e−ρ(τ−t)Eit[V unciT ] ≤ Const×
(
Eit
[
e−ρ(τ−t)
(Dτ
Dt
)1−γi])γi
→ 0, as T →∞. 
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Lemma B.2. Let P(V ) be a point-wise monotone operator such that for all point-
wise bounded functions V1 and V2 such that V1 ≤ V2 ⇒ P(V1) ≤ P(V2). Suppose
further there exist point-wise bounded functions V and V such that V ≤ V , P(V ) ≥
V , and P(V ) ≤ V . Then, there exists a point-wise bounded function V ∗ such that:
1) V ≤ V ∗ ≤ V ; 2) V ∗ ≤ P(V ∗); 3) Pn(V )→ V ∗ point-wise as n→∞.
Proof of Lemma B.2. From the monotonicity of the operator P(V ) and the
definitions of V and V , we obtain:
V ≤ P(V ) ≤ P(V ) ≤ V . (B14)
Applying operator P to inequalities (B14), and then using the definitions of V and
V , we obtain: V ≤ P(V ) ≤ P2(V ) ≤ V . Proceeding in the same way n times
we obtain V ≤ P(V ) ≤ P2(V ) ≤ · · · ≤ Pn(V ) ≤ V . Consequently, Pn(V ) is
point-wise increasing and bounded, and hence converges to some function V ∗ such
that V ≤ V ∗ ≤ V and Pn(V ) ≤ V ∗. Applying operator to both sides of the latter
inequality, we find that Pn+1(V ) ≤ P(V ∗). Taking limit, we find that V ∗ ≤ P(V ∗).

Proposition B.2 (Verification of optimality). Consider an infinitesimal in-
vestor i who lives in an economy where the state price density is given by equation
(2.29). Suppose, this investor maximizes expected discounted utility (2.7) subject to a
self-financing budget constraint and the collateral constraint (2.10). Then, there ex-
ists unique bounded value function V ∗i satisfying the dynamic programming equation
(2.20) and the transversality condition, such that for all feasible consumptions
V ∗it ≥ Eit
[+∞∑
τ=t
u(ciτ )∆t
]
, (B15)
and, moreover,
V ∗it = Eit
[+∞∑
τ=t
u(c∗iτ )∆t
]
, (B16)
for the optimal consumptions given by FOCs (2.23).
Proof of Proposition B.2. Consider the following operator:
Pi(V ) = max
ct
{
ui(ct)∆t+ e−ρ∆tEit[Vi,t+∆t)]
}
, i = A,B (B17)
where maximization is subject to budget constraint (2.21) and collateral constraint
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(2.22). Consider the following functions:
V it =

0, γi < 1,
Eit
[+∞∑
τ=t
e−ρ(τ−t)ui(liDτ )∆t
]
, γi ≥ 1,
V it =

V uncit , γi ≤ 1,
0, γi > 1,
(B18)
where V unct is given by (B3).
We observe that for γi ≥ 1 function V i is bounded due to condition (2.15)
imposed on model parameters. Because ct = liDt is feasible, we obtain that
P(V i) ≥ ui(liDt) + e−ρ∆tEit
[ +∞∑
τ=t+∆t
e−ρ(τ−t)ui(liDt)∆t
]
= V i.
For γi < 1 it is easy to see that P(V i) ≥ V i because ui(c) > 0. Next, we prove
that Pi(V i) ≤ V i. The latter inequality is straightforward for γi > 1 because
Pi(0) ≤ 0. Suppose now, γi ≤ 1. Consider operator P˜i(Vi) given by equation (B17),
where the maximization is subject to the budget constraint (2.21), but without the
collateral constraint (2.22). Hence, Pi(Vi) ≤ P˜i(Vi). By Lemma B.1, V unci is the
solution of the unconstrained optimization, and hence V i = P˜i(V i). Therefore,
Pi(V i) ≤ P˜i(V i) = V i.
We drop subscript and superscript i for convenience. Consider the sequence
Vn+1 = P(Vn), with V0 = V , where V is given in (B18). Then, by Lemma B.2,
Vn → V ∗ point-wise as n → ∞. Next, we show that V ∗ is the value function and
P(V ∗) = V ∗. By the definition operator P(V ) in (B17), for all feasible consumption
streams
Vn+1 ≥ u(ct)∆t+ e−ρ∆tEt [Vn(Wt+∆t; vt+∆t)]
≥ Et
[
n∆t∑
τ=t
e−ρ(τ−t)u(cτ )∆t
]
+ e−ρn∆tEt[V ].
(B19)
Taking point-wise limit n → ∞ in (B19) and taking into account that Et[V ] is
point-wise bounded, we obtain inequality (B15).
By Lemma B.2, V ∗ ≤ P(V ∗) and V ∗ ≤ V , where V is given in (B18), and hence
V ∗(Wt, vt) ≤ u(c∗t )∆t+ e−ρ∆tEt [V ∗(Wt+∆t; vt+∆t)]
≤ Et
[
T∑
τ=t
u(c∗τ )∆t
]
+ e−ρTEt[V ∗(WT , vT )]
≤ Et
[
T∑
τ=t
u(c∗τ )∆t
]
+ e−ρTEt[V (WT , vT )],
(B20)
where c∗ is the optimal consumption that solves optmization in equation (B17).
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We note that V = 0 for γ > 1 and lim sup e−ρTEt[V (WT , vT )] ≤ 0 as T →∞
for γ ≤ 1, by Lemma B.1. Taking limit T → ∞ in (B20) we find that V ∗ ≤
Et
[∑+∞
τ=t u(c∗τ )∆t
]
, which along with inequality (B15) yields (B16). Equation (B16)
along with inequality (B20) also imply that V ∗ = P(V ∗). Moreover, V ∗ is point-wise
bounded because V ≤ V ∗ ≤ V . Then, given the existence of the value function,
the optimal consumptions are given by (2.23). Finally, we show that V ∗ satis-
fies the transversality condition. We note that e−ρ(T−t)Et[V T ] ≤ e−ρ(T−t)Et[V ∗T ] ≤
e−ρ(T−t)Et[V T ]. Taking limit T → 0 we find that the upper and lower bound in the
latter equation converge to 0, and hence the transversality condition is satisfied for
V ∗. 
Proposition B.3 (Closed-form solutions).
1) In the limit ∆t→ 0 the price-dividend ratio Ψ and wealth-consumption ratios Φi
are given by equations (2.31) and (2.32), where function Ψ̂(v; θ) is given by:
Ψ̂(v; θ) =
∫ v
v
s(y)θψ̂(v−y)dy+
∫ v
v
s(y)θ
[
ψ̂′(v − y)− ψ̂(v − y)
]
dy
1 +H
(
ψ̂(v − v)−
∫ v−v
0
ψ̂(y)dy
) (1−H ∫ v−v
0
ψ̂(y)dy
)
,
(B21)
where s(y) solves equation9 (2.14), and ψ̂(x), H and some auxiliary variables are
given by:
ψ̂(x) =
2
σ̂2v
∞∑
n=0

2λ(1 + JD)1−γA
σ̂2v

n
exp
(
(ζ+ + ζ−)(x+ nĴv)/2
)
(ζ+ − ζ−)2n+1n! (B22)
× Qn
(ζ+ − ζ−)(x+ nĴv)2
1{x+nĴv≥0}
 , (B23)
Qn(x) = exp(−x)
n∑
m=0
(2x)n−m
(n+m)!
m!(n−m)!− exp(x)
n∑
m=0
(−2x)n−m
(n+m)!
m!(n−m)!, (B24)
H = λ+ ρ− (1− γA)µD +
(1− γA)γA
2 σ
2
D − λ(1 + JD)1−γA , (B25)
9Although s(y) is not in closed form, we observe from equation (2.14) that its inverse is given
by s−1(x) = γB ln(x)− γA ln(1−x). The change of variable x = s(y) eliminates implicit functions,
similar to Chabakauri (2015). We keep all integrals in terms of s(y) because s(y) is intuitive and
easily computable from (2.14).
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ζ± = −
µ̂v + (1− γA)σ̂vσD ∓
√
(µ̂v + (1− γA)σ̂vσD)2 + 2σ̂2v
(
λ+ ρ− (1− γA)µD + (1−γA)γA2 σ2D
)
σ̂2v
.
(B26)
2) Stock return volatility in normal times and the jump size Jt are given by:
σt = σD +
Ψ̂′(vt;−γA)
Ψ̂(vt;−γA)
−
γA(1− s(vt))
γA(1− s(vt)) + γBs(vt)
 σ̂v, (B27)
Jt =
(1 + JD)Ψ̂
(
max{v; vt + Ĵv};−γA
)
s
(
max{v; vt + Ĵv}
)γA
Ψ̂(vt;−γA)s(vt)γA
− 1. (B28)
Numbers of shares n∗i,St and leverage Lit = −bitBit to market price St ratio are given
by:
n∗i,St =
Φi(vt)σD + Φ
′
i(vt)σ̂v
Ψ(vt)σt
,
Lit
St
= ni,St −
Φi(vt)
Ψ(vt)(1− lA − lB). (B29)
Proof of Proposition B.3. 1) First, we solve the differential-difference equation
in Lemma 2. We denote g(x) = Ψ̂(x + v; θ) and apply the following changes of
variables:
x = v − v, σ˜ = σ̂v, µ˜ = µ̂v + (1− γA)σDσ̂v, J˜ = −Ĵv, λ˜ = λ(1 + JD)1−γA ,
ρ˜ = λ+ ρ− (1− γA)µD +
(1− γA)γA
2 σ
2
D.
(B30)
Equations (2.33) and (2.34) with new variables now become:
σ˜2
2 g
′′(x) + µ˜g′(x)− ρ˜g(x) + λ˜g(max{x− J˜ , 0}) + s(x+ v)θ = 0, (B31)
g′(0) = 0, g(v − v)− g′(v − v) = 0. (B32)
Let L [g(x)] = ∫∞0 e−zxg(x)dx be the Laplace transform of g(x), and similarly for
other functions. The Laplace transforms of g′(x), g′′(x) and g(max{x − J˜ , 0}) are
119
given by:
L [g′(x)] = zL [g(x)]− g(0),
L [g′′(x)] = z2L [g(x)]− zg(0)− g′(0),
L
[
g(max{x− J˜ , 0})
]
=
∫ ∞
0
e−zxg(max{x− J˜ , 0})dx
=
∫ J˜
0
e−zxg(0)dx+
∫ ∞
J˜
e−zxg(x− J˜)dx
=
1
z
(1− e−J˜z)g(0) + e−J˜zL [g(x)] .
(B33)
Applying the transform to equation (B31), we arrive at the following equation:
σ˜2
2 (z
2L [g(x)]− zg(0)− g′(0)) + µ˜ (zL [g(x)]− g(0))− ρ˜L [g(x)]
+ λ˜
e−J˜zL [g(x)] + 1
z
(1− e−J˜z)g(0)
+ L [s(x+ v)θ] = 0.
(B34)
Applying boundary condition g′(0) = 0 and solving for L [g(x)], we obtain:
L [g(x)] =
L
[
s(x+ v)θ
]
ρ˜− µ˜z − σ˜22 z2 − λ˜e−J˜z
+ g(0)
1
z
−
ρ˜− λ˜
ρ˜− µ˜z − σ˜22 z2 − λ˜e−J˜z
·
1
z
 . (B35)
Now define a new function ψ̂(x) through inverse Laplace transform
ψ̂(x) = L−1
 1
ρ˜− µ˜z − σ˜22 z2 − λ˜e−J˜z
 . (B36)
Next, we apply inverse transform to each term in (B35). Noting that L−1[1/z] = 1
and using the theorem which states that Laplace transform of a convolution is the
product of Laplace transforms, we derive the following inverse transforms:
L−1
 L
[
s(x+ v)θ
]
ρ˜− µ˜z − σ˜22 z2 − λ˜e−J˜z
 = ∫ x
0
s(y + v)θ · ψ̂(x− y)dy,
L−1
 1
ρ˜− µ˜z − σ˜22 z2 − λ˜e−J˜z
·
1
z
 = ∫ x
0
1{y≥0} · ψ̂(x− y)dy =
∫ x
0
ψ̂(y)dy.
(B37)
The linearity of the Laplace transform gives the following equation:
g(x) = L−1 [L [g(x)]] =
∫ x
0
s(y + v)θ · ψ̂(x− y)dy + g(0)
[
1−
(
ρ˜− λ˜
) ∫ x
0
ψ̂(y)dy
]
.
(B38)
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We calculate g(0) below, and then after changing the variable back from x to v =
x+ v, substituting in expressions for ρ˜ and λ˜ from (B30), we obtain (B21).
Next, we solve for ψ̂(x) in closed form. We expand L
[
ψ̂(x)
]
as series, and sum up
the inverse transforms of each term in the summation to get ψ̂(x).
L
[
ψ̂(x)
]
=
1
ρ˜− µ˜z − σ˜22 z2 − λ˜e−J˜z
= (ρ˜− µ˜z − σ˜22 z2)−1 · (1−
λ˜e−J˜z
ρ˜− µ˜z − σ˜22 z2
)−1
=
∞∑
n=0
λ˜ne−nJ˜z
(ρ˜− µ˜z − σ˜22 z2)n+1
.
(B39)
The above series converges for z such that |ρ˜− µ˜z− (σ˜2/2)z2| > |λ˜ exp(−J˜z)|. This
holds if the real part of z is sufficiently large, e.g., <(z) > 4|µ˜|/σ˜2 + (2/σ˜)
√
ρ˜+ λ˜.
The inverse Laplace transform can then be calculated along the line (z−i∞, z+i∞)
in the complex domain where z > 4|µ˜|/σ˜2 + (2/σ˜)
√
ρ˜+ λ˜, and hence, the inequality
for <(z) is satisfied.
Let ζ− < ζ+ be roots of ρ˜ − µ˜z − σ˜2z2/2 = 0, given by (B26). We use the
following inversion formula for 1/[(z− ζ+)(z− ζ−)]n+1 from Gradshteyn and Ryzhik
(2007, p. 1117):
L−1
[
1
[(z − ζ+)(z − ζ−)]n+1
]
=
√
pi
Γ(n+ 1)
xn+
1
2
(ζ+ − ζ−)n+ 12
e
ζ++ζ−
2 xIn+ 12
(
ζ+ − ζ−
2 x
)
.
(B40)
Function e−nJ˜z in the complex domain corresponds to a shift from x to x − nJ˜ .
Therefore,
L−1

λ˜ne−nJ˜z
(ρ˜− µ˜z −
σ˜2
2 z
2)n+1
 = λ˜
n
− σ˜22

−n−1
1x≥nJ˜
×
√
pi
Γ(n+ 1)
(x−nJ˜)n+ 12
(ζ+−ζ−)n+
1
2
e
ζ++ζ−
2 (x−nJ˜)In+ 12
(
(ζ+−ζ−)(x−nJ˜)
2
)
.
(B41)
Consequently, the explicit expression for ψ̂(x) is given by:
ψ̂(x) =
∞∑
n=0
λ˜n
(
− σ˜
2
2
)−n−1 1{x≥nJ˜}√pi
Γ(n+ 1)
(x− nJ˜)n+ 12
(ζ+ − ζ−)n+ 12
e
ζ++ζ−
2 (x−nJ˜)In+ 12
(
(ζ+ − ζ−)(x− nJ˜)
2
)
,
(B42)
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where function In+ 12 (·) is a modified Bessel function of the first kind, ζ− < ζ+ are
given by (B26) and ρ˜, µ˜, σ˜, λ˜, and J˜ are defined in (B30). Bessel function In+ 12 (·)
is given by (see equation 8.467 in Gradshteyn and Ryzhik (2007)):
In+ 12
(z) =
1√
2piz
ez n∑
m=0
(−1)m(n+m)!
m!(n−m)!(2z)m + (−1)
n+1e−z
n∑
m=0
(n+m)!
m!(n−m)!(2z)m
 .
(B43)
Substituting (B43) into (B42), after minor algebra, we obtain expression (B23) for
ψ̂(x). The infinite series (B42) has only finite number of non-zero terms because
for a fixed x indicators 1{x≥nJ˜} vanish for sufficiently large n, and hence, (B42) is
well-defined.
To find g(0) in equation (B38), we first evaluate ψ̂(0). From the above formula
(B42), because 1{0≥nJ˜} = 0 for all n > 0, we obtain
ψ̂(0) = − 2
σ˜2
· e
ζ+·0 − eζ−·0
ζ+ − ζ− = 0. (B44)
Differentiating (B38) and using ψ̂(0) = 0, we find:
g′(x) =
∫ x
0
s(y + v)θ · ψ̂′(x− y)dy − g(0) ·
(
ρ˜− λ˜
)
ψ̂(x), (B45)
We solve for g(0) from the boundary condition g(v− v)− g′(v− v) = 0 and obtain:
g(0) =
∫ v−v
0
s(y + v)θ ·
[
ψ̂′(v − v − y)− ψ̂(v − v − y)
]
dy
1−
(
ρ˜− λ˜
) ∫ v−v
0
ψ̂(y)dy +
(
ρ˜− λ˜
)
ψ̂(v − v)
. (B46)
Substituting (B46) into (B38), we derive equation (B21) for Ψ̂(v; θ).
2) Next we solve for stock volatility and jump size. In the unconstrained region
v < vt < v, stock price St, dividend Dt and state variable vt follow processes:
dSt = St[µtdt + σtdwt + Jtdjt],
dDt = Dt[µDdt + σDdwt + JDdjt],
dvt = µ̂vdt+ σ̂vdwt +
(
max{v; vt + Ĵv} − vt
)
djt.
(B47)
Applying Ito’s lemma to St = (1 − lA − lB)Ψ̂(vt;−γA)s(vt)γADt, and matching dwt
and djt terms, after some algebra, we obtain σt and Jt in Proposition B.3.
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Equation equation (2.9) for Wi,t+∆t, implies the following expressions for n∗i,St
and b∗it:
n∗i,St =
√√√√√ vart[Wi,t+∆t −Wit|normal]
vart[∆St + (1− lA − lB)Dt∆t|normal],
b∗it = Et[Wi,t+∆t|normal]− nitEt[St+∆t + (1− lA − lB)Dt+∆t∆t|normal].
Taking limit ∆t→ 0 in the above expressions and using expansions similar to those
in the proof of Lemma 2, we obtain the number of stocks and the leverage per the
market value of stocks in equation (B29).
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Chapter 3
Information Acquisition with Long
Lived Assets
This paper studies information acquisition with a long-lived risky asset that gener-
ates dividends in each period. The investors can either be informed or uninformed,
and the informed investors actively acquire information on the time-varying dividend
growth rate. Informed investors take short positions in the variance swap to real-
ize their informational advantage; the uninformed investor takes a long position to
hedge his risks. Serial correlation of returns is decreasing in information acquisition
of informed investors. Low uncertainty induces investors to acquire less information
and decreases the cross-sectional dispersion of beliefs in expected returns.
Keywords: Information acquisition, Dividend growth, Variance swap, Rational
expectations equilibrium
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3.1. Introduction
Investors in financial markets acquire private signals on asset fundamentals and em-
ploy this information in their trading strategies. This fundamental value changes
over time and the value of old signals decays as time progresses. Therefore infor-
mation acquisition on this time-varying fundamental affects how asset returns are
correlated in time-series and cross-sectional dimensions. In this paper, I develop a
rational expectations model where investors endogenously acquire information and
trade a long-lived dividend-paying asset as well as a volatility derivative.
The economy is populated by a continuum of informed investors and a repre-
sentative uninformed investor. They trade a long-lived risky asset that generates
dividends in each period, and the growth rate of dividends consists of a time-varying
fundamental component and a noise component. The informed investors could ac-
quire private signals about the fundamental at a cost that is quadratic in signal
precision. Exogenous noisy supply of the asset prevents the price from fully reveal-
ing the fundamental. A variance swap that pays the difference between the realized
variance of the excess return and a fixed strike is also traded in this economy.
The uninformed investor learns from the realized dividend growth and changes
in prices. The informed investors have access to private signals in addition to the
information that is available to the uninformed investor. An informed investor’s
expected excess return is increasing in the difference between his estimate of the
dividend growth and that of the uninformed. Information acquisition leads to more
accurate estimates of the excess return and reduces asset volatility from the informed
investors’ perspective.
The informed investors possess an information advantage over the uninformed
investor and are willing to take short positions in the variance swap to profit from
this advantage. The uninformed investor takes a long position because the variance
swap insures his wealth against extreme movements of asset prices. In equilibrium,
both investors take up positions such that their marginal utility weighted risk-neutral
variances of returns are equal to the price of variance, measured by the strike of the
variance swap.
The informed investors choose a level of signal precision that equates the marginal
cost of information to the marginal value of information. The cost of information is
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quadratic and this limits the amount of information the investor is willing to acquire
in a single period. The value of information is increasing in uncertainty about the
fundamental dividend growth rate and noise trader demands. When uncertainty is
high, investors face better investment opportunities and acquire more precise private
signals as a result.
An investor’s unexpected return and future expected returns are both increas-
ing in the difference between the true value of the fundamental and this investor’s
estimate. This estimation error component contributes to positive serial correlation
in asset returns. Information acquisition reduces the magnitude of this component
and therefore decreases the autocorrelation of returns for the informed investors.
Highest cross-sectional dispersion of beliefs in asset returns is realized when in-
formation acquisition is at an intermediate level. When private signals are imprecise,
all informed investors’ estimates of both the return and the dividend growth are all
close to those of the uninformed investor. When investors acquire highly precise
private signals, all investors’ estimates of the dividend growth are close to its true
value. In both cases dispersion of beliefs is small. Lower uncertainty about the
fundamental decreases the value of information, induces investors to acquire less
information, and reduces the cross-sectional dispersion of beliefs.
This paper is related to an extensive literature on information acquisition in
financial markets, initiated by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Verrecchia (1982).
The model builds upon the dynamic asymmetric information asset pricing framework
developed by Wang (1993). That paper works with the assumption that informed
investors are endowed with perfect information about the fundamental component of
dividend growth. Wang (1993) solves the rational expectations equilibrium in closed
form, and demonstrates that information asymmetry among investors increases the
risk premium, price volatility, and negative autocorrelation in returns.
This paper instead allows investors to endogenously choose their signal preci-
sion. In equilibrium, no investor chooses to acquire perfectly informative signals
because the fundamental is time-varying and the value of old signals decays as time
progresses. Investors acquire different pieces of information and their sources of
private information are assumed to be independent, as in Hellwig (1980). This as-
sumption introduces cross-sectional dispersion of beliefs on expected returns among
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informed investors. In addition, the equilibrium is symmetric within the group of
informed investors if the cost of information acquisition is the same across investors.
This assumption facilitates the analytical solution of the model. If instead investors
are competing for the same stream of information, no equilibrium where informed
investors acquire the same precision of information can exist.
I further analyze the impact of information acquisition on the serial correlation of
returns and investors’ trading strategies. Both Wang (1993) and Brennan and Cao
(1996) find that uninformed investors behave as rational trend-followers, while more
informed investors follow a contrarian strategy. I establish a link between investors’
trading strategies and the amount of information they privately acquired. Because
information acquisition is affected by uncertainty, this analysis opens up a channel
between uncertainty and differences in trading strategies.
This paper introduces a volatility derivative market which facilitates risk-sharing
between informed and uninformed investors. The informed investors possess an
information advantage on asset returns and sell insurance-like variance swaps to
the uninformed investor. Brennan and Cao (1996) consider a model with one risky
asset realizing a terminal payoff and a quadratic derivative is written on it. They
found that the derivative does not reveal any additional information and effectively
completes the market. Chabakarui, Yuan and Zachariadis (2016) further extend
this result to economies without payoff normality. These papers assume that the
fundamental value stays the same over time, whereas in this model the fundamental
that investors acquire private signals on is time-varying. The market is not effectively
complete because dividend strips are not traded and a noise component of dividend
growth cannot be learned.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model setup. Section
3 characterizes the equilibrium, solves the signal precision choice for the informed in-
vestor, and solves the portfolio demands for both informed and uninformed investors.
Section 4 analyzes the impact of information acquisition on return autocorrelation
and cross-sectional dispersion of beliefs. Section 5 concludes.
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3.2. Model
I consider an infinite-horizon discrete time economy that features a single long-lived
risky asset. The asset generates dividend dt at date t and its ex-dividend price is
denoted by pt. The dividend growth consists of two components, one fundamental
component ft and one “noise” component dt+1 ∼ N (0, τ−1d ), where τd is a constant
precision parameter.
dt+1 − dt = ft + dt+1. (3.1)
The fundamental component of dividend growth is persistent. It follows an
AR(1) process and reverts to its long-run mean f . The speed of mean reversion is
represented by parameter λ.
ft+1 − ft = −λ(ft − f) + ft+1, ft+1 ∼ N (0, τ−1f ). (3.2)
Investors and Information Acquisition
The investors in the economy can be either informed or uninformed about the
fundamental component of dividend growth ft. There is a continuum of informed
investors indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] and a representative uninformed investor with a mass
of unity. Both types of investors learn from the time series of prices and dividends.
The informed investors have access to the public information and also have an
opportunity to acquire private signals. The signal at date t for investor i is repre-
sented by sit. The signal is acquired before trading starts and the investor could
employ this signal in his portfolio choice at date t. The precision of the private
signal ait is endogenously determined by the investor.
sit = ft + sit, sit ∼ N (0, a−1it ). (3.3)
New information comes at a cost that is quadratic in the signal precision. This
cost takes a quadratic form ka2it/2. The marginal cost of information kait is propor-
tional to the signal precision.
For simplicity, I assume that investors acquire different pieces of information and
their sources of private information are independent. The noises in private signals
sit are independent both over time and across investors.
Assets
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All investors have access to a risk-free storage technology with a constant rate
of return r. They can borrow and lend at this interest rate with no additional cost.
The excess return of the risky asset is (pt+1 − pt + dt+1) − rpt, which we denote as
ret+1.
Demand from the noise traders prevents the price from fully revealing the fun-
damental. Let zt denote the difference between the total supply of the risky asset
and its noisy demand. The residual supply zt has a long-run stationary level z:
zt+1 − zt = −λ(zt − z) + zt+1, zt+1 ∼ N (0, σ2z). (3.4)
There is a volatility derivative market in this economy, and the underlying asset
is the risky asset. At date t, investors could trade a one-period variance swap
exchanges the realized variance of the excess return (ret+1)2 for some fixed “strike”
vt at date t+ 1. vt is typically set to make the value of the payoff (ret+1)2−vt zero at
the initiation of the trade. The net supply of this one-period variance swap is zero.
Preferences and Investor Optimization
At date t, the representative uninformed investor allocates his wealth Wut to
cut units of consumption, θut units of the risky asset, and ψut units of one-period
variance swap. He invests the remaining Wut − cut − θutpt in the risk-free storage
technology. Let Wit represent the wealth of informed investor i before trading starts
but after the acquisition of information at date t. Similarly, his consumption and
portfolio choices are denoted by cit and (θit, ψit).
All investors have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preference with time
preference parameter ρ and risk aversion parameter A. They maximize their ex-
pected utilities:
Eut
[ ∞∑
s=t
− exp (−ρ(s− t)− Acus)
]
, (3.5)
Eit
[ ∞∑
s=t
− exp (−ρ(s− t)− Acis)
]
. (3.6)
subject to their self-financing budget constraints:
Wu,t+1 = (1 + r)(Wut − cut) + θutret+1 + ψut
[
(ret+1)2 − vt
]
, (3.7)
Wi,t+1 = (1 + r)(Wit − cit) + θitret+1 + ψit
[
(ret+1)2 − vt
]
− k2a
2
i,t+1. (3.8)
Definition of Equilibrium
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The definition of equilibrium is standard. Investors make the optimal portfolio
and signal precision choices and the market clears.
Definition 1. The equilibrium is a set of risky asset prices pt, variance swap strikes
vt, portfolio policies (θut, ψut) and (θit, ψit), and signal precision policies ait that solve
the optimization problem (3.5) and (3.6) for uninformed and informed investors and
clear the asset markets:
θut +
∫ 1
0
θitdi = zt, (3.9)
ψut +
∫ 1
0
ψitdi = 0. (3.10)
3.3. Characterization of Equilibrium
I characterize a stationary equilibrium in a three-step process similar to that of Wang
(1993). I first conjecture an equilibrium price function and derive investors’ belief
processes. Next, I solve the signal precision choices for the informed investors and
the portfolio choices for both informed and uninformed investors. Market clearing
is then imposed to pin down the coefficients in the conjectured price function.
3.3.1 Asset Price and Evolution of Beliefs
The uninformed investor learn from the entire history of prices and dividends. Let
f̂ut = Eut [ft] denote the expectation of the fundamental dividend growth rate by the
uninformed investor and τut = (Varut [ft])−1 denote the precision of this belief. In
contrast to Wang(1993), the informed investors do not directly observe the funda-
mental ft. They have access to private signals in addition to the information that is
available to the uninformed investor. I use τit = (Varit[ft])−1 to represent the belief
precision of investor i after information acquisition at date t, and f̂it = Eit[ft] to
represent the conditional expectation after incorporating the private signal sit.
The uninformed investor’s expectation of the present value of future dividends
is given by:
Eut
[ ∞∑
s=t+1
e−r(s−t)ds
]
= 1
r
dt +
1 + r
r(r + λ) f̂u +
(1 + r)λ
r2(r + λ)f (3.11)
The equilibrium price differs in two aspects from the above expression. Informed
investors also incorporate private signals in their trading strategies. Investor i’s asset
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demand is increasing in f̂it− f̂ut, the difference between his estimate of the dividend
growth rate and that of the uninformed. Because noises in informed investors’
private signals are independent, the average difference in beliefs between informed
and uninformed investors is equal to ft− f̂ut. As a result, the asset price is increasing
in the average difference in beliefs. The investors also demand a risk premium for
the risk involved in uncertain cash flows. This risk premium is larger when the
supply of the risky asset zt is higher.
Because investors have CARA preferences and all state variables are jointly nor-
mally distributed, we look for the equilibrium price in a form that is linear in the
average difference in beliefs ft − f̂ut and the asset supply zt:
pt =
1
r
dt +
1 + r
r(r + λ) f̂ut +
(1 + r)λ
r2(r + λ)f − b0 + bf (ft − f̂ut)− bz(zt − z). (3.12)
Coefficients bf and bz are both positive and respectively measure the sensitivity
of price to ft− f̂ut and zt. b0 represents the average discount of the asset price when
the average difference is zero and the asset supply is equal to its long-run stationary
level. Because f̂ut belongs to the information set of both informed and uninformed
investors, price pt is informationally equivalent to its sufficient statistic bfft − bzzt.
This sufficient statistic also belongs to both investors’ information set. This implies
that the uninformed investor’s expectation of this sufficient statistic Eut [bfft−bzzt] is
equal to its true value bfft−bzzt. As a result, the uninformed investor’s expectation
of the asset supply ẑut = Eut [zt] is given by:
ẑut = zt +
bf
bz
(f̂ut − ft). (3.13)
The uninformed investor updates his belief from both changes in prices and the
realized dividend growth. This belief is therefore affected by the shocks to asset
supply and the noise component of dividend growth. Lemma 1 reports how their
expectation and belief precision evolve. Proofs of all lemmas and propositions are
given in the appendix.
Lemma 1. The law of motion of the uninformed investor’s belief precision τut,
expectation of the dividend growth rate f̂ut, and expectation of asset supply ẑut are
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given by:
τu,t+1 =
[
(1− λ)2(τut + τd)−1 +
b2zτ
−1
f τ
−1
z
b2fτ
−1
f + b2zτ−1z
]−1
, (3.14)
f̂u,t+1 = λf + (1− λ) τut
τut + τd
f̂ut + (1− λ) τd
τut + τd
ft
+ (1− λ) τd
τut + τd
dt+1 +
bfτ
−1
f
b2fτ
−1
f + b2zτ−1z
(
bf
f
t+1 − bzzt+1
)
, (3.15)
ẑu,t+1 = λz + (1− λ) τut
τut + τd
ẑut + (1− λ) τd
τut + τd
zt
+ bf
bz
(1− λ) τd
τut + τd
dt+1 −
bzτ
−1
z
b2fτ
−1
f + b2zτ−1z
(
bf
f
t+1 − bzzt+1
)
. (3.16)
The uninformed investor’s belief precision is constant over time in a station-
ary equilibrium and I use τu to represent this constant level. The dynamics of
the informed investors’ expectations and belief precision are similar to that of the
uninformed investor and are provided in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. The law of motion of the informed investors i’s belief precision τit and
expectation f̂it are given by:
τi,t+1 =
[
(1− λ)2(τit + τd)−1 +
b2zτ
−1
f τ
−1
z
b2fτ
−1
f + b2zτ−1z
]−1
+ ai,t+1, (3.17)
f̂i,t+1 =
(
1− ai,t+1
τi,t+1
) [
λf + (1− λ) τit
τit + τd
f̂it + (1− λ) τd
τit + τd
ft
+(1− λ) τd
τu + τd
dt+1 +
bfτ
−1
f
b2fτ
−1
f + b2zτ−1z
(
bf
f
t+1 − bzzt+1
)]
+ ai,t+1
τi,t+1
(
ft+1 + si,t+1
)
. (3.18)
3.3.2 Portfolio and Signal Precision Choices
I start this section with analysis on investor’s investment opportunities, with focus
on the excess return of the asset ret+1 = pt+1 + dt+1 − (1 + r)pt. Because the asset
price depends on the uninformed investor’s estimate of the fundamental f̂ut, the
return also relies on the belief dynamics of the uninformed investors. Let bfu =
(1 + r)/r(r + λ) − bf denote the coefficient of f̂ut in the equilibrium price function
(3.12). From equations (3.12) and (3.15)-(3.18) I arrive at the excess return of the
asset and investors’ conditional expectations. Lemma 3 reports these results.
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Lemma 3. The excess return of the risky asset ret+1 is given by:
ret+1 = rb0 +
[
r + λ+ (1− λ) τd
τu + τd
]
bfu(ft − f̂ut) + (r + λ)bz(zt − z)
+
(1 + r
r
+ (1− λ) τd
τu + τd
bfu
)
dt+1 +
(
1 +
bfτ
−1
f
b2fτ
−1
f + b2zτ−1z
bfu
)(
bf
f
t+1 − bzzt+1
)
.
(3.19)
The expected excess return from the uninformed investor’s perspective is:
Eut [ret+1] = rb0 + (r + λ)bz(ẑut − z). (3.20)
For informed investor i, the expected excess return is:
Eit[ret+1] = rb0 +
[1 + r
r
+ (1− λ) τd
τu + τd
bfu
]
(f̂it − f̂ut) + (r + λ)bz(ẑut − z).
(3.21)
Similar to the asset price, the excess return ret+1 is increasing in the asset supply
zt and the average difference in beliefs between informed and uninformed investors
f − f̂ut. Both investors’ expected returns depend on their estimation of the asset
supply. From informed investor i’s perspective, the expected return is linear in the
difference between his estimate of the fundamental f̂it and that of the uninformed
investor f̂ut. The private signals acquired by the informed investors provide them a
more precise estimate of the time series of asset returns.
Let σ2ut = Varut [ret+1] denote the conditional variance of the excess return for the
uninformed investor and σ2it = Varit[ret+1] denote that for the informed investor. The
informed investors face less uncertainty compared to the uninformed investor, and
this difference is increasing in the amount of information they privately acquired.
Different beliefs about uncertainty provide the informed investors an incentive to
take short positions in the variance swap and the uninformed investor an incentive
to take a long position.
Consider the situation where I weight each outcome of the excess return by
one investor’s marginal utility. The resulting measure is this investor’s risk-neutral
distribution of ret+1, and I refer to the variance of this distribution as the risk-neutral
variance. In the absence of the variance swap market, the risk-neutral variances of
the excess return differ across investors. The introduction of the variance swap
market equalizes this difference.
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When the uninformed investor takes zero position in the variance swap market,
his risk-neutral variance is higher than the strike of variance swap vt. Therefore it is
profitable for him to take a long position to hedge extreme risks. Long positions in
the variance swap increase the utility when price movements are large and therefore
decreases the risk-neutral variance. The uninformed investor will continue to take
long positions until his risk-neutral variance is equal to the strike of the variance
swap. Similarly, the informed investors start with a risk-neutral variance lower than
the strike of variance swap and will continue to take short positions until their risk-
neutral variances reach vt. Thus vt represents the variance of the excess return for
all investors in their risk-neutral measures.
Now I investigate the optimization problem of the uninformed investor. The
only state variable that plays a role in this investor’s next period expected return is
his estimate of the asset supply ẑut. Furthermore, this state variable is Markovian
from the uninformed investor’s perspective. From equation (3.16), the conditional
expectation of ẑu,t+1 only relies on ẑut:
Eut [ẑu,t+1] = λz + (1− λ)ẑut. (3.22)
Therefore all information about future investment opportunities at date t is
summarized by ẑut. As a result, the value function of the uninformed investor only
depends on ẑut and not f̂ut.
With the above analysis in mind, I proceed to solve the uninformed investor’s
optimization problem. Proposition 1 reports the portfolio choice of the uninformed
investor.
Proposition 1. Let σ2uz = Varut [ẑu,t+1] denote the conditional variance of ẑu,t+1 and
ρurz = Corrut [ret+1, ẑu,t+1] denote the conditional correlation of ẑu,t+1 and ret+1. The
value function of the uninformed investor has the following form:
V (Wut, ẑut) = − exp
(
−rAWu,t − αuz2 (ẑut − z)
2 − βuz(ẑut − z)− γuz
)
. (3.23)
The uninformed investor’s demand for the risky asset is:
θut = (1 + α∗uzρ2urzσ2uz)
Eut [ret+1]
rAσ2ut
− [α∗uz(1− λ)(ẑut − z) + β∗uz]
ρurzσuz
rAσut
. (3.24)
where α∗uz and β∗uz are functions of αuz, βuz, ρiuz and σuz
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His position in the variance swap is given by:
ψut =
1
2rAvt
− (1 + α∗uzρ2urzσ2uz)
1
2rAσ2ut
. (3.25)
The myopic demand for the risky asset is determined by Eut [ret+1], which is linear
in the uninformed investor’s estimate of the supply ẑut. ẑut also naturally appears
in the investor’s hedging demand. Therefore the uninformed investor’s demand for
the risky asset is linear in ẑut.
If the variance swap is not traded, the risk-neutral variance of excess return for
the uninformed investor is equal to σ2ut/(1 + α∗uzρ2rzσ2z). ẑu,t+1 measures the next
period expected return of this asset and is correlated with the current period unex-
pected return ret+1 − Eut [ret+1]. The investor benefits from better future investment
opportunities when price movements are large. This increase in utility in these states
reduces the risk-neutral variance to a level below that in the objective physical mea-
sure σ2ut. The investor takes positions in the variance swap if σ2ut/(1 + α∗uzρ2rzσ2z) is
different from the strike vt and the demand is given by equation (3.25).
Next I look at the portfolio choice of the informed investors. Different from that
of the uninformed investor, the expected excess return of the informed investors
consists of two components: difference in belief f̂it−f̂ut and the uninformed investor’s
estimate of asset supply ẑut. A high precision of belief provides an accurate estimate
of the current period excess return. It also translates into precise predictions about
future investment opportunities. The dynamics of both f̂it − f̂ut and ẑut rely on
investor i’s estimate of ft:
Eit[f̂i,t+1 − f̂u,t+1] = (1− λ)
τu
τu + τd
(f̂it − f̂ut), (3.26)
Eit[ẑu,t+1] = z + (1− λ)(ẑut − z) + (1− λ)
τd
τu + τd
bf
bz
(f̂it − f̂ut). (3.27)
All information about future investment opportunities at date t is summarized
by f̂it − f̂ut and ẑut , and both state variables enter the informed investors value
function. In this model, Wit represents the date t wealth before trading but after
the acquisition of information. I similarly define the value function as the investor’s
expected utility after the incorporation of the private signal into his belief. The
value function and the portfolio choice of the informed investors are provided in
Proposition 2.
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Proposition 2. Let σ2iz = Varit[ẑu,t+1] and σ2if = Varit[f̂it − f̂ut] denote informed in-
vestor i’s conditional variances. Let ρirz = Corrit[ret+1, ẑu,t+1] and ρirf = Corrit[ret+1, f̂i,t+1−
f̂u,t+1] denote the conditional correlations. The value function of the informed in-
vestor i has the following form:
V (Wut, ẑut, f̂it − f̂ut, τit) = − exp
(
−rAWit − αz2 (ẑut − z)
2 − αfτit2 (f̂it − f̂ut)
2
−αzf (ẑut − z)(f̂it − f̂ut)− βz(ẑut − z)− βf (f̂it − f̂ut)− γ(τit)
)
.
(3.28)
The uninformed investor’s demand for the risky asset is:
θit =
(
1 + α∗zρ2irzσ2iz + α∗fτi,t+1ρ2irfσ2if + 2α∗zfρirzρirfσizσif
) Eut [ret+1]
rAσ2ut
,
−
[
α∗z Eit[ẑu,t+1 − z] + α∗zf Eit[f̂i,t+1 − f̂u,t+1] + β∗z
] ρirzσiz
rAσit
−
[
α∗zf Eit[ẑu,t+1 − z] + α∗fτi,t+1 Eit[f̂i,t+1 − f̂u,t+1] + β∗f
] ρirfσif
rAσit
. (3.29)
His position in the variance swap is given by:
ψit =
1
2rAvt
−
(
1 + α∗zρ2irzσ2iz + α∗fτi,t+1ρ2irfσ2if + 2α∗zfρirzρirfσizσif
) 1
2rAσ2it
. (3.30)
Informed investor i’s demand for the risky asset is linear in the two state variables
ẑut and f̂it − f̂ut. The investor’s position on the variance swap ψit depends on both
the strike vt and his risk-neutral variance in the absence of the variance market.
Last I come to the informed investors’ information acquisition choices. Because
of normal distribution and CARA preference, the signal precision choices do not
depend on the level of wealth or previous estimates of the asset supply ẑu,t−1 or
the fundamental f̂i,t−1− f̂u,t−1. The value function V (Wut, ẑut, f̂it− f̂ut, τit) given in
Proposition 2 represents investor i’s expected utility after the acquisition of infor-
mation. At the beginning of date t, investor i chooses the precision of his private
signal ait to maximize this objective. Investor i’s belief precision τit follows the law
of motion given in Lemma 2 and maps one-to-one to ait:
τit =
[
(1− λ)2(τi,t−1 + τd)−1 +
b2zτ
−1
f τ
−1
z
b2fτ
−1
f + b2zτ−1z
]−1
+ ait (3.31)
Therefore the problem could be reformulated a choice of the optimal τit. This
belief precision choice determines the distribution of the state variable f̂it − f̂ut.
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Substituting the expression of f̂it − f̂ut into the value function (3.28), integrating
over the realization of the private signal sit, and differentiating with respect to τit:
∂
∂τit
V (Wut, ẑut, f̂it − f̂ut, τit) = V (Wut, ẑut, f̂it − f̂ut, τit)
[
αf
2 +
βf
2τit
+ γ′(τit)
]
.
(3.32)
The above expression gives the marginal value of information in terms of util-
ity. The cost of information in terms of wealth is ka2it/2 and the marginal cost of
information is kait. In equilibrium, the investor selects a signal precision level that
equalizes the value of information with the cost of information:
ait =
1
k
[
αf
2 +
βf
2τit
+ γ′(τit)
]
. (3.33)
There is a limit to how much information the investor is willing to acquire. The
cost of information is quadratic in this setup, and it is prohibitively expensive to
acquire a large amount of information in a short time. In addition, the marginal
value of information is decreasing in the investor’s belief precision τit. Even if the
investor pushes this precision to infinity, his utility is still finite and bounded from
above. Two factors contribute to this result. First, the noise component in dividend
growth dt+1 is assumed to be unlearnable. An investor endowed with complete
information about the fundamental component of dividend growth would still face
investment risks. Second, the value of a signal on the fundamental at a given date
decreases as time progresses. The fundamental ft also evolves over time and signals
on past values could not by itself contribute to an accurate estimate of the current
value.
The analysis focuses on a stationary equilibrium where belief and signal precision
are all constant over time. It is still helpful to intuitively think about what will
happen if the informed investors’ belief precision start at a level different from that
in the stationary equilibrium. If the informed investors are endowed with more
information, the marginal value of information will be smaller and investors will
acquire less information compared to the stationary level. Conversely, investors will
acquire more information if they start with less precise beliefs. As time progresses,
investors’ belief and signal precision will converge to the stationary level.
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3.3.3 Market Clearing
First I analyze equilibrium in the variance swap market. The equilibrium is sym-
metric within the group of informed investors: belief precision τit, signal precision
ait, and all conditional correlations and variances ρirz, ρirf , σ2iz and σ2if are constant
across investors. The reason is that the cost of information is the same and that
realizations of belief and private signals do not affect precision in a normal distri-
bution setup. As a result, the risk-neutral variance in the absence of the variance
swap is the same for all informed investors. Their positions in the variance swap are
also the same from equation (3.30).
The informed and uninformed investors have equal mass and take opposite po-
sitions in the variance swap. Substituting (3.30) and (3.25) into (3.10):
ψut =
1
2
[
(1 + α∗uzρ2urzσ2uz)
1
2σ2ut
−
(
1 + α∗zρ2irzσ2iz + α∗fτi,t+1ρ2irfσ2if + 2α∗zfρirzρirfσizσif
) 1
2σ2it
]
,
(3.34)
ψit = −ψut, (3.35)
vt =
[
(1 + α∗uzρ2urzσ2uz)
1
2σ2ut
+
(
1 + α∗zρ2irzσ2iz + α∗fτi,t+1ρ2irfσ2if + 2α∗zfρirzρirfσizσif
) 1
2σ2it
]−1
(3.36)
The strike of the variance swap vt is equal to the harmonic mean of two groups of
investors’ risk-neutral variances without variance swaps. The uninformed investor
takes a long position in the variance swap market and the informed investors take
short positions. Long positions decrease investors’ risk-neutral variances and the
converse happens for short positions. In equilibrium, the risk-neutral variances for
both informed and uninformed are equal to vt.
Next, I impose market clearing for the risky asset itself. Because the equilibrium
is symmetric within the group of informed investors, their asset demands (3.29) can
be simplified to the following expression:
θit = h0 + hf (f̂it − f̂ut) + hz(ẑut − z). (3.37)
where h0, hf , and hz are constants and do not depend on the index of the investor.
Similarly for the uninformed investor:
θit = hu0 + huz(ẑut − z). (3.38)
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The average of difference in beliefs f̂it − f̂ut is equal to f − f̂ut. From (3.13),
f − f̂ut = bz(zt − ẑut)/bf . Substituting (3.37) and (3.38) into (3.9):
zt =
∫ 1
0
θitdi+ θut
= h0 + hu0 + hf (ft − f̂ut) + (hz + huz)(ẑut − z)
= h0 + hu0 + hf · bz
bf
(zt − ẑut) + (hz + huz)(ẑut − z) (3.39)
Comparing both sides of the equation:
hz + huz = 1, (3.40)
bz
bf
· hf = 1, (3.41)
h0 + hu0 = z. (3.42)
The above system of equations allows me to numerically pin down the coefficients
in the conjectured equilibrium price function (3.12). I start from an initial guess of
bf and bz and proceed to solve the uninformed investor’s value function and portfolio
demands. The uninformed investor’s belief precision is solved by setting τu,t+1 equal
to τut in equation (3.14).
The informed investors’ belief precision and signal precision satisfy two equa-
tions: the law of motion of beliefs (3.17) and the information acquisition decision
(3.33). In the former equation, the stationary level of belief precision is increasing in
the amount of information acquired. In the latter equation, higher belief precision
reduces the value of information and thus the signal precision. This system of equa-
tions for τit and ait thus have a unique solution given bf and bz. The asset demand
equations (3.40) and (3.41) then determine bf and bz and then (3.42) determines the
average discount of the asset price b0.
3.4. Analysis of Equilibrium
I investigate how information acquisition influences return autocorrelation and cross-
sectional dispersion of beliefs in this section. I first analyze how uncertainty affects
information acquisition. In section 4.1, I study the serial correlation of returns
for both informed and uninformed investors. In section 4.2, I study the cross-
sectional dispersion of beliefs among the informed investors. All results come from
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comparative statics analysis and do not involve the motion towards a new stationary
equilibrium. A fully dynamic model where information acquisition endogenously
reacts to exogenous news shocks would be a good direction for future research.
The fundamental that investors acquire private signals on is time-varying in this
model. In a setup where the fundamental value stays the same over time, information
acquisition is determined by uncertainty about the fundamental which is measured
by its risk-neutral variance. No such simple relationship exists in this setup, because
not all components of asset returns can be learned and information acquired today
also plays a role in future portfolio decisions.
However, uncertainty about the fundamental dividend growth and supply shocks
is still the primary driving force behind investors’ information acquisition. The
value of information is increasing in the innovation variance of the fundamental τ−1f .
When the noise trader demands are more volatile, investors face better investment
opportunities and they could expect to realize higher profits from the same piece of
information.
Investors acquire more information in response to higher uncertainty and this
mitigates the initial impact of uncertainty on asset volatility. Compared to the
case where private signals with fixed precision are received, the informed investors
in this high uncertainty situation have a more precise belief and thus trade more
aggressively in the asset market. As a result, asset prices become more informative
about the fundamental and future expected return. This is reflected in the variance
swap market with a lower level of risk-neutral variance or strike vt.
3.4.1 Serial Correlation of Returns
The uninformed investor’s unexpected return in the current period consists of 3
components: the difference between the true value of fundamental and his estimate
ft − f̂ut, the noise component of dividend growth dt+1, and innovations in dividend
growth and asset supply bfft+1 − bzzt+1:
ret+1 − Eut [ret+1] =
(1 + r
r
+ (1− λ) τd
τu + τd
bfu
)
(ft − f̂ut)
+
(1 + r
r
+ (1− λ) τd
τu + τd
bfu
)
dt+1 +
(
1 +
bfτ
−1
f
b2fτ
−1
f + b2zτ−1z
bfu
)(
bf
f
t+1 − bzzt+1
)
.
(3.43)
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The next period expected return Eut+1[ret+2] also consists of its date t expectation
Eut [ret+2] and these three components:
Eut+1[ret+2] = Eut [ret+2] + (r + λ)(1− λ)
τd
τu + τd
(ft − f̂ut)
+ (r + λ)(1− λ) τu
τu + τd
bf
d
t+1 − (r + λ)
b2zτ
−1
z
b2fτ
−1
f + b2zτ−1z
(
bf
f
t+1 − bzzt+1
)
.
(3.44)
Both ft − f̂ut and dt+1 components contribute to positive autocorrelation in re-
turns. When price and dividend news indicate that dividend growth is likely to be
above his current expectation, the investor revises his beliefs upwards and this leads
to persistence. The bfft+1− bzzt+1 term on the contrary contributes to negative au-
tocorrelation in returns. Supply shocks that lead to a positive return in the current
period are expected to reverse itself in future periods.
Positive serial correlation from the estimation error in the fundamental ft − f̂ut
decays more quickly compared to the negative serial correlation from supply shocks.
From equation (3.4), the asset supply zt reverts to its mean at a speed of 1−λ. The
estimation error ft − f̂ut, however, reverts at a faster speed (1− λ)τu/(τu + τd):
ft+1 − f̂u,t+1 = (1− λ) τu
τu + τd
(ft − f̂ut)
+ ft+1 − (1− λ)
τd
τut + τd
dt+1 −
bfτ
−1
f
b2fτ
−1
f + b2zτ−1z
(
bf
f
t+1 − bzzt+1
)
(3.45)
As the horizon increases, positive autocorrelation from the estimation error be-
comes weaker in comparison with negative autocorrelation from supply shocks.
Therefore returns are more likely to exhibit reversal at long horizons.
The informed investor i’s unexpected return is given by:
ret+1 − Eit[ret+1] =
(1 + r
r
+ (1− λ) τd
τu + τd
bfu
)
(ft − f̂it)
+
(1 + r
r
+ (1− λ) τd
τu + τd
bfu
)
dt+1 +
(
1 +
bfτ
−1
f
b2fτ
−1
f + b2zτ−1z
bfu
)(
bf
f
t+1 − bzzt+1
)
.
(3.46)
This investor’s next period expected return also has the form:
Eit+1[ret+2] = Eit[ret+2] + ei(ft − f̂it) + esst+1 + eddt+1 + efft+1 + ezzt+1.
where ei, es, ed, ef , and es are constant coefficients and ei is positive.
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Both the unexpected return and next period expected return are increasing in
estimation error of the informed investor ft − f̂it. The variance of this component
τ−1it is smaller than that of the uninformed investor τ−1ut . Therefore this component
contributes less to positive serial correlation for the informed investors compared to
the uninformed. Information acquisition increases the discrepancy of return auto-
correlation between the beliefs of informed and uninformed investors.
Within the group of informed investors, the autocorrelation of returns is decreas-
ing in information acquisition. The variance of ft − f̂it is decreasing in the amount
of information acquired. In addition, the incentive to learn from prices and divi-
dends is smaller when investors have accurate private signals. In the limit where
informed investors have complete knowledge about the fundamental, the estimation
error ft − f̂it becomes zero, and this component ceases to exist.
Information acquisition also has an impact on informed investors’ trading be-
havior. Consider an informed investor who has infinitesimal mass and no impact on
the equilibrium asset prices. When this investor acquires imprecise private signals,
his trading strategies is similar to that of the uninformed investor. An unexpected
price increase corresponds to an upward revision of belief and leads to increased de-
mand for risky assets. On the contrary, if this investor’s private signals are precise,
high return today correspond to lower expected returns in the future and therefore
decreases his asset demand. Investors with more information adopt a contrarian
strategy while those with less information behave like trend followers.
3.4.2 Cross-sectional Dispersion of Beliefs
Cross-sectional dispersion measures the extent to which individual investor’s ex-
pected return diverge from the market average. The expected return of investor i
given by equation (3.21) is linear in f̂it− f̂ut, the difference in beliefs between herself
and the uninformed investor. The variance of the expected return across different
investors is equal to:
Var(Eit[ret+1]) =
(1 + r
r
+ (1− λ) τd
τu + τd
bfu
)2
· Var(f̂it) (3.47)
where the cross-section variance of belief f̂it is
Var(f̂it) =
τit − τu
τ 2it
(3.48)
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Var(f̂it) is an inverted-U shaped function of the informed investors’ precision τit.
Highest dispersion is realized when information acquisition is at an intermediate
level. When there is no learning from private signals, the informed investors have
the same information set as the uninformed investor and all investors’ estimates of
the dividend growth rate are equal to f̂ut. When the private signals are infinitely
precise, all informed investors’ estimates are equal to ft. In both cases there is no
dispersion of beliefs.
Low uncertainty about the fundamental almost always decreases the cross-sectional
dispersion of beliefs. All investors form their belief using the information that is
publicly available. In this situation, the time series of prices and dividends already
provide relatively accurate information about the dividend growth rate. Lower un-
certainty also decreases the value of information and induces investors to acquire
less accurate private signals. The difference of precision between informed and un-
informed investors τit − τut is small relative to τut in this case, and all informed
investors’ estimates will be close to that of the uninformed.
3.5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I develop a rational expectations model with endogenous information
acquisition where investors trade a long-lived dividend-paying asset and a volatility
derivative. The analysis starts with the conjectured price function (3.12) from which
I derive the evolution of beliefs for both informed and uninformed investors. The
expected excess return of informed investors is linear in the difference between his
estimate of the dividend growth and that of the uninformed. Information acquisition
increases the precision of belief about asset returns and reduces volatility.
The uninformed investor possesses less information and feels that investment in
the asset is riskier. He takes a long position in the variance swap to insure against
extreme price movements. This long position drives up the price of the variance,
measured by the strike of the variance swap. The informed investors believe that
the variance of asset returns is smaller and find it profitable to take short positions
in the variance swap.
Uncertainty about the fundamental increases the value of information and in-
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duces more information acquisition. The serial correlation of returns for more in-
formed investors is smaller and they adopt a contrarian trading strategy. Low un-
certainty about the fundamental, on the other hand, induces investors to acquire
less information and reduces the cross-sectional dispersion of beliefs in asset returns.
This paper opens up interesting directions for future research. A non-normal
setup would allow the level of expectation to affect the conditional variances and cor-
relations in investors’ beliefs, which create cross-sectional dispersion in the value of
information and amount of information investors acquire. Alternatively, a fully dy-
namic model where information acquisition endogenously reacts to exogenous news
shocks would be a good setup to study the impact of FOMC and other macroeco-
nomic announcements on VIX and the risk premium.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
The dynamics of fundamental ft could be rewritten as:
ft+1 = λf + (1− λ)ft + ft+1. (A1)
The expectations of ft and ft+1 conditional on the date t+ 1 information set of
the uninformed investor are given by:
Eut+1[ft] =
τut
τut + τd
f̂ut +
τd
τut + τd
(
ft + dt+1
)
, (A2)
Eut+1[
f
t+1] =
bfτ
−1
f
b2fτ
−1
f + b2zτ−1z
(
bf
f
t+1 − bzzt+1
)
. (A3)
Substituting (A2) and (A3) into (A1), I obtain (3.15).
From equation (3.13),
ẑu,t+1 = zt +
bf
bz
(f̂u,t+1 − ft+1). (A4)
Substituting (A1) and (3.15) into (A4), I obtain (3.16).
Proof of Lemma 2.
If we limit the information set to investor i’s date t information and date t + 1
price and dividend, the conditional expectation of ft+1 is given by:
Ei[ft+1|f̂it, pt+1, dt+1] = λf + (1− λ) τit
τit + τd
f̂it + (1− λ) τd
τit + τd
ft
+ (1− λ) τd
τu + τd
dt+1 +
bfτ
−1
f
b2fτ
−1
f + b2zτ−1z
(
bf
f
t+1 − bzzt+1
)
.
(A5)
The noise si,t+1 in signal si,t+1 is independent from f̂it, pt+1, and dt+1. Investor
i’s estimate of ft+1 given his full information set at date t+1 is the weighted average
of Ei[ft+1|f̂it, pt+1, dt+1] and signal si,t+1:
Eit+1[ft+1] =
τi,t+1 − ai,t+1
τi,t+1
Ei[ft+1|f̂it, pt+1, dt+1] + ai,t+1
τi,t+1
si,t+1. (A6)
Substituting (A5) into (A6), I obtain (3.18).
Proof of Lemma 3.
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Substituting (3.12) and (3.15) into ret+1 = pt+1 + dt+1− (1 + r)pt, I obtain (3.19).
Eut [ret+1] = rb0 +
[
r + λ+ (1− λ) τd
τu + τd
]
bfu(Eut [ft]− f̂ut) + (r + λ)bz(Eut [zt]− z)
(A7)
From definition Eut [ft]− f̂ut = 0, Eut [zt] = ẑut. The above equation is equivalent
to (3.20).
For informed investor i:
Eit[ret+1] = rb0 +
[
r + λ+ (1− λ) τd
τu + τd
]
bfu(Eit[ft]− f̂ut) + (r + λ)bz(Eit[zt]− z)
= rb0 +
[
r + λ+ (1− λ) τd
τu + τd
]
bfu(f̂it − f̂ut) + (r + λ)bz(ẑit − ẑut) + (r + λ)bz(ẑut − z)
= rb0 +
[
r + λ+ (1− λ) τd
τu + τd
]
bfu(f̂it − f̂ut) + (r + λ)bz bf
bz
(f̂it − f̂ut) + (r + λ)bz(ẑut − z)
= rb0 +
[1 + r
r
+ (1− λ) τd
τu + τd
bfu
]
(f̂it − f̂ut) + (r + λ)bz(ẑut − z). (A8)
This is equation (3.21). The third equality comes from the fact that the sufficient
statistic bfft− bzzt belongs to both informed and uninformed investors’ information
set.
Eit[bfft − bzzt] = bfft − bzzt = Eut [bfft − bzzt] (A9)
Proof of Proposition 1.
The value function at date t+ 1 is given by:
V (Wu,t+1, ẑu,t+1) = − exp
(
−rAWut + rAcut − rAθutret+1 − rAψut
(
(ret+1)2 − vt
)
−αuz2 (ẑu,t+1 − z)
2 − βuz(ẑu,t+1 − z)− γuz
)
. (A10)
I decompose ẑu,t+1 − z into 3 components:
ẑu,t+1 − z = (1− λ)(ẑut − z) + ρurzσuz
σut
(ret+1 − Eut (ret+1)) + ̂u,t+1. (A11)
The first component is the conditional expectation of ẑu,t+1. The second component
is linear in the unexpected component of excess return. The third component ̂u,t+1
is orthogonal to the second component and its mean is equal to zero.
Substituting (A11) into (A10) and integrating over ̂u,t+1, I arrive at the condi-
tional expectation of value function given ret+1. Solving this optimization problem,
I obtain (3.24) and (3.25).
The proof of Proposition 2 is similar to that of Proposition 1.
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